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How, why and under what conditions do new racial categories form? This dissertation examines 
the construction of South and Southeast Asian migrants (tongnama) as a new racial category in 
South Korea: a country in a continent long neglected within studies of race. Through 
ethnographic research on foreign migrant workers and marriage immigrants in South Korea, it 
was discovered that a new racial category has emerged. Tongnama has become an umbrella term 
to refer to migrants from Southeast Asian countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Indonesia, but also from South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka. My findings show that several elements contribute to the racial formation of tongnama 
migrants: the Korean State, Korean culture, gender and patriarchy, and the Korean split labour 
market. To be specific, exploitative capitalist practices in the Korean labour market and state-
facilitated gendered recruitment of foreign brides shape and reshape South Koreans’ 
understanding of this new racial category. At the same time, the racial formation of South and 
Southeast Asian migrants emerges out of a need by Koreans to understand their country’s 
position within contemporary international migration flows. Building upon Omi and Winant’s 
racial formation theory, my findings demonstrate that racial formation in South Korea shares 
similar racial logics with racial formation in European and white settler countries; such as an 
emphasis on the physical characteristics of groups, race as a group position, and a gendered 
racialization process. Yet, my findings also suggest that racial formation taking place in South 
Korea exhibits a different trajectory from Euro-American racial formation, which emerged 
alongside slavery, colonialism, and (neo) imperialism. This dissertation thus attempts to explain 
the dynamics of contemporary race and racial formation in a non-‘Western’ context. I argue that 
in South Korea, migrants’ countries of origin and the economic developmental status of these 
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nations within the global economic order appears to be a critical factor in racial formation, which 
is essential to Koreans’ perception of a global racial hierarchy. Therefore, the case of South 
Korea contributes to theories of race by emphasizing the importance of contemporary economic 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: How Economic Migration Contributes to Racial 
Formation 
On an afternoon in 2013, I was in a taxi heading to a foreign worker’s welfare center 
located in the middle of a huge industrial complex near Seoul, South Korea. The taxi driver 
looked surprised upon hearing of my destination and responded by telling me that this 
neighbourhood was dirty and dangerous because there were so many oegukin (foreigners) 
working and living there. He was concerned for my safety as a woman and advised me to 
reschedule my meeting in a café or a restaurant in the city center. He added, those foreigners are 
mostly Chinese and tongnama (South and Southeast Asian) migrant workers. 
 While the word oegukin is still broadly used to refer to any non-Korean person in South 
Korea, the term tongnama is increasingly used to refer specifically to marriage immigrants and 
foreign migrant workers from South and Southeast Asian countries, who came to South Korea 
for work and to build families. In the Korean vernacular, tongnama was once a geographical 
term associated with the Southeast Asian region, but today tongnama is more commonly used in 
the media and by laypersons to refer to the thousands of foreign brides and foreign migrant 
workers who have moved to South Korea since the 1990s. The meaning and boundary of this 
social category may appear to indicate the geographical and national origins of these migrants; 
however, my research findings show that tongnama operates as a racial category that is marked 
by physical traits (brown skin, round eyes, small body) and cultural traits. It privileges South 
Koreans as a superior cultural and racial category while simultaneously subordinating 
immigrants and migrants from South and Southeast Asian countries.  
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Therefore, this dissertation examines the construction of tongnama as a new racial 
category in South Korea. This new racial category has emerged only in the past two decades 
since South Korea became a migrant-receiving country. Interestingly tongnama’s literal meaning 
is the region or people of Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia, but this term also includes South Asian countries, such as Pakistan, 
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. 
The racialization of South and Southeast Asian migrants is linked to how Koreans create 
racial hierarchies to understand their position within new international migration flows toward 
more industrialized Asian countries, such as South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Taiwan. Racial categories in contemporary South Korea are continuously adjusting their 
boundaries due to increasing intra-regional migration and a growing second-generation of the 
immigrant population. The racialization of South and Southeast Asian migrants as one category 
reflects "the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social 
practice or group" (Omi and Winant [1986] 2014:111). This process is systemically supported by 
the South Korean state and by individual actions of Koreans. Thus, the racialization of tongnama 
also reflects a broader process of a “racial formation” (ibid), which is shaped by the macro-level 
social structure of inequalities with those of micro-level signifying actions. The content and 
importance of racial categories, argued Omi and Winant (ibid) in their analysis of racial 
formations, are socially constructed and reconstructed by social, economic and political forces. 
Yet, the process of racial formation taking place in South Korea exhibits a different 
trajectory from Euro-American racial formation. As scholars point out, the content of race and 
the process of racialization is historically and locally specific (Omi and Winant [1994] 2014, 
Miles and Brown [1989] 2003). In the U.S, the racial issues are still profoundly affected by the 
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history of slavery even after the massive influx of immigrants. On the other hand, in Europe, 
racism is more often perceived as the consequence of colonialism than slavery (Miles and Brown 
[1989] 2003).  
While the legacy of European colonialism, American imperialism, and slavery is still 
influential in shaping the concept of race and racial hierarchies, new intra-regional migration 
flows in the Asia region - often characterized as marriage and labour migration towards more 
industrialized Asian countries (Constable 1997, Suzuki 2005, Lan 2008, Kim 2014, Cheng and 
Choo 2015) - require new approaches to the understanding of race. How can we understand the 
racial formation of South and Southeast Asian migrants in a country like South Korea: a 
latecomer to global capitalism, a society in dramatic transition from the traditional to the modern, 
and a people who believe that they are racial/imperial victims vis-à-vis “the West”? 
 To understand the racial formation of South and Southeast Asian migrants in South Korea, 
this dissertation takes into account two interrelated factors that shape dynamics of race and 
migration: South Korea's new position as a migrant-receiving country in international migration, 
and patriarchy as a system of organizing gender and migration flows. These two key sources 
illuminate how the concept of race and racial hierarchy can be shaped by exploitative capitalist 
practices regarding foreign migrant workers and state-facilitated gendered recruitment of foreign 
brides as the main body of immigrants. The state and its institutions play crucial roles as macro 
social forces in shaping the category and concept of race (Omi and Winant [1986] 2014). 
However, it is necessary to note that the construction of race does not happen separately at either 
the macro level or the micro level. Race   is constructed not only through institutions such as the 
state apparatus, education, law or citizenship, but also through the cultural representation and 
everyday experiences of individuals (Omi and Winant [1986] 2014, Wimmer 2008, Roth 2012). 
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Thus, it is important to examine the dialectical process of racialization, from institutions and 
policy aspects to individuals’ everyday experiences. 
 Although Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory provides the analytical framework to 
examine racial formation of tongnama migrants in South Korea, it still focuses on locally 
specific cases within white settler countries, such as the U. S, Brazil, and South Africa. Thus, the 
main findings of this dissertation suggest that updating and revising Omi and Winant’s racial 
formation theory with a case study of South Korea provides a powerful framework to rethink 
race and racial hierarchies as one of the main forms of inequality in a contemporary global 
context.  
By revisiting the discussion of the political economy of race, which Miles and Brown 
([1989] 2003) and Winant (2001) have importantly analyzed, and the role of patriarchy in the 
creation of racial hierarchies (Glenn 1999, Stoler 2002), this dissertation explores how the 
political economy of race and patriarchy work into the process of racial formation of South and 
Southeast Asian migrants. This dissertation also discusses how race gains its cultural meaning 
through references to other forms of inequalities on a national and global scale. Finally, this 
dissertation examines how making a new racial category is crucial for South Korea in 
reconstructing racial hierarchies on a global scale.   
 Racialization is a part of racial formation (Omi and Winant [1986] 2014), and racialization 
can take place on multiple scales and in multiple spaces. It happens in the workplace, family, 
media, education system, and even on the street. Methodologically, then, this research focuses on 
multiple scales from individuals’ subjective understanding, everyday interactions, structured 
practices, to state policies that occur in diverse spaces of workplace, family, and neighbourhood. 
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1.1 Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
1.1.1 What Role Does Migration Play in Racial Formation? 
With the growth in international migration over the last three decades, immigration scholars 
argue that the concept of race and racial inequality are central to understanding the dynamics of 
migration and settlement (Espiritu 2003, Cornell and Hartmann 2004, N. Kim 2008, Roth 2012). 
In America, for example, race-based immigration quotas blocked the entry of Africans, Asians, 
and Latin Americans until the 1950s and 1960s. African-Americans were racialized as ‘Black’ 
due to the historical legacy of slavery, and racial segregation restricted their public activities. 
When race-based quotas were dismantled in the 1960s, and the American population became 
more racially diverse, racist portrayals fused into concerns over the social integration of 
immigrants. Sociological inquiries focused on how well or not well certain groups assimilated 
(Alba and Nee 2009), what factors shaped the “segmented assimilation” of the second generation 
(Portes and Zhou 1993), and reasons why certain groups experienced downward assimilation 
(Waters 1999).  
Scholars ascribed the success or failure of particular racial and ethnic groups to traits that 
were assumed intrinsic to that ethnic/racial culture (Ogbu 1974, Lewis 1975, Herberg 1989). For 
example, Black and Latina women were stereotyped as welfare queens and associated with a 
culture that lacked a work ethic (Hancock 2004). Asians, on the other hand, were stereotyped as 
a model minority (Lee 1996). Their educational and economic attainments were explained as the 
result of unique Asian cultural values (Lee 1996, Tuan 1998). Thus, the nexus between racial 
formation and migration is central to understanding the experiences of stigmatized racial groups. 
Such interconnections historically took place in the context of colonialism, slavery, and 
capitalism, which were the main macro-structural motivations towards constructing categories of 
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race and accelerating racial discrimination throughout modern history (Wacquant 1997, Miles 
and Brown [1989] 2003, Omi and Winant [1986] 2014).  
 In contrast to the wealth of studies focusing on racial formation in western ‘settler’ 
societies, East Asia has long been neglected in studies of race. This is likely because academic 
studies of race heavily concentrate on the history and legacy of American slavery and European 
colonialism. The concept of race and racial formation has thus been much less examined in East 
Asian countries. Considered racially homogenous, East Asia is not typically viewed as a place 
where race operates as an organizing principle of social inequality (Diko¨tter 1992, Takezawa 
2005).   
However, since the 1980s, large economic disparities between countries transformed 
South and Southeast Asian countries into major exporters of migrants to Japan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, China and South Korea (Constable 1997, Suzuki 2005, Lan 2008, M. Kim 
2014, Cheng and Choo 2015). Migration to industrialized Asian countries is characterized as 
labour and marriage migration. As these industrialized Asian countries assume their new position 
as migrant-receiving nations, ethnic and racial discrimination against labour and marriage 
migrants draw increasing public and academic attention (Lan 2008, Constable 2009, Lie 2014). 
In South Korea, for example, foreign migrant workers from South and Southeast Asia, and 
China, who work with only limited contracts for minimum wages in manufacturing, 
construction, agriculture, or service industries, are located at the bottom of the social stratum 
(Gray 2004).  
In the Asian region, migration scholars (Constable 1997, Suzuki 2005, Lan 2008) point 
out that feminization of migration, which refers to an increasing number of women are seeking 
work in different types of occupations in foreign countries, is one of the prominent 
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characteristics of migration from South and Southeast Asia to industrialized East Asian 
countries. In South Korea, interestingly, feminization of migration happens through marriage 
migration more than through labour migration. These female marriage migrants are supposed to 
take the role of primary care-giver and child bearer in order to reproduce and to maintain the 
family, which is often seen as the basic unit of society (Freeman 2005, M. Kim 2014, H. Kim 
2014).         
Glenn (1992: 30) observed "the racial division of reproduction labor" in the United 
States, where "class-privileged women free themselves of the mental, emotional, and manual 
labor needed for the creation and recreation of people as cultural and social, as well as physical 
beings by hiring low-paid women of color." Building on the racial division of reproduction 
labour, Parrenas (2000) argues that in the international division of reproductive labour, 
hierarchies are formed between class-privileged white women in Europe and domestic workers 
who migrated for low-paid jobs from the so-called Third World.  
In marriage migration, especially in the East Asian region, reproductive labour and 
unpaid care-work are considered the duty and responsibility of female marriage migrants, who 
are expected to perform the role of a good mother and a good wife.  Piper and Roces (2005) 
argue that while migrant women in the Asia-Pacific region often use migration as a means to 
escape domestic work in their home countries, they are treated as good domestic workers 
(nannies, maids) or obedient wives under the patriarchal institution of marriage in the host 
countries. Lan (2008) examines gendered migration in Taiwan, focusing on Southeast Asian 
migrant women (domestic workers and foreign brides), whose bodies and sexuality are socially 
controlled for the labour market demand. In Taiwan, Indonesian women are portrayed as loyal 
and dutiful domestic workers who can provide a good service caring for the elderly, and 
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Vietnamese women are depicted as obedient wives. Building upon these studies, this research 
examines how capitalistic labour exploitation and gender inequality are interrelated in the 
process of racial formation in South Korea.  
 
1.1.2 Importance of Temporary Migrants in Global Racial Inequality 
To resolve labour shortages, traditionally white settler societies such as the US, Canada, and 
Australia have received immigrants who come to live permanently. Therefore, the issue of 
immigration and race has to date largely been discussed regarding the social integration of 
immigrants. Thus, models of assimilation, such as conventional assimilation (straight-line 
assimilation) and “segmented assimilation” (Portes & Zhou 1993) are dominant in these white 
settler countries. This is because the supporters of assimilation theory see race as a matter of 
settlement and social integration of permanent immigrants who are supposed to lose their ties to 
their countries of origin over the course of assimilation.  
 On the other hand, transnational migration scholars point out that since many immigrants 
do not settle permanently in their society of reception, rather those immigrants travel back and 
forth between their countries of origin and the host countries, those assimilation theses are 
critically limited in their ability to explain global inequality, which fosters racial barriers.  Sassen 
(1998) rightly points out that economic, military, and ideological links amongst countries are 
crucial to understanding the global scale of migration between the so-called First World and the 
Third World. Therefore, N. Kim (2008) argues that research on transnational migration should 
pay more attention to uneven power relations between states and global inequality structures.  
Scholars who study transnational racialization notice not only that the category of race and the 
meaning of race also travels back and forth along with those migrants (i.e., Espiritu 2003, N. 
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Kim 2008, Roth 2012), but also that transnational racialization is based on uneven power 
relations amongst states and occurs under the influence of global racial hierarchies (Espiritu 
2003, N. Kim 2008).  
However, although scholars of transnational racialization have opened up the debate over 
the transnational exchange of categories/meanings of race in the context of global racial 
inequality and imperialism, these studies still exclude a very important category of people: 
temporary migrant workers. Contemporary international migration is more and more 
characterized by ever-increasing temporary migration and the global scale of the migration 
circuit under neoliberal globalization (Sharma 2006, Rodriguez 2010). Neoliberal globalization 
accelerates the restructuring of production sites, the world market, and the labour market as well. 
Under neo-liberalism, the immigration system has been readjusted to address labour market 
demands more closely. Industrialized countries have adopted new strategies to survive severe 
global capitalist competition through increasing reliance on temporary migration. Temporary 
migrant workers are deprived of not only their legal rights but also any rights of cultural or 
political identity. Since temporary migrant workers are conceived of as temporary solutions to 
labour market gaps, they are regarded as disposable ‘cheap labour.’ Temporary migrant workers 
are considered non-political beings since they do not have any political rights, so it is not 
necessary to integrate them into the host society (Sharma 2006).  
 Temporary migrant workers exhibit the hypermobility that forms migration circuits. 
However, this hyper mobility is created by structural forces beyond their control, such as limited 
term contracts, the urgent need to sell their flexible labour, and deportability (Walters 2002, 
Sharma 2006, Rodriguez 2010). Moreover, they are the subjects of racial discrimination 
everywhere they go.  The denial of citizen-like rights and permanent status for migrant workers 
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is based on the “disciplining of labouring subjects, with the maintenance of nationalized binary 
identities of national subjects and foreign objects with all of their racialized and gendered 
components, and with the expansion of global capitalism” (Sharma 2006: 136).  Indeed, the 
increased reliance on temporary foreign worker programs has become a defining characteristic of 
contemporary global capitalism. 
 
1.1.3 Updating Racial Formation Theory: Global Racial Hierarchies 
Over 20 years have passed since Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s influential racial formation 
theory was first introduced. Racial formation theory provides an innovative theoretical 
framework to move beyond outdated assimilation theories (Feagin and Elias 2013). While many 
earlier mainstream American scholars treated race as static and fixed, the theory of racial 
formation considers race as an outcome of racial formation, which is defined “as the socio-
historical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” 
(Omi and Winant [1986] 2014:55). They argue for the necessity of synthesizing race as both a 
matter of social structure and cultural representation of individuals (ibid:60). In this view, race is 
an element of a macro-level social process of racial formation. At the same time, race also shapes 
an individual’s identity at the micro-level through everyday experience. They define race as “a 
concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different 
types of human bodies (emphasis from the original text)” (ibid:55). When we see race in this 
way, it becomes a site of political and social contestation, which raises a question about the 
uneven distribution of power and resources, and the role of power in shaping the meaning and 
the boundaries of racial groups in society. This can “facilitate understanding of the nature of 
racism, the relationship of race to other forms of differences, inequalities, and oppression such as 
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sexism and nationalism […]” (ibid: 56). Therefore, the racial formation approach is useful to 
understand not only the process of racialization of South and Southeast Asian (tongnama) 
migrants in South Korea but also to understand race as a form of social stratification which is a 
result of political and social conflicts over signifying groups of people. 
However, racial formation theory is primarily based on the social contexts and history of 
white settler societies such as the U.S, Brazil, and South Africa where “racial domination” 
(Marx, 1998) has been long established, and where there is a comparatively strong racial 
segregation. Consequently, the binary racial discourse of Black/White is still dominant in racial 
formation theory, even though a significant number of people come from South America, Asia, 
and Africa as economic migrants. Thus, racial formation theory needs to consider how global 
economic hierarchies play into racialization within different national and regional contexts. 
Indeed, the increasing reliance on foreign migrant workers and immigrants to fill labor shortages 
and to solve the reproduction crisis is not a phenomenon limited to certain industrialized western 
nations any longer, but rather a defining characteristic of contemporary global capitalism, thus 
there is a great necessity to rethink racial formation in the context of contemporary global 
economic migration.  
Then how can we situate racial formation in a broader context of migration under global 
capitalism? The studies of migration that utilize world system approaches provide insight into 
uneven power relations and hierarchies between states/regions on the whole under the global 
capitalism (Wallerstein 1974, Castells 1989, Sassen 1998, Rodriguez 2010). Scholars 
(Wallerstein 1974, Sassen 1998) have long pointed out the phenomenon of the international 
division of labour under global capitalism. Production sites are relocated from postindustrial 
countries in West Europe and North America to less developed countries in Asia and Latin 
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America in search of the cheaper locations in which to manufacture commodities. Sassen 
(1998:53) argues that the low-paid service industries in the global cities and the manufacturing 
industries in the traditional periphery draw immigrant labour, and they are "the systematic 
equivalent of offshore proletariat" under the global division of labour. Rodriguez (2010) 
documents that the practice of sending and receiving migrant workers itself becomes a “global 
enterprise” of labour. Thus, so-called developing countries like the Philippines act as “labour 
brokerage state[s]”, actively mobilizing their citizens to produce desirable flexible and obedient 
labour commodities to sell on the world labour market, not only in Western Europe and North 
America but also in industrialized Asian countries like Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, 
China and South Korea (ibid). While this scholarship discusses the fundamental relationships 
between migration and uneven developmental hierarchies amongst states, they nonetheless pay 
too little attention to the racial hierarchies that regions and countries represent. 
To understand racial hierarchies on a global scale, post-colonial theories offer insight into 
how the ideology of racial hierarchies is produced and practiced by interrogating colonial 
knowledge production and the racialized modernity (Said 1978, Bhabha 2000, Chakrabarty 2007, 
Hesse 2007, Trouillot 2012). Post-colonial scholars (Chakrabarty 2007, Hesse 2007) argue that 
the invention of modernity was possible only through the creation of pre-modernity in 
Asia/Africa as its antithesis. While modernity is a signifier of the economic, political and cultural 
progress of the West, pre-modernity is a signifier of the lack of progress in Asia/Africa (Hesse 
2007). While Asia and Africa are associated with inferior characteristics and images such as 
empty, ahistorical, static, retroverted, primitive, Europe is associated with superior 
characteristics and images such as, history, progress, dynamism, reason, and civilization (Said 
1978, Bhabha 2000, Chakrabarty 2007, Hesse 2007). During this process, racial logics play an 
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essential role to construct colonial subjects and in materializing the imagined corporeal 
differences between colonizers and colonized. Once the West constructed Asian/African colonial 
subjects as ‘races’, this racial hierarchy was accepted as the natural order rather than a relational 
artifact in the colonial system (Hesse 2007). Consequently, geography became seen in a 
racialized sense; that what country and what region you come from signifies what race you are 
and where your race is located in the global scale of racial hierarchies.  
However, these postcolonial studies, as important as they have been, do not adequately 
consider the significance of contemporary economic migration in shaping racial logics. 
Therefore, bringing world systems approaches and post-colonial theories together may be useful 
to examine how developmental hierarchies amongst states influence the global scale of racial 
hierarchies. 
Winant (2001:20) suggests the idea of global racial formation, which incorporates 
Wallerstein’s world-historical perspective, better-known as world system theory into racial 
formation theory stating, “modernity is a global racial formation project.” 
 
The claim that race was one of the central ingredients in the circular and cumulative 
causation of modernity hinges on the presence of racial dynamics, key processes of racial 
formation, in all the main constitutive relationships that structured the origins and 
development of the modern world system. These important relationships involved the 
making of new forms of empire and nation; the organization of new systems of capital 




Winant incorporates both the political economy of race and the cultural articulation of race in the 
modern world system within the racial formation framework that offers race as relational to 
economics, politics, and culture on a global scale. Although racialization is not an exclusively 
economic process, exploitative social relations of production are complementary and inextricable 
to racialization. Thus, the racialization of migrants has functioned to justify the capitalist 
exploitative labour practices and class differentiation (Miles and Brown ([1989] 2003):120).  
Therefore, bringing the political economy of racism and the cultural articulation of racism 
back to the conversation is crucial to the understanding of a global racial formation under global 
capitalism, which results in producing, what I call “global racial hierarchies.” Global racial 
hierarchies, an ideological system based on racial hierarchies and developmental hierarchies 
amongst states, is critical to understanding contemporary global racial inequalities. The concept 
of global racial hierarchies allows us to pay attention to how contemporary international 
economic migration is deeply involved in the construction of race, and uneven power relations 
amongst states under global capitalism. Also, this concept allows us to see that racial hierarchies 
are socially constructed, and they change over time under particular conditions. In focusing on 
how Koreans conceive of the idea of global racial hierarchies, I attempt to update Omi and 
Winant’s (1994 [2014]) racial formation theory in the context of global economic migration.   
 
1.1.4 South and Southeast Asian Migrants in South Korea 
As one specific way of Othering, racialization imposes otherness on a certain group of people. 
Racialization is problematic because it includes a dialectical process of the conceptualization of 
the Self (in-group) as a superior race, which simultaneously solicits the conceptualization of the 
Other as the inferior race by attributing a positive evaluation to the Self and a negative evaluation 
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to the Other (Miles and Brown 2013 (1989)). Van Dijk (1993:20) points out that racism 
“affect[s] Other People primarily because they are thought to belong to another group, that is, as 
group members and not as individuals." This means that a specific ethnic group is seen as “alike 
and interchangeable” (ibid:20). This process slots specific ethnic groups and individuals into the 
already existing “ethno-racial hierarchy, influencing social mobility, access to societal rewards 
and resources and overall quality of life” (McDonnell and de Lourenco 2009:239).   
 In South Korea, media representation of different races shows interconnections between 
race and class. Korean mass media portrays marriage immigrants and foreign migrant workers 
from Southeast Asia and rural China as a “new underclass” (Hong and H. Kim 2010, Y. Kim, 
Yoo and J. Kim 2009, K. Kim 2009, S. Kim and E. Kim 2008, Jo 2008). H. Lee, Yoo, and Ahn 
(2007) point out in their research on telecommunication, real estate and finance TV commercials 
that Korean characters are portrayed as adventurous explorers who embrace the underdeveloped 
Southeast Asian countries; as sophisticated cultural beings who share European cultural values; 
or as cosmopolitans who enjoy their transnational lives between metropolises. Korean 
commercials strategically use a racial hierarchy to highlight Koreans’ superior position to South 
and Southeast Asians and to equate their racial position to that of Europeans and North 
Americans (ibid: 497-8).   
   Scholars who have studied attitudes and social distance (Lew and T. Lee 2006, Hwang et 
al. 2007, In 2009, Lim and C. Kim 2011, D. S. Kim, D. H. Kim and Jung 2011, Han 2011) point 
out that Koreans have strong stereotypes and prejudices towards non-Koreans. Such stereotypes 
include ideas like: ‘White people are rational, talented, and confident, but Black, tongnama and 
Chinese people are irrational, untalented, and unconfident.’ Thus, Koreans feel the social 
distance to non-Whites much more strongly than to Whites. According to Hwang et al. (2007), 
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Korean youth in their 20s tend to be more open-minded to foreign cultures compared to older 
generations. However, this cultural openness is mostly toward North American and European 
cultures. Korean youth show less acceptance for South Asian, Southeast Asian, and Chinese 
cultures due to an association with marriage immigrants and foreign migrant workers in Korea. 
Lim and C. Kim (2011) point out that, while Koreans prefer white people to any other foreigners, 
there are also racial preferences within non-white foreign groups. Koreans have a more positive 
image of Japanese and international students compared to tongnama, Black, Chinese, and foreign 
migrant workers. Koreans prefer to be friends with Whites, African Americans, and Japanese, 
while tongnama and Chinese are less desirable as friends. Interestingly, Koreans have negative 
images of black Africans, but they are willing to be friends with African Americans due to their 
American nationality. D. S. Kim, D. H. Kim and Jung (2011) researched images of foreigners in 
Korea. While Americans are conceived of as masculine, confident, talented, attractive, and 
arrogant, tongnama, Chinese, Korean-Chinese, and North Koreans are feminine, inferior, 
untalented, unattractive, passive and gentle. According to Lew and T. Lee (2006), while 
Americans are represented as white, male, English-speaking, well-off, and elite, tongnama and 
Africans are darker skinned, non-English speaking, poor, and undeveloped.  
 
1.2 Methods: Ethnographic Research  
1.2.1 Data Collection 
This dissertation is based on ethnographic research conducted in two typical industrial working-
class cities in South Korea - Ansan and Siheung - between September 2013 and May 2014. 
Ansan and Siheung are administratively two different municipalities but there is basically one 
large industrial complex, which shares infrastructures and government facilities. A significant 
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population of immigrants and foreign migrant workers populate these neighbouring cities 
because of the industrial complex located there. In this industrial complex there are over 10,000 
small and medium-sized factories.  
 
Figure 1 Ansan and Siheung 
  
• Source: Google Maps  
 
I was interested in examining not only “what people say” about race but also “what 
people actually do” (Waters 2001: 11). While working alongside migrants in several factories, 
and participating in classes at the migrant centers, I observed everyday interactions and 
experiences amongst different actors in order to gain insights into the process of racialization. I 
spent nine months conducting this field research. However, it was not a new research site for me. 
As a native Korean, I have volunteered and worked at several migrant helping centers in Ansan 
city from 2002 to 2007. Thus, this research can be characterized as an example of an 
“ethnographic revisit” (Burawoy 2009). 
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The migration flows toward South Korea are characterized as labour and marriage 
migration. Because of the demographic composition of foreign migrant workers and marriage 
immigrants, I believed that the workplace and family were the best sites to capture the daily 
interactions between migrants and Koreans. Therefore, for the first half of the field research, I 
worked for several manufacturing factories as a factory worker alongside Koreans, immigrants, 
and foreign migrant workers of diverse ethnic backgrounds, such as Chinese, Korean-Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Cambodian, Filipino, and Mongolian. These factories included different 
subcontractors, which produced products, such as PCB (Printed Circuit Board), speakers, 
cosmetics, first-aid packets, and food. 
 
Figure 2 A food factory 
 
  Hard-boiled eggs rolling along conveyer belts  
 
While I worked as a factory worker, I could observe how migrants and Koreans 
interacted and treated each other on the factory floor. On top of this factory work, I interviewed 
factory workers (Koreans, immigrants, and foreign migrant workers) and management to gain 
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insights into how they think of each other, to what extent they mingle together, and their feelings 
of different races. Because I did not want to create any possible conflicts between workers and 
management from the factories I worked at, I recruited interviewees after I had completed all the 
factory work.  
 
Figure 3 Ansan Global Multicultural Center 
 
 
After several months of the factory work, I volunteered as a childminder at the Ansan 
Multicultural Family Support Center. I also attended some classes offered to female marriage 
immigrants and their families, such as Korean cooking classes, basic job training (cooking 
certificates and coffee brewing), childcare seminars, and language classes alongside Chinese, 
Korean-Chinese, Vietnamese, Filipina, Japanese, Mongolian, and Uzbek women. At the Center, 
the majority of programs were intended for female marriage immigrants under the official 
category of “multicultural family”: based on the assumption that marriage immigrants are 
women and full-time homemakers. Even though I am a native-born ethnic Korean, I was able to 
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take these classes with other female marriage immigrants, because of my “foreigner” husband. 
Therefore, my family was also officially categorized as a multicultural family.  
Theoretically, foreign husbands can also use the services and classes in the Multicultural 
Family Support Center. However, they usually do not visit the Center because they see it as a 
place ‘for women’ due to its services oriented toward immigrant women. Instead, they use the 
Migrant Community Center, which is intended for documented and undocumented foreign 
workers who enter Korea on three to a five-year contract for manufacturing and service 
industries. The Migrant Community Center mainly provides labour counselling services on top 
of computer classes, driver’s license classes, martial art training, free medical services, and 
ethnic group meetings. These centers are open for any foreign migrant workers, but usually 
young male foreign workers hang out in the lobby more often than female foreign workers. I 
regularly visited the Migrant Community Center to meet male immigrants and foreign migrant 
workers. 
Figure 4 Siheung Migrant Community Center 
  
I realized that the neighbourhood is also a very important site to capture the interactions 
between migrants and Koreans. Whenever I travelled by subway or bus with my toddler 
daughter, I noticed that my daughter always drew visible attention from people because of her 
An information tent with free 
medical services for 
undocumented migrant workers 





biracial look. Responses differed depending on whether they saw me as an Asian foreign bride 
with a non-Korean looking child, or whether they saw my daughter as a white honhyŏl (mixed 
blood) from a white father. Thus, I also included interviews with the Korean neighbours of 
marriage immigrants. 
 
Figure 5  A migrant neighbourhood in Ansan 
 
                         Labour agency and store signs in many different languages 
 
As part of my ethnographic research, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 59 
people - 40 local Koreans and 19 migrants from Bangladesh, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, 
Nepal, and China. This includes interviews with Korean neighbours, Korean spouses and Korean 
in-laws of marriage immigrants, marriage immigrants, and foreign migrant workers. I asked 
them about their feelings about different migrant groups, their experience living together as a 
multicultural family, or working together as coworkers. Almost all long-term immigrants who 
have stayed in South Korea for over five years are fluent in Korean. Thus, I conducted interviews 
mostly in Korean unless they preferred to speak English. The interviews lasted from 1.5 hours to 
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three hours. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. I also attended relevant social 
forums, public hearings, immigrant cultural events, activist meetings, and protests. I wrote field 
notes every night. I tried to use the qualitative analysis software NVivo to analyze my field notes 
and interview transcripts, but this software did not support Korean language. Thus, I manually 
coded the field notes and interview transcripts by adding annotations and topical summaries. As I 
coded the data, I found that many of the quotations and annotations could be grouped into similar 
thematic categories. These themes include the gendered process of racialization, local and global 
racial hierarchies, and the nature of ethnic and racial identities. 
 
1.2.2 Ethnography 
I conducted ethnography across two research sites: factories and families. As Burawoy (2009: 
88-91) points out, ethnography offers an opportunity to examine the “internal process” and 
“external forces” of social phenomena. According to Buraway (ibid), internal process refers to 
what actually happens in the research sites, and external forces (external context) refers to the 
environment or system experienced as powers beyond the field sites, or powers that shape the 
field sites yet exist outside the control of the site. In my case study of racial formation of South 
and Southeast Asian migrants, examining the internal processes and external forces are essential 
to understanding how, why, and under what conditions this racial formation occurs. In addition, 
ethnography makes it possible to explore the structural/institutional conditions of racialization, 
and everyday experiences/cultural representations of the process of racialization, as Omi and 
Winant ([1986] 2014) point out.  Reconstruction of reality and theory form part of the main aims 
of ethnography (Waters 2011, Burawoy 2009). In particular, it is important to situate interviews 
within specific institutional contexts. As Waters (2001: 11) points out, this is necessary in 
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particular to explore not only what people say, but also to understand their experiences and 
relationships with other people. For my case study, ethnography permits the examination of what 
people say about race and what people actually do in work or family interactions with 
immigrants, foreign migrant workers, and Koreans. 
Therefore, ethnographic research in workplaces and families in Ansan and Siheung city 
offered me the ability to contextualize the lived reality of foreign migrant workers, immigrants, 
and Koreans, and the role of government policies. This also helped me to situate the findings 
from my semi-structured interviews and secondary literature research and helped me with the 
reflexive interpretation of the data collected.  
 Entry into the field is crucial for ethnographic-observation and semi-structured interviews. 
Based on my experience as a counselor assistant helping foreign migrant workers and foreign 
wives from 2002 to 2007 in Ansan, I knew that migrants' rights advocacy organizations were 
good places to meet migrants who faced problems such as unpaid wages, unfair treatment from 
management, and domestic violence. However, one significant drawback is that it is hard to meet 
Korean co-workers and Korean family members through these organizations. Usually, migrants’ 
relationships with Korean employers and Korean family members are already aggravated 
because of the troublesome situations that brought them to these organizations in the first place. 
Therefore, I thought a better way to examine immigrants and foreign migrant workers’ daily 
experiences and interactions was to enter a company or a factory to participate, observe and 
conduct interviews. 
Figure 6  Flyers in a bus stop near the industrial complex 
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             Flyers say “day workers and temp workers wanted” 
 
Initially, I planned to work as a regular factory worker for 2 or 3 months at one of the small or 
medium sized factories which have a good mixture of Korean workers, foreign migrant workers, 
and immigrant workers in the industrial complex of Ansan-Siheung. However, I soon discovered 
that it was hard to enter a factory as a researcher. I contacted several factories to ask for their 
permission to work without pay as a factory trainee, but they all rejected my request to enter their 
factory. Factory owners and management do not trust outsiders, not only because of trade and 
technology secrets but also because of the legacy of militant labour union movements in South 
Korea. Especially in the 1980s, a large number of university students and activists went 
undercover in factories in order to organize workers. Moreover, a combination of legal and 
illegal labour practices are still prevalent in the industry, such as the illegal use of labour 
agencies, and the use of undocumented foreign migrant workers.  
 Using labour agencies as labour brokers – which in South Korea are better known as 
manpower firms or labour dispatch agencies (p'agyŏnŏpch'e) - became a common way to get 
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factory and other minimum waged casual jobs after the 1997 economic crisis. In the Ansan-
Siheung industrial complex, there are around 10,000 factories and over 300 labour agencies that 
provide workers for the factories. Thus, I decided to find factory work in the same way that an 
immigrant woman or a married Korean woman would find a job after several years of childbirth 
and parenting.  
Finding a job through these labour agencies was not difficult but finding a job in a factory 
which had a good mix of Korean workers and foreign migrant workers was not that easy. 
Managers of labour agencies tend to look down on job seekers based on the assumption that 
people who come to a labour agency for low paid jobs and day labour are most likely old and 
poorly educated, or legal/illegal foreign migrant workers. Moreover, labour agencies do not like 
it when job seekers ask questions. On several occasions labour agencies hung up the phone as 
soon as I asked about the working conditions and the names of the factories that they might send 
me to. After visiting several labour agencies, I soon learned that I should not ask any questions, I 
just needed to provide my personal information and wait until they assigned me. In this way, I 
could immediately work in a factory. My labour agency sent workers every day to a different 
factory unless a factory wanted to keep the worker.  
Within the first two weeks, I worked for five different factories. These factories produce 
PCB (Printed Circuit Board), cosmetics, first-aid packets, clock packaging, and speakers. I 
worked only several days for each factory and then I was sent to another factory without any 
information. The labour agency usually does not inform their workers about which factory they 
would be sent to until the workers get on the shuttle bus in the morning.  
Figure 7 A labour agency 
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Waiting for job placements in front of the labour agency (left).  The shuttle bus (right) 
 
On the shop floor, temporary workers like me had no control over their work. The management 
of the factories often ordered overtime and workers had to accept; there was no other 
transportation from the factory except for the shuttle bus that the labour agency provided. Thus, 
every morning I assumed that I might have to work overtime. In the speaker company - a 
subcontractor of Samsung Electronics, I stayed for three weeks to observe interactions between 
Korean workers and Korean-Chinese workers, but I eventually quit in order to find a factory, 
which might have a better mix of foreign migrant workers.  
After about five weeks of working for several factories as a temporary worker, I found a 
job as a regular worker in a hard-boiled egg packaging factory that had foreign migrant workers 
from Vietnam, Cambodia, Mongolia, and China. I worked as regular worker for 2 months until 
my toddler daughter joined me in South Korea. Luckily, I could also stay in the factory 
dormitory for free with the foreign migrant workers. Including overtime, I worked 14 hours per 




Figure 8  In the factory’s dormitory 
            
The author as a factory worker (left).  In the dorm room having a late meal with Vietnamese workers after 
over-time work (right) 
 
After working in factories, I carried out participant observation at the Multicultural Family 
Support Center - a settlement organization in Ansan city. With some help from my previous 
network, I could work with Chinese and Filipina immigrant women as a volunteer for a child-
minding program at the Center. I also took several classes and participated in events with 
marriage immigrants.  
Figure 9 A Korean cooking class 
             
Migrant brides taking 
videos of cooking lessons  
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While at the Center, I regularly chatted with visitors in the lobby or in the cafe. As my husband 
was not in South Korea with me during this part of my field research, my daughter often 
accompanied me to the classes and interviews whenever I could not arrange childminding for 
her. Interestingly, I found that my status as a mother of a biracial child offered opportunities to 
get closer to female marriage immigrants. I had asked them to hang out with me or have a coffee 
sometimes, but they often said no to me. However, when they found out that I also have a 
foreign spouse and a biracial child, they often asked me to show some photos of my daughter. 
They seemed curious about my daughter’s appearance and they invited my daughter and me over 
to their homes for playdates and family occasions like birthday parties. Sometimes we went on 
picnics with our children to the local museum and parks.   
Finally, I visited migrant advocacy organizations in Ansan, such as the Ansan Migrant 
Community Service Center (run by the city of Ansan to provide administration services for new 
immigrants and foreign migrant workers), the Cambodian Worker’s Network, the Korean-
Chinese Association in Ansan, and the local police station. I also attended events for migrants; 
such as picnics, the world migrant workers’ day event, anti-racism protests, and some ethnic 
group events for Cambodian and Burmese workers.    
 
1.2.3 Interviews 
From 2013-2014, I conducted semi-structured interviews with fifty-nine people; most of whom 
resided in the Ansan and Siheung area. I interviewed nineteen migrants from Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Nepal, and China. Fifteen of them were long-term 
immigrants who had stayed in South Korea for over five years and spoke fluent Korean or 
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English.1 Since migrants from the Philippines preferred to speak English, I conducted interviews 
with them in English, otherwise I conducted interviews in Korean. Four of them had been in 
South Korea less than three years. Some had enough Korean language skills to communicate but 
some did not. Therefore, if they could speak English fluently, I conducted interview in English.  
 I interviewed forty local Koreans who had sufficient interactions with migrants from their 
work, extended family, community organizations, or neighbourhood. As I conducted my field 
research, I had to adapt to local situations and needed to continuously modify my approach. I 
learned that the majority of residents in Ansan and Siheung had some experience working in a 
factory because of the industrial complex nearby. Moreover, many Korean residents of this area 
had interpersonal connections to marriage immigrants as family members, relatives, or 
neighbours. Therefore, I tried to recruit interviewees as randomly as possible at the beginning of 
my interview phase. I talked to taxi drivers, passengers in subway trains, visitors to community 
centers and settlement institution users. When I had recruited enough random interviewees, I 
used snowball sampling to recruit new participants through my interviewees’ networks.  
Although I did not plan to have group interviews, two of my Korean interviewees in their 
late fifties voluntarily spread the word about my research and helped me form several interview 
                                                 
1 Once I interviewed a Vietnamese woman with the help of a Vietnamese interpreter. I noticed that my 
interviewee looked uncomfortable and the interview did not go very well. A few days later, the 
Vietnamese woman wanted to have a follow up interview without the interpreter. Even though her Korean 
language skills were not that strong, the interview went much more smoothly than the first interview. 
After learning from this experience, I did not use interpreters anymore. However, I still think that if I had 
been able to interview more recent immigrants and short term foreign migrant workers, my research 
might be able to show more diverse voices from different groups of people. This is one of the 
methodological limitations of this doctoral research project. I assume that a larger research project 
involving several researchers who have diverse language and cultural backgrounds would minimize this 
kind of problem. This also requires a shift in the design of the research project, towards doing research 




groups. They explained that although an academic interview had sounded somewhat intimidating 
to them, they enjoyed being interviewed and sharing their thoughts. Because of this, they wanted 
to introduce more people to this opportunity. After conducting several group interviews through 
their network, I had to ask my informants to not arrange any more group interviews to avoid 
relying on one or two informants excessively.  
Through the interview process I also found that Korean informants who are closer to my 
parents’ age tended to accept my interview requests more easily. Since this generation highly 
values education, providing favours to students for educational purposes is highly encouraged. 
Interviewees from this older generation often said that they participated in my research not only 
to help the younger generation, but also to contribute to Korean studies. They seemed to see my 
research as a way to promote South Korea. These remarks often left me feeling somewhat 
uncomfortable as I suspected that my project would not be able to satisfy their hopes.  
The respondents can be roughly divided into five groups: Korean factory workers; 
foreign migrant factory workers; marriage immigrants; Korean family members of marriage 
immigrants; and civil workers or staff members who work with migrants at institutions in the 
Ansan and Siheung area. However, the boundaries of these groups are often blurry. For example, 
I met several Korean factory workers to ask about their experiences working with foreign 
migrant workers. Soon I found that they are also husbands or relatives of marriage immigrants. 
Similarly, all the foreign husband interviewees initially came to South Korea as a foreign 
migrant worker, and the majority of them still worked in factories. Several female foreign 
migrant workers came to Korea through the Korean guest worker program - the Employment 
Permit System (EPS) and ended up marrying a Korean man, so they became immigrants through 
marriage. Regarding their socio-economic characteristics, only two of the interviewees could be 
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considered close to the lower middle class based on their education level, their occupation, and 
their partners’ occupations. The vast majority of the Korean and marriage immigrant informants 
came from a working-class background. In Ansan-Siheung there are several middle-class suburb 
neighbourhoods and newly developed areas to attract white-collar office workers and 
professionals. However, the majority of my research respondents reside in working-class 
neighbourhoods near the industrial complex. Even in these neighbourhoods there are several new 
high-rise apartments and condominiums; enough to wonder why these places have such poor 
reputations. According to several informants and taxi drivers, although these neighbourhoods 
look decent, they have a comparatively high proportion of social housing and co-op housing.  
 I asked my informants questions about two broad themes: immigration and race. The 
questions about immigration inquired into their daily experiences of working or living with 
people from different ethnic and national groups, interpersonal relationships, multiculturalism, 
and their personal immigration history (if the informants were migrants). The topic of race 
included questions about national, ethnic, and racial identity and subjective understandings of 
race. If the informants desired, I met them at their homes. Most of these informants are women 
who have young children, so meeting at their homes was easier as their children could play 
nearby. For male informants and group interviews, I suggested meeting at the cafeteria of the 
Multicultural Family Support Center which is cozy and quiet. 
 
1.2.4 Issues in the Research:  Being an Ajumma Factory Worker and the Mother of a 
Biracial Child  
Since Patricia Hill Collins (1986:14) introduced the concept of the “outsider within status” –a 
researcher’s ironical but special standpoint on self, family, and society, a researcher’s 
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marginality is considered as having the advantage of allowing more reflexive research. For 
example, a black female researcher has the ability to understand the cultural context of black 
women’s experiences, but at the same time she is an outsider to the wider society, as a black 
female researcher who constantly experiences personal alienation and exclusion in academic 
settings. She thus has the ability of the ‘stranger’ to observe things in the wider society that the 
‘insiders’ of the society may not able to see. Outsiders of the wider society, such as women, 
immigrants, ethnic/racial minorities, sexual minorities, and political minorities, have a more 
conscious awareness of their marginalized standpoints compared to insiders who are perceived to 
have power over the outsiders. The “outsider within status,” therefore, provides insight into 
uneven power relations between the researcher and the researched, and “the interlocking nature 
of race, gender, and class oppression” (ibid:19).  
 I found that a researcher’s “outsider within status” - a methodological perspective   
provides me the ability to see the Korean society from an outsider or marginalized perspective as 
a mother of a biracial child, as a wife of a foreign man, and as a female factory worker while 
reading the detailed texture of a dominant culture or social structure as a native Korean.  
In the 1980s, I grew up in a working-class neighbourhood in a satellite city of Seoul. 
Because of my childhood upbringing, I assumed that I could understand working class people 
quite well. Indeed, my family’s class background helped me understand their life experiences 
and feelings. However, becoming an irregular factory worker, especially an ajumma (a married 
woman over thirty) factory worker was a very different experience. As I tried to get jobs at 
factories I experienced derogatory treatment because of my gender, age, marital status, and 
assumed class background. As a factory job seeker, I was seen as a poorly educated ajumma, 
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whose husband was likely incompetent, and who was probably desperate to find any work to 
make ends meet.   
I was often lectured about planning my life better by the managers at labour agencies. On 
the shuttle bus, I often overheard the shuttle bus driver - a man in his late 50s - loudly 
commenting in front of a bus full of female workers on how dumb women were. A factory 
manager propositioned me, assuming that I was a pitiful ajumma worker who might be 
struggling in her marriage. I could see how people changed their attitudes according to their 
perceived status of me. Several Cambodian workers called me, sŏnsaengnim (teacher, often used 
for showing respect) when we met through a migrant worker advocacy center. Soon after when I 
started working in factories, they started calling me ajumma.  
During the first phase of my fieldwork, I could see how my social position as an ajumma 
factory worker is deeply related to the gendered vocational hierarchy. As St. Louis and Barton 
(1998: 3-4) point out, while people are generally aware of their social position concerning others, 
those in the center often fail to realize the full extent of power dynamics compared to those at the 
bottom margins because they benefit from these power relationships. At the same time, those at 
the margins either try to find ways to join those in the center or accept the fact that they will 
never be able to become part of the center. In this sense, as a researcher, I was glad that I could 
work as an ajumma worker because my experiences would help me develop a more accountable 
and reflexive research project. However, while I agree with Lee’s (1973, cited from Collins 
1999) suggestion that assuming a position of marginality attenuates imbalanced power relations 
and may spark new insights, being dismissed and belittled because I was an ajumma factory 
worker is a bitter experience. 
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After my field work in factories, I moved to another site; the family. When research 
moves from the more traditional single site to multiple sites, the researcher needs to be reflexive 
of corresponding power shifts and shifts in positionality.2 A researcher’s position is not fixed, 
and the researcher must negotiate these power shifts continuously to understand how they affect 
the process of knowledge production. 
 I revealed my identity as a researcher as I started meeting people for interviews, visiting 
settlement institutes and NGOs, and participating in classes and events. Different from the first 
phase of my fieldwork in factories, I did not receive much derogatory treatment from my 
informants. Instead, they called me teacher (sŏnsaengnim) to show some degree of respect. 
However, after my daughter joined me in South Korea, I could sense my social position shifting 
again as the mother of a foreign-looking biracial child. Since I had finished my factory work, and 
since my husband was not with us during my field research, I moved to my parents’ place with 
my daughter. During this period my parents and I often had to deal with derogatory comments 
and curious glances at my child.  
In general, Koreans treat multicultural families somewhat better when it involves a North 
American or a European foreigner, as they assume a higher social and economic status. I thus 
expected that I would not experience discomfort in my hometown because my child is a white 
honhyŏl. So it was a surprise to suddenly be faced with such derogatory treatment. Soon I 
                                                 
2 Maher and Tetreault (1994: 22) define positionality as the “knower’s specific position in any context as 
defined by race, gender, class, and other socially significant dimensions.” hooks (1984) illustrates 
positionality by employing ‘margin’ and ‘center’ as descriptors. These spatial descriptors help to 
illuminate how positionality can be used to reveal the imbalance of power in relationships. hooks (ibid) 
describes how those who occupy ‘center’ positions tend to force others, such as people of colour or the 
poor, into marginal positions. 
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discovered that many people, especially older generations of Koreans around the age of my 
parents, saw me as the Korean nanny of a white child, or as a tongnama mother with a non-
Korean looking child.  I also discovered  that there is still cultural stigma against the family of a 
Korean woman and a white man because this union reminds older generations of Korean sex 
workers near the U.S military camps. Indeed, my hometown has a Korean air base where the U.S 
Air Force is located, and a red-right district. My parents’ place is only 2kms away from both 
locations.  
 After my daughter joined me, I learned about my new social category, tamumhwa 
(multicultural family) through the child care subsidy programs. For example, I learned that my 
family is tamumhwa when I registered my daughter on the wait lists of public daycare centers. 
The director of the public daycare center told me that my family falls in the category of 
tamumhwa, so my daughter could get priority, which is the same benefit offered to 
underprivileged families, such as single-parent families, low-income families, and disabled 
parent-families. The same day I visited one more public daycare center to register for the 
waitlist. This time, I told them that I have priority as a tamumhwa family. The director asked me 
"ah, you are a foreigner?" I was surprised and told her that I am Korean, but my husband is a 
foreigner. After looking at my child, the director added, “oh, your husband must be a Russian or 
Uzbekistani man” implying that this could be the only explanation for why we had chosen to stay 
in South Korea.  
As I mentioned above, I was often misrecognized as a foreign bride from Southeast Asia. 
Elderly women in my neighbourhood often asked me if I am a foreign mother. On one occasion, 
a Korean grandmother offered a can of juice to my daughter and said to me, "Are you a 
foreigner? I am sorry that the Korean winter is too cold for you. You must come from a very 
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tropical country." I did not want to embarrass her, so I pretended to be a foreign mother. I 
responded to her, "Actually I come from a place that is quite cold, like South Korea." While 
some people showed me their generosity, others openly stared at my daughter and me. 
      During my field research, I could clearly see that my relationship to the research site, my 
own position, and my degree of marginality changed as I was moving from working in factories 
to interviewing people in family contexts. Therefore, the “outsider within status” perhaps helped 
me to see “the interlocking nature of race, gender, and class oppression” and to “determine what 
the links are among these systems” (Collins 1986:19). In doing so, a researcher can have insights 
that the researcher would not otherwise have had.  
 
1.3 Chapter Outline 
In the following pages, this dissertation examines the centrality of economic migration for 
theorizing racialization and racial formation in South Korea under global capitalism. 
Chapter 2 provides the background information on South Korean state intervention in 
migration flows and the settlement process.  
Chapter 3 offers a historical background of race and the contemporary socio-economic 
contexts of South Korea as a multiethnic/ multicultural society. This chapter also discusses the 
main process of racial formation of migrants and how ethnic status is slotted into the Korean 
ethno-racial hierarchy, which is essential to the discussion on Koreans’ understanding of global 
racial hierarchies.   
Chapter 4 explores the racialization of South and Southeast Asian migrants in family life 
by examining the primarily female migrants, and therefore gendered marriage migration in 
relation to Korean patriarchy. This chapter shows how patriarchy, as one of the most influential 
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social institutions in South Korea, plays a crucial role in the process of racialization through what 
I call patriarchal racialization. Patriarchal racialization is a gendered racialization process 
whereby for foreign brides, patriarchal gender roles are emphasized to minimize racial 
differences and to reproduce patriarchy as essential and ahistorical. At the same time, for foreign 
husbands, racial differences are emphasized to exclude them socially from the national 
community. Thus, children of a foreign mother are seen as racially closer to Koreans than the 
children of a foreign father based on the belief in paternal blood lineage that blood passes down 
through father’s line.  
Chapter 5 explores the racialization of foreign migrant workers from South and Southeast 
Asian countries at 3D factories (difficult, dangerous, dirty) by examining state labour policy and 
the experiences of foreign migrant workers, immigrant workers, and Korean workers. This 
chapter shows that South and Southeast Asian workers are structurally racialized to justify 
exploitation and discrimination in the low-paid job market. The production of cheap, obedient, 
and flexible foreign migrant workers helps Korean factories to survive severe global 
competition. I show how Korean employers prefer foreign migrant workers and immigrants to 
native-born Korean workers to fill out extremely low-level jobs. I document the tensions and 
stereotypes amongst groups and analyze the interpersonal, cultural and structural racism 
experienced by foreign migrant workers.  
Chapter 6 ties the themes together and addresses the theoretical implications of these 
findings for a more global understanding of race, which is crucial to understand the link between 
contemporary economic migration and global capitalism. 
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Chapter 2: New Migration Flows and the State’s Intervention 
 
2.1 Economic Migrants in South Korea: Foreign Brides and Foreign Migrant Workers  
Korea has often been referred to as one of the very few countries that is racially and ethnically 
homogeneous (Kymlicka 2007). Until the early 1990s, there were only a few foreigners who 
resided in South Korea, and they made up of only 0.1% of the total population. They were 
mostly foreign government officials, businessmen, Christian seminaries, and the U.S armed 
forces. However, since the 1990s a rapidly expanding immigrant and foreign migrant worker 
population has led to an increased awareness that South Korea is becoming more ethnically and 
racially diverse (Seol 2010, S. Kim et al. 2010, Bang et al. 2010, Hong and H. Kim 2010, Prey 
2011). The foreign population is rapidly increasing, with over 2 million foreigners residing in 
South Korea. Although this represents only about 4 percent of the total population, this is a 
dramatic change from 1990 – a 40 percent increase in their share of the population.3  
 
Table 1 (Un) Documented foreign population 
(unit: person) 



































Undocumented 183,106 208,778 214,168 208,971     251,041 
• Source: Statistics Korea (2018), Foreign population (Ch'eryuoeguginhyŏnhwang) 
                                                 




• Note 1: The overall number of foreigners only includes foreigners with holding visas. Long-term 
refers to foreigners who stay longer than three months, and short-term refers to foreigners who 
stay less than three months.  
• Note 2: Undocumented foreigners refers to foreigners who overstay without renewing their visa 
status or permits.4  
 
In South Korea, low skilled foreign migrant workers and marriage immigrants are the major 
groups of foreigners. Roughly, 30% of the foreign population is made up of migrant workers in 
the manufacturing, construction, and agriculture industries (Statistics Korea 2017).  Although 
this thesis focuses on foreign migrant workers who are not ethnic Koreans, given that the latter 
are often seen as foreign workers, this visa category makes up around 50% of the foreign 
population when they are included (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Foreigner population by visa types in 2016 
           (unit: person) 













































Source: Statistics Korea (2017) Foreign population by visa types (Ch'eryujagyŏkpyŏl 
Ch'eryuoeguginhyŏnhwang) 
 
                                                 
4 Statistics Korea estimates the undocumented foreign population using entry and departure records. 
Although South Korea is a peninsula, entering South Korea via land is not feasible because of the highly 
militarized border with North Korea. Since the only two ways to enter South Korea are via seaports and 
airports, tracking entry and departure records are comparatively well controlled.  
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Foreign migrant workers first began coming to South Korea in 1988, the year of the Seoul 
Olympics when Korea’s relative wealth was revealed across Asia. Until this time, Korea was a 
migrant-sending country, with thousands of Korean construction workers toiling in the Middle 
East, and nurses and miners working in Germany. By the late 1980s, Korea had shifted towards 
becoming a migrant-receiving country. Around this time, the manufacturing and construction 
industries in South Korea were suffering from severe labour shortages as young Koreans began 
avoiding so-called 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, difficult). The migrant worker population increased 
quickly over a short period, to the point where there are now over half a million documented 
migrant workers, and roughly 200,000 undocumented workers, in a country of 51million. 
The growth in the migrant worker population is primarily due to labour cost-cutting and 
Koreans' unwillingness to work in 3D jobs due to social stigma and lower wages. Foreign 
migrant workers in the manufacturing, construction, fishing, agriculture, and service industries 
come to South Korea from all over the world, but primarily from Asian countries such as China, 
Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and 
Cambodia. In South Korea, there are several foreign labour programs, such as the Employment 
Permit System (EPS) for low-skilled workers, the Visit and Work program for ethnic Koreans 
with foreign citizenships as low-skilled workers, the Professional Employment program for 
highly educated professionals and English teachers (HRDKorea 2013). The majority of the low 
skilled foreign migrant workers come through the Korean guest worker programs: the EPS and 
the Visit and Work. 5   
                                                 




Marriage immigrants are predominantly female. In 2016, marriages between a Korean 
man and a foreign woman comprised 83.4 percent of the total number of international marriages, 
while unions between a Korean woman and a foreign man made up the remaining 15.6 percent. 
In the mid-1990s, Korean bachelors began importing foreign brides from countries like China, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand in increasing numbers. This resulted from a number of 
factors, including a surplus of bachelors in South Korea and a lack of marriageable Korean 
women for rural farmers and working-class men (M. Kim 2014). The number of marriage 
immigrants has grown as more Korean women pursue careers and resist patriarchal marriages. 
Dangerously low fertility rates and a rapidly ageing population has prompted the South Korean 
state to actively facilitate the recruitment of foreign brides as a substitute for Korean women.   
Foreign husbands’ nationalities are mainly Chinese, American, Canadian, Japanese, and 
Australian. Since revisions in the Nationality Law in 1997 and 2000, which offers a spousal visa 
to both foreign brides and husbands equally, some of the foreign migrant workers who initially 
entered South Korea through the EPS remained in romantic relationship with Korean women, 
and permanently settled in South Korea after marrying Korean women (Kwak 2018). 
 
Table 3 Foreign spouse population, 2009-2016 
   [unit: person / percent] 


















































Source: Statistics Korea (2017). Marriage immigration trends (Kyŏrhoniminja hyŏnhwang) 
Table 4 Country of origin of foreign spouses in 2017 
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 [unit: person / percent] 
Total international marriages       20,835 
Korean man + Foreign woman 14,869 (100%) Korean woman + Foreign man 5,966 (100%) 
Vietnam 5,364 (36.1%) China 1,523 (25.5%) 
China 3,880 (26.1%) U.S 1,392 (23.3%) 
Thailand 1,017 (6.8%) Canada 436 (7.3%) 
Japan 843 (5.7%) Japan 311 (5.2%) 
Philippines 842 (5.7%) Australia 203 (3.4%) 
U.S 541 (3.6%) Others 2,101 (35.2/%) 
Cambodia 480 (3.3%)   
Others 1,902 (12.7%)   
Source: Statistics Korea (2018). International marriage trends (Kukchegyŏrhon hyŏnhwang) 
 
 
The South Korean government predicts that the number of foreign brides will increase mainly 
due to demographic factors: the low fertility rate, the rapidly ageing population, and gender 
asymmetry according to the Multicultural Family Policy Committee in 2010.6  
However, many critical scholars (Park 2005, McDonald 2009, Bae 2009, 2010, Cho 
2010, Han and Chun 2014) argue that we need to pay attention to gender inequalities and the 
traditional patriarchal system in the family and the labor market when attempting to identify the 
source of the ‘reproduction crisis’ that leads to the importation of foreign brides. The Korean 
state treats the family as a basic unit of economic growth (Bae 2010). Especially the patriarchal 
family model, which placed a male at the top of the family structure, has been the basic model 
used to organize Korean society and economy (Cho 2010). Therefore, the state’s control over the 
female body and in particular her fertility is crucial in managing the patriarchal family structure, 
the labour market, and the nation’s economic development. However, Korean women today are 
                                                 
6 Multicultural Family Support Policy Master Plan 2010-2012 by Prime Minister’s Office and Relevant 
departments.   
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increasingly resisting traditional patriarchal roles of wife, mother, daughter-in-law and primary 
caregivers by prioritizing careers, minimizing interactions with in-laws, having fewer children, 
and remaining unmarried.  
The distorted gender ratio and shortage of marriageable Korean women is a result of 
gender-selective abortion. Research explains the sex-ratio imbalances as a key structural 
condition of international marriage migration (see Chan 1991, Glenn 1992 in the cases of the 
U.S; see Lan 2008 for the case of Taiwan). In South Korea, the sex-ratio imbalances are mainly 
due to gender-selective abortion of female fetuses, which is illegal but commonly practiced due 
to the traditional cultural preference for sons. For example, for over 30 years the sex ratio always 
surpassed the natural birth ratio from the early 1970s until late 2006 (Bae 2010). Some years 
display an extremely distorted ratio. In 1975, there were 112.4 boy babies born for every 100 girl 
babies (sex ratio 112:4:100), and in 1990 the sex ratio was 116.5:100 (ibid).  
Socio-cultural transformations also contribute to the reproduction crisis in South Korea. 
Amongst young families, a double income and fewer children have become more desirable. This 
indicates that higher educated Korean women are pursuing career aspirations, financial and 
personal independence from the traditional in-law relations, and equal marriage relations with 
their husbands. This is partly due to their demands for more gender equality, and partly because 
of the disadvantages they still face in both the household and the labour market. While the male 
breadwinner ideal is still pervasive, women's income has become crucial, especially in the city 
because it is difficult to support a family on a single income. While Korean women's labour 
market participation has increased in the past few decades, it is still lower than men’s7, and 
                                                 
7 In April 2018, Korean women's labour market participation rate was 59%, while labour market 
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gender-segregated labour markets have exacerbated the exploitation of women and 
discriminatory hiring practices (Han and Chun 2014). Although Korean women's education 
levels surpassed that of men8, there remains a significant gender wage gap.9  
On top of this, despite a gradual improvement of Korean men’s participation in 
housework and parenting, the sexual division of labour in the household still reinforces women 
as a primary caregiver.  For those working women, thus, family responsibilities usually 
constitute “the second shift” (Hochschild and Machung 1989). One of the coping strategies 
Korean women employ is to have fewer children. They also try to minimize their traditional 
domestic roles as a daughter-in-law. Furthermore, Korean women are also increasingly delaying 
marriage or not marrying at all. According to a 2015, while 54.8 percent of male respondents 
answered that the overall cost of marriage is their main reason for delaying marriage, 58.9 
percent of female respondents said that they delay getting married because of unequal gender 
roles regarding housework, child care, and in-law-oriented marriage life.10 Therefore, scholars 
suggest that the Korean state needs to introduce more gender-equal family and labour policies. 
 Instead, the Korean state has turned to foreign brides to increase the fertility rate and has 
amended the citizenship law to make the importation of foreign brides easier for Korean 
bachelors. The Korean government encourages foreign brides to have children by providing 
necessary services and benefits under the new family policy and the Multicultural Family 
                                                 
participation amongst Korean men’s was 79%. (Statistics Korea 2018, Employment trends) 
8 In 2013, 74.5% of female high school graduates went to colleges or universities and 67.4% of male high 
school graduates went to colleges or universities. (Statistics Korea 2015, Statistics and women’s life). 
9 On average, Korean women receive 68% of Korean men’s average wage in 2016. (Statistics Korea 
2017, Social indicators in 2016) 
10 Maekyong Economy Weekly. Cover story on April 16, 2015. 
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Support Act. As a result, the number of foreign brides has been dramatically increasing every 
year. International marriages now make up 8% of the total number of marriages in  
South Korea (Statistics Korea 2018). In interregional and international migration, the role of the 
state is growing more critical in initiating, selecting, retraining, and ending migration flows 
(Teitelbaum 2002). In the following section, I demonstrate the Korean State's intervention in 
migration flows by looking at migration policies. 
 
 
2.2 Korean State Intervention in Migration Flows  
2.2.1 Gendered Immigration, Citizenship, and Settlement Policies 
 In the case of the U.S, immigration policies historically excluded women of colour to prevent 
non-white family formation. For example, Asian women were not allowed to enter the U.S in the 
early decades of immigration even long after the importation of Chinese and Japanese male 
workers (Thai 2008). On the contrary, South Korean immigration policy is oriented towards 
female marriage immigrants. Contemporary Korean immigration policy is highly inclusive of 
female migrants from different racial and ethnic backgrounds, despite strong undercurrents of 
ethnonationalism and the myth of homogeneity.  
South Korean immigration policy is based on two interrelated gender ideologies; blood is 
passed down paternally and a wife is considered under her husband’s control. First, Koreans' 
belief that blood passes down through a father is essential to understanding gendered 
immigration and citizenship policies, which are inclusive of foreign women but exclusive of 
foreign men. Until 1997, a foreign bride could automatically have attained Korean citizenship 
upon marriage to a Korean husband, but a foreign husband was only allowed to get a temporary 
visitor visa. In many cases, foreign husbands had to re-enter South Korea every three months to 
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renew their visitor status (Jung 2007).  Since they were officially tourists, the majority of foreign 
husbands were not allowed to get jobs in South Korea until the Korean nationality law was 
revised in 1998. 
While the children of a foreign bride and a Korean man were Korean citizens, the Korean 
government did not recognize the children of a foreign husband and a Korean woman as Korean 
citizens (Jung 2007). According to the Korean nationality law, the children of a foreign father 
were foreigners following their father’s nationality (ibid). Therefore, they had to register as 
foreign nationals even though they were born in South Korea and their mother was Korean. 
Therefore, if children with a Korean mother and a foreign father wanted to register as Korean, 
the couple needed to have a legal divorce even though they remained in a de-facto marital 
relationship (ibid). In 1998, the Korean nationality law was revised, but instead of allowing fast-
track citizenship for both foreign brides and foreign husbands, the South Korean government 
discontinued automatic citizenship for foreign brides (H. Lee 2008). Thus, both foreign men and 
foreign women now have to wait at least two years before applying for Korean citizenship.  
  Since 2005 the Korean government has instituted policies to deal with these new families 
of international marriage, which are now officially called “multicultural families” (tamunhwa 
gajok). While immigration and citizenship policies sanction entry and legal status in the country, 
the Multicultural Families Support Act is a settlement policy to help marriage immigrants and 
their Korean families’ successful integration into Korean society.  
 The Multicultural Families Support Act is a result of the realization of Korea becoming a 
multicultural and multi-ethnic society. In 2006, South Korean president Roh Moo-Hyun passed 
two new acts: "Act on the Social Integration of Mix-Race Families and Immigrants," and "Act on 
Foreign Wife Integration."  President Roh declared that the "the trend towards multi-
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race/multicultural society is irresistible" and therefore "it is high time to incorporate multicultural 
policies. The Ministry of Education and Human Development also announced a shift in civic 
education textbooks from an emphasis on mono-ethnicity towards multiculturalism and the 
values of tolerance” (H. Kim 2007: 65). This is a rather drastic departure from previous 
educational content, where the most important topic in the civic textbook was how distinctive 
and unique Koreans are from other ethnic groups in the world and how lucky Korea is to be 
ethnically homogeneous. In 2008, the Multicultural Families Support Act was passed, and the 
law installed the Multicultural Family Support Centers.  
There were 211 Multicultural Family Support Centers throughout the whole country by 
2013. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, these Centers offer 
standardized programs. They provide assistance programs mainly for female marriage 
immigrants' successful integration to Korean family culture and society. Therefore, the centers 
provide free Korean language and culture classes, Korean cooking classes, drivers' license 
classes, computer classes, legal aids for domestic violence, child-rearing seminars, speech clinics 
for children, and simple job training. Primarily, the free Korean language and culture classes 
offer a waiver of the Korean proficiency test when immigrants apply for Korean citizenship. 
There is no doubt that the multicultural families support centers greatly assist the settlement of 
marriage immigrants on a daily level. 
  However, the logic of the Multicultural Families Support Act and the actual programs put 
marriage immigrants and their families into a separate category of ‘multicultural family' 
alongside their racial, gender, and class status. Interestingly, according to the Support for 
Multicultural Families Act, the subjects of integration into Korean society are not only the 
marriage immigrants themselves but also their Korean spouses and Korean born children. By 
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legal definition, a multicultural family means a family of a union between a Korean citizen and a 
marriage immigrant, a union between a natural born Korean citizen and a naturalized Korean 
citizen, and a union between two naturalized Korean citizens. Thus, a standard Korean family is 
narrowly defined as a family of two ethnically, legally, and culturally Koreans and their Korean-
born children. A family with any ethnic, legal, and cultural non-Korean components falls into the 
category of multicultural family. This narrow legal definition distinguishes a multicultural family 
from a standard Korean family. Thus, multicultural family support centers mainly provide social 
integration programs for so-called multicultural families, of which one or more family members 
are native Koreans.  
 Government welfare programs also play an essential role in disseminating the social 
images of multicultural family throughout Korean society. For example, until 2018 when the 
Korean government introduced the universal child care benefit, Korean families had to prove 
their low income to receive welfare benefits (i.e., childcare subsidies), but a multicultural family 
could get benefits regardless of their income level. Eventually the term ‘multicultural family’ is 
socially translated into a low-income family. Koreans often use the term tamunhwa to refer to a 
multicultural family in a neutral sense, but at the same time, they use the term tamunhwa in a 
derogatory way to imply a certain degree of underprivilege.     
 
2.2.2 Korean Guest Worker Program: The Employment Permit System 
In the early 1990s, the Korean government started importing low-skilled foreign migrant worker 
for the manufacturing industry when irregular/precarious employment (bijŏnggyujik) began 
dramatically increasing, and as neo-liberal economic policies were introduced in South Korea. 
Beginning in 1993, as a form of irregular employment, foreign migrant workers came through 
49 
 
the Industrial Trainee Programs (ITP), the earlier version of low-skilled foreign labour 
importation. Originally, the ITP was intended to transfer skills to students from less-developed 
countries for intra-regional economic co-operation. However, the ITP was abolished in 2007 
because an excessive number of foreign industrial trainees escaped from their programs and 
became undocumented migrant workers (HRDKorea 2013:3).  
Since an increasing number of small and medium-size factories used trainees as cheap 
labour, these programs became a de facto channel for recruiting low-skilled foreign migrant wor 
kers (Gray 2004, K. Park 2005, S. Lee 2007, Seol 2000). However, foreign industrial trainees 
were officially students, not workers. Therefore, foreign trainees were not subject to the Labor 
Standards Act. Because foreign trainee were not workers, they only received a monthly 
allowance, instead of wages, that was roughly 30-40% of what an undocumented foreign worker 
could earn from a factory for similar work (S. Lee 2007). On top of that, the majority of foreign 
trainees entered South Korea through expensive private legal and illegal migration brokers. 
Consequently, foreign trainees voluntarily became undocumented workers and stayed until they 
could make enough money to support their family back home and to pay back the debt that they 
owed migration brokers (ibid). In 1997, 32% of foreign trainees left their workplace and became 
undocumented workers (Ministry of Justices 1998). Moreover, inhumane treatment and abuse of 
foreign trainees became a major social issue (Doucette and Prey 2010, HRDKorea 2013). Thus, 
the Korean government gradually reduced the ITP and eventually decided to abolish it in 2007.  
To replace the ITP, the Korean government introduced the Employment Permit System 
(EPS) in 2004 to recruit low skilled foreign migrant workers (ibid:3). One of the main 
characteristics of the EPS is the substantial involvement of the South Korean government. The 
government highly regulates the population of the foreign workforce, entry processes, labour 
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relations, legal status of workers, and entry and departure processes. Low skilled foreign migrant 
workers come to Korea on 3- or less than 5-year limited term contracts under the EPS through 
the governmental Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Korea and 16 countries:  
China, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, East Timor, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Under the EPS, 
foreign migrant workers can be protected by the Labor Standards Act, Minimum Wage Act, 
Industrial Safety and Health Act, and can access social benefits such as medical insurance, 
industrial accident compensation insurance, and national pension.11  However, the EPS does not 
allow foreign migrants to change their workplace except in cases of unpaid wages, physical or 
sexual harassment, or factory shutdown. Thus, the immobility of foreign migrant workers is 
often criticized by human right organizations in South Korea. 
 To prevent overstay after foreign migrant workers’ contracts end, and to make sure they 
return to their home countries, the Korean government installed additional regulations, such as 
mandatory return insurances and the quota system of foreign workforce. The mandatory return 
guarantee insurances of the EPS include Departure Guarantee Insurance (similar to a retirement 
bonus) and Guarantee Insurance (for the case of unpaid wages) that employers should buy for 
foreign migrant workers. Foreign migrant workers should also buy two other insurances, Return 
Cost Insurance (for one-way airfare) and Casualty Insurance (in case of death or serious disease). 
These insurance savings are used for return expenses. A foreign migrant worker can receive all 
the remaining funds after their departure from South Korea. These insurances are intended to 
                                                 




guarantee foreign migrant workers’ return to their home countries by preventing any excuse to 
overstay in South Korea.12 On top of that, the Korean government operates the quota system in 
order to regulate the population of the foreign workforce and to prevent overstays of foreign 
migrant workers by forcing migrant-sending countries’ active intervention in the successful 
return of migrants. Each year, the Korean government announces the size of the workforce for 
each MoU country’s government based on an assessment of the entry and departure records of 
the foreign workforce. To avoid being disadvantaged by the quota system, migrant-sending 
countries try to ensure the successful return of migrants to their home countries.    
It should be mentioned that ethnic Koreans from China and from former Soviet Union 
countries like Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan typically enter South Korea through the Visit and Work 
program under the EPS. These ethnic Koreans are descendants of Korean emigres who fled from 
Japanese colonialism to China and Russia in the early 1900s. Visit and Work allows ethnic 
Korean descendants with foreign nationality to work as unskilled and low skilled workers in 
manufacturing, construction, agriculture, fishing, and service industries for three years 
(HRDKorea 2013:3). While the EPS does not allow foreign migrant workers’ job mobility, Visit 
and Work allows ethnic Koreans to freely search for jobs and to change workplaces within the 
accepted category of jobs. Ethnic Koreans from China (chosŏnjok or Korean-Chinese) are the 
majority of migrants in the Visit and Work program.   
 
                                                 
12 Guide on EPS 4 Major Insurances from the EPS official website accessed June 28 in 2018 




This chapter has explored how racialization of South and Southeast Asian migrants as tongnama 
depends on structural arrangements, such as the government-controlled importation of migrants, 
immigration law, and settlement policies. The Korean State plays a crucial role in the 
racialization of South and Southeast Asian migrants by setting up the institutional conditions that 
affect the life of migrants. The State actively recruits migrants for its economic and social needs, 
and carefully selects migrants under certain criteria by controlling its borders and by utilizing 
citizenship and settlement policies. Immigration policy and citizenship are crucial tools for 
differentiating who is, and who is not, a member of the national community. While the Korean 
State does not allow labour migrants’ settlement and only uses their labour through the Korean 
guest worker program – the Employment Permit System, the State actively recruits marriage 
immigrants, mostly foreign brides to remedy its declining population size. In turn, the term 
tongnama, which was previously understood in a geographical sense, has gained a new racial 
meaning.  
The following three empirical chapters will show how a combination of physical traits 
and the conceived economic power of each group operates during the racialization process in the 







Chapter 3: The Racialization of Migrants - an Outcome of Post-
Industrialization  
Korean society is culturally indulgent to commenting on the appearance of others. Even though 
commenting on appearance is beginning to be considered an intrusive and improper manner 
amongst younger generations, this is still seen as a way of showing care and intimacy to family 
members, friends, colleagues and neighbours. During my field research, I received comments 
from my family and friends on my tanned skin and ‘natural’ face. They advised me that I needed 
to take better care of my skin, otherwise people would misrecognize me as a tongnama foreign 
bride, or chosŏnjok migrant worker. I was surprised - not because people commented on my 
looks - but because they use ethnic and racial analogies to describe less desirable skin and style. 
Koreans used to insult those with darker skin by comparing them to farmers - which implies 
cultural hierarchies between the urban and the rural - now they were using foreign migrants from 
South and Southeast Asia or China as the point of reference. Indeed, it is not difficult to observe 
how Koreans understand South and Southeast Asian and rural Chinese migrant workers in South 
Korea. However, I could not help wondering what people actually mean by tongnama skin 
colour and ‘style’, and why their light brown or brown skin is less desirable? Is it only about skin 
colour and style? Or do such physical markers matter because they imply the hierarchies between 
Koreans and migrants from what Koreans call tongnama countries? 
This chapter examines the key aspects of racialization of Southeast Asian migrants as 
tongnama migrants. First, I discuss the historical context of how Euro-American racial logics 
were introduced in the late 19th century and how Japanese colonial power strategically re-
appropriated these racial logics in order to make Koreans as colonial subjects. I also discuss 
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ethnonationalism and the legacy of the authoritarian regime as a culture of hierarchies. The 
racialization of tongnama migrants is deployed within South Korea’s cultural system as common 
sense. In what follows, I will show how Koreans mobilize Korean identity as an essential 
component of their community and nation, and how Koreans deliberately construct the tongnama 
Other at the same time. Then, I demonstrate that slotting ethnic status into a racial category is the 
key unit organizing South Koreans’ understanding of tongnama migrants. I will demonstrate 
how economic developmental hierarchies are translated into ethnic/racial hierarchies on a global 
scale during the process of constructing migrants when South Korea sees itself as a post-
industrialized and advanced capitalist country. This key aspect helps us to understand how the 
racialization of migrants takes place. Finally, I will discuss Koreans’ understanding of new 
global racial hierarchies, and why South Korea needs racial others.     
 
3.1 Historical and Cultural Background of Race in South Korea 
3.1.1 Imported Racial Hierarchy: Legacy of Japanese Colonialism and the U.S 
Imperialism 
 
Empirically, ethnicity is more predominant than race in East Asia. There is a firm belief in South 
Korea and Japan that they are homogenous one-nation-countries even though each country has 
ethnic minorities (Lie 2001, 2014). However, East Asian countries have produced racial others 
throughout modern history for diverse reasons, such as to defend themselves from European 
imperial invasions, to control their own ethnic minorities, and to justify their invasion of other 
parts of Asia. For example, before the onset of Western colonialism (European and American 
colonialism), there existed long-standing racial traditions in China (Dikötter 1992). According to 
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Dikötter (ibid), the Chinese racial tradition is a mixture of Confucianism (a cultural distinction 
between the civilized center and the barbarian periphery) and western idea of race (based on 
assumed biological differences). This conception of race played a role not only in building 
national consciousness but also in controlling ethnic minorities under the Han Chinese rule in the 
19th century. At the same time, this Chinese version of a racial hierarchy (yellow and white 
people are on top; black, red and brown on the bottom) also ideologically served Chinese people 
in their fight to defend China’s cultural superiority from western imperialism. In Japan, the 
categories of race and ethnicity served to control ethnic minorities, such as Ainu (indigenous 
people in Hokkaido), Okinawan people, burakumin, and Korean and Chinese minorities. It also 
played a role in constructing a homogenous national consciousness that was contrary to the 
reality of “multi-ethnic Japan” (Lie 2004). Similarly, in the 19th century, on the Korean 
peninsula, the concept of race first appeared as a defensive tactic against western imperial power 
and as a way to understand the national ‘self’ under the conditions of geopolitical conflict 
between the West and Japan (Schmid 2002). 
The dominant western racial hierarchy that places the white race on top arrived in Korea 
belatedly through intellectuals who supported Western ideas of scientific progress and 
civilization in the late 19th Century (B. Chun 1995, S. Park 1996, N. Park 2002). This was during 
a period of political turmoil when western imperialism was threatening neighbouring Asian 
countries. According to B. Chun (1995), in the mid-19th century Chosŏn (the old name of Korea) 
had defined white people as barbarians. It is important to point out that white people were not 
conceived of racially at this time, as the concept of race itself did not even exist before Chosŏn 
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opened its markets to the imperial powers in 1876.13 Since Chosŏn was under China’s 
cultural/political influence for several hundred years, civilized beings and barbarians were 
distinguished according to whether they followed Confucianism manners or not. Since white 
people did not follow Confucianism, they were not recognized as civilized beings14. Thus, 
discrimination against others was based on cultural distinctions, not on any perceived biological 
differences.  
However, by the late 19th Century, new geopolitical realities had forced dramatic changes 
to notions of race. After its treaty with Japan, Chosŏn was forced to sign more unequal treaties 
with Britain and America. This new position of subordination to the white race popularized the 
idea that white people should be placed on the top of a racial hierarchy that had Asians in the 
middle and black and indigenous races on the bottom. Western-influenced intellectuals argued 
that Korea should imitate Western civilization in order to ensure the survival of “the East Asian 
race” (B. Chun 1995, N. Park 2002). In particular, Yoon Chi-Ho15 educated Chosŏn people on 
American conceptions of racial hierarchy through his newspaper, The Independent.16  A column 
of The Independent, June 24 in 1897 describes different races in the following manner: "the 
black race is […] more stupid than the Asian race and inferior to the white race. The indigenous 
race has a red face, and their appearance is similar to Asians, but they are inferior to Asians. […] 
                                                 
13 Since 1876, Chosŏn was forced to open its market for Japan, America, Russia and European imperial 
powers.  
14 For example, the scholar Lee HangRo (1792-1868) argued that even though white people are skilled 
and scientifically advanced, they cannot be civilized beings in the same way that we don’t consider bees 
to be human beings despite their amazing ability to produce honey. (Park and Yoon1980:179)   
15 Yoon Chi-Ho was the first Chosŏn intellectual to study in the U.S (1888 – 1893). 
16 The Independent was founded in 1896. It was the first modern newspaper to be written in Korean and 
English. Other newspapers of the time were written in Chinese so that only intellectuals could access 
them. While illiteracy rates were quite high, The Independent was widely accessible for ordinary people 
who could read and write Korean.  
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The white race is the smartest and bravest amongst the races of the world.” (cited from B. Chun 
1995:133) 
Chun Bok-Hee (1995:127) points out that while the idea of race in Europe and America 
functioned as an ideology to prove the superiority of the white race and to justify colonization in 
Africa and South Asia, intellectuals of Chosŏn used the idea of race to explain the conflict 
between Asian countries and Western countries in the international politic arena. Some 
intellectuals of Chosŏn, like Yoon Chi-ho, used the idea of race and argued the solidarity of 
Asian people as one race to defend Asia from invasion by the white race. However, while this 
early idea of race may have been useful in mobilizing self-defense against imperialism, it soon 
combined with Social Darwinism to accept the logic of imperialism (ibid: 144). The colonization 
of Korea by Japan from 1910-1945 heavily depended on this notion of race as it gave the 
Japanese Imperial State legitimacy. 
 It is important to point out that conceptualizing race was an elite intellectual discourse as 
ordinary Koreans did not have much interaction with Americans and Europeans. The non-
existence of racial minorities in Korea in the 19th and early 20th century meant that Koreans did 
not generate their own popular conception of race or ethnicity. Instead, following Jeon (2001:85) 
it can be said that “racism in Korea was the product of colonial modernization.”  
 It is also a very recent development whose boundaries are still taking shape to the ongoing 
influx of foreign migrant workers and immigrants. The boundary between Koreans and 
tongnama migrants is drawn with Koreans positioning themselves atop. Interestingly, the racial 
logic that Koreans are closer to Whites while tongnama migrants are closer to Blacks is very 
similar to the racial logic the Japanese colonial regime (1910-1945) applied to colonial Koreans. 
The Japanese conceived of themselves as the ‘whites of East Asia’ while colonial Koreans were 
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seen as ‘blacks’ (Chung 2004). In other words, Koreans were blackened under Japanese 
colonialism within the category of the East Asian race. Thus, differentiation within the category 
of East Asian had been more prominent during Japanese colonialism.  
However, the relationship between American Whites and Blacks became more influential 
to Korean understandings of racial hierarchy after the Korean War (han'gukchŏnjaeng, 1950-3) 
(N. Kim 2008), even though Korea did not have a sizeable foreign population for a long time. 
Koreans were racialized through their imperial relationship with the U.S, so the imperialist racial 
formation they adapted was forged mainly through the U.S dominance over South Korea after 
the Korean War (Moon 1997, N. Kim 2008). For example, American media and TV networks 
like AFKN (American Forces Korea Network) exerted a strong influence over the conceptions of 
race and racial hierarchies in South Korea (K. Park 2007, N. Kim 2008). In response, Koreans 
strategically positioned themselves in-between whites and blacks, adopting racial prejudices 
against blacks (N. Kim 2008: 113). While this American racial hierarchy was imported into 
South Korea, Koreans’ own cultural system interpreted race more according to ethno-nationality, 
which is concerned with blood origins such as tanil-minjok (the single ethnic/race nation) (ibid: 
23-4). Therefore, non-Korean people are generally placed the lump category of oegukin 
(foreigner) that works to create a clear boundary between Koreans and non-Koreans.  
Since the 1990s though, after the influx of foreign migrant workers and immigrants, a 
new boundary has been inscribed into the category of oegukin (foreigner). This new group is 
tongnama (Southeast Asian) migrants from South and Southeast Asian countries. At the same 
time, the skin colour and physical characteristics of these migrants are used as markers to 
differentiate these migrants. As N. Kim (ibid: 27-33) points out, white and black colours were 
associated with social status in traditional agrarian Korean society long before Western racial 
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hierarchies were introduced. White represented higher social status, cultural sophistication, 
intellectualism, while the colour black represented lower social status, cultural vulgarity, and 
ignorance. This was because the ruling class had a relatively pale skin tone while peasants and 
labourers were tanned from working outside. Koreans consider themselves to have a relatively 
lighter skin tone compared to migrant workers and foreign brides from Southeast Asian countries 
and they think that this lighter skin tone is closer to the white race while the darker skin of 
migrants is closer to that of the black race. Thus, traditional Korean colour prejudice has fused 
with skin colour distinctions that were entrenched through Japanese colonialism and U.S 
hegemony. 
 
3.1.2 Cultural Foundations: Korean Ethnonationalism and Authoritarian Culture  
Korean-ness is characterized by ethnonationalism, which underpins a strong undercurrent of 
ethnic homogeneity and Korean bloodism - the belief that every single Korean is a descendant of 
the same ancestor. However, Benedict Anderson (1983) points out that a nation is “an imagined 
political community” which is imagined by the people who believe themselves to be members of 
the same group.  Along the same lines, Korean scholars (H. Cho 1998, D. Kim 2000, Ha 2012) 
argue that Korean ethnonationalism is a very modern invention and it was mobilized for several 
different political and geopolitical reasons. For example, Korean identity was actively 
reconstructed as a means of resistance against Japanese colonialism and American imperialism 
(Ha 2012). At the same time, Korean identity was used as a dominant ideology to mobilize the 
whole nation for rapid industrialization and economic growth (Yoon and G. Kim 2005).  
In the early 1900s, Korean identity was mobilized as a resistance strategy against 
Japanese colonialism. Korean anticolonial nationalists essentialized Korean identity and tradition 
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in association with the ideology of pure blood to resist Japanese colonialism. H. Cho (1998: 89) 
argues that colonial Korea’s defensive subjectivity lay between the aspirations of colonial 
modernization - with colonial elites strongly believing that Korea would become stronger with 
the help of Japan - and the anticolonial nationalism that totalized discourse within a fixed Korean 
identity and essentialized tradition. This tension between colonial modernization and 
essentializing Korean ethnonationalism remains even after the post-colonial era (ibid).  
During the industrialization period of the 1970s, the authoritarian government mobilized 
Korean-ness as a developmental strategy under a command economy. Tambiah (1996) points out 
that Asian and African post-colonial states often promoted the ideology of ethnonationalism for 
nation-building and economic development. Korean scholars (H. Cho 1998, D. Kim 2000, Yoon 
and G. Kim 2005) also point out that in the post-colonial period the whole nation was mobilized 
toward economic growth and industrialization. To mobilize the whole nation, nationalist values 
like patriotism and individual sacrifice for the nation were prioritized. In particular, Korean 
ethnonationalism was emphasized to provide the ideological linkage between the Korean nation 
and the state. Koreans eventually came to believe in the political and biological conformity of the 
Korean nation-state (D. Kim 2000). Through this process, the Korean state exerted full control 
over the Korean economy and society until 1987 when the democratization movement swept 
over the country (D. Kim 2000, Koo 2001, Cho 2010). Economic exploitation of workers and the 
political oppression of citizens were justified as a noble sacrifice made for the nation’s economic 
growth and modernization under the rhetoric of the glorious future of Korea (J. Lee 2004, Cho 
2010). To mobilize and encourage the whole nation, the Korean state often presented North 
America and Western Europe as model societies that Korea could learn from, and one day 
possibly catch up to. As a result, while Koreans built a strong nationalistic tendency and a pride 
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in being han'guksaram (Korean), Koreans have also had an inferiority complex to North 
America and Western Europe because the Korean developmental discourses posited its own 
culture and society as traditional and behind the “West."     
In this sense, the 1990’s boom in Korean cultural movements, such as finding the Korean 
self and finding Korean roots and tradition, signifies the start of Koreans building confidence in 
their own cultural heritage and identity (H. Cho 1998). The desire to explore Korean traditional 
culture among the youth who yearned for strong cultural identity and pride emerged soon after 
South Korea achieved rapid economic growth (ibid). Koreans’ self-confidence in their economic 
success allowed South Koreans to view Korean culture, which had depreciated for a while, as a 
new resource that could appeal to the rest of the world. This 1990s discourse of Korean-ness 
resonated with the South Korean state’s policy slogan of globalization - segyehwa – the aim of 
which was not only to boost the economy but also to improve the image and reputation of South 
Korea.  
   
3.1.3 Learning Race through Education  
Physical characteristics are often used as markers to justify racial boundaries. In South Korea, 
skin colour is often used as a means of collective representation, even when the skin colour 
differences between people are not obvious. I found that when people use skin colour to mark 
boundaries, they mean general phenotype. Almost all Korean interviewees responded that skin 
colour is the most important standard to divide White, Black, and Asian races. They often 
explain that race is about skin colour. The following excerpt from a group interview with Korean 




Lee: What could be the most important thing when you define race? 
Mrs. Kim: It is skin colour. 
Mrs. Choi: Yes, skin colour. 
  Mrs. Seo: Because it is visible.  
Mrs. Choi: I think everyone would say the same answer. 
 Mrs. Kim: I think so too.  
                              (Korean women, Mrs. Seo, age 63, Mrs. Choi, age 59, Mrs. Kim, age 54) 
 
As this conversation shows, skin-colour differences may be evident and visible for Koreans who 
believe that race is about skin colour distinction. However, in reality, there is no clear boundary 
between different skin colours. How then can we understand that almost all Korean interviewees 
divide the world’s population into categories organized by skin colour, such as black, white, and 
Asian? Why does everyone respond with much the same answer? I soon found that education 
plays an essential role in disseminating racial categories in South Korea. This explains why 
South Koreans still use the simple colour distinction of racial categories when it comes to 
categorizing races even though South Koreans have developed detailed cultural cues to 
distinguish Koreans from Chinese and Japanese for example. Many Korean interviewees 
commented that they learned about black, white, and Asian race from their elementary school 
text books. Mr. Park who has a high school education remarked:   
 
Mr. Park: I learned these things, for example, race, black, white, Asian, skin colour from 
school. It isn't my judgement. So I thought that you had a hidden intention behind 
when you asked me how I define race.   
63 
 
(Mr. Park, Korean male, ex-auto factory worker, age 39) 
 
Korean public elementary school textbooks used to teach that races are divided by skin colour 
into white, black, and Asian – distinctions which initially reflected 19th century's Euro-American 
views on races. Therefore, the majority of Koreans understand race as a category of skin colour 
distinction.  
In immigrant hosting societies, it is well known that public education is one of the main 
sites where ethnic and racial stereotypes are reproduced. Osunde, Tlou, and Brown (1996) point 
out that the attitudes and knowledge of school teachers are very influential in teaching students 
about racial stereotypes. Griffin et al. (2006) found in their research on Australian students that 
the attitudes of school teachers affect students' negative or positive attitudes towards Asia. The 
education system in South Korea also reproduces racial stereotypes and portrayals. For example, 
the social studies school textbooks of elementary and secondary schools from 1996 to 2007 
described Africa with phrases such as “previously colonies of Europe,” and “poverty, civil wars, 
and refugees” (D. Kim and Han 2012).  
 In 2005, the Ministry of Education and Human Development announced a shift in civic 
education textbooks from an emphasis on mono-ethnicity towards multiculturalism and the 
values of tolerance (H. Kim 2007: 65). Therefore, the younger generation of children in South 
Korean schools may have greater values of tolerance to differences. However, education is still a 
vital domain for reproducing racial prejudice and categorization by skin colour even after 
incorporating multicultural contents in civic education textbooks since 2007. The following 
handout from an elementary school – the intention of which is to learn about cultural diversity – 
provides a snapshot of how race is taught in class. 
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[Figure 1] A class handout  
 
Note 1. This handout was used in 2012 in an 
elementary school to teach cultural 
diversity. It explains the racial 
characteristics of Asians, Whites, and 
Blacks. The handout instructs students to 
colour the skin and hair accordingly. The 
handout says that the yellow race lives in 
Asia, whose features are characterized by 
yellowish skin, a broad forehead, small 
noses, and black straight hair. The white 
race live in Europe, North and South 
America, and North Africa. They have 
pale skin, a big nose with a long face, 
mild curly hair, blue and light brown 
eyes. Finally, the black race live in Africa 
and North America. They have copper 
brown or dark brown skin, flat noses, 
thick lips, and short curly hair.  
 
Source: K. Lee 2012.  
 
 
This class material, which reflects teachers' stereotypes and knowledge about race, teaches racial 
categories to young students. According to research on elementary school textbooks from grade 
one to three conducted by a migrants’ human right group in 201217, school textbooks that are 
supposed to teach cultural diversity and multiculturalism contain racial stereotypes about foreign 
mothers, their children, and people from South and Southeast Asian countries. In the illustrations 
and pictures in the school textbooks examined in this study, while white Europeans and white 
North Americans are delineated as tourists and international students, Southeast Asians and 
Africans are depicted as factory workers with darker skin. According to the report, theses 
                                                 
17  02/28/2012. Busan Ilbo. 
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illustrations misrepresent the reality that Asians make up of 85.2% of foreign tourists, and 92.4% 
of international students in South Korea.  
 
3.1.4 The Role of Media 
According to recent research on media and race (Kim and Cho 2010, H. Kim 2017), following 
school textbooks, the media is the second most important channel for learning about ethnic and 
racial stereotypes in South Korea. Stuart Hall (2000:273) argues that “amongst other kinds of 
ideological labour, the media construct for us a definition of what race is, what meaning the 
imagery of race carries, and what the “problem of race” is understood to be. They help to classify 
out the world in terms of the categories of race.” Indeed, the mass media is one of the essential 
domains for spreading out racial ideologies. N. Kim (2008) argued that since South Koreans are 
heavily exposed to American TV and film - which portray the normativity of white America and 
the inferiority of non-white America - South Koreans take racial inequality for granted.  
G. Han (2003) analyzed the representations of foreign residents in South Korea and found 
that while white people are depicted as highly educated and sophisticated, Africans and 
Southeast Asians are portrayed as unsophisticated or as objects for laughter. This hierarchy is 
also easily observable through media representations, as Y. Kim, Yoo, and J. Kim (2009: 25) 
write in their study of Korean soap operas; “Generally, white men represent traditional 
bourgeoisie, and Japanese, Taiwanese and Chinese are represented the middle class with new 
money, but Chinese migrant workers and South and Southeast Asian men are omitted.”  Recent 
research on media and ethnic and racial stereotypes (H. Kim 2017) backs up this point: South 
Koreans consider white people from North America and Europe as admirable, Asians from 
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economically developed countries (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China) as competitors, but 
Southeast Asians are viewed as illegal migrants or objects of sympathy.  
Not only Koreans but also immigrants learn race through the mass media. While many 
immigrant and foreign worker interviewees did not even know the word, tongnama, some 
immigrant interviewees - especially those who have been exposed to Korean mass media more 
often and who have more interactions with Koreans - have learned the term tongnama. A 
Vietnamese immigrant, Hong, who married a Korean man, explains how she learned the word 
tongnama from her neighbours and from TV news. 
  
   Lee: Have you thought of yourself as tongnama? 
Hong: Yes, I have. I heard tongnama from Korean people a long time ago soon after I 
came to Korea. On one occasion, there was a Cambodian woman near me, and 
Korean people thought this woman was me. They said, "oh, you guys look similar 
because you are tongnama.”  It was the first time to hear of tongnama, and I 
thought that maybe I am tongnama.  Also, then I heard it again from the TV news.      
   Lee: What was it?  
Hong: Well…. In the TV news, when foreign workers have some complaints. I heard 
from the TV news about tongnama foreign workers’ protest for unpaid wages.  
   Lee: Did the TV news use the word, tongnama?  
Hong: Yeah, it did, and I thought that I am tongnama.                  
(Hong, Vietnamese female immigrant, age 29) 
Long-term immigrants, who have a higher level of Korean language proficiency and a more 
comprehensive understanding of Korean culture, learn the term and the meaning of tongnama as 
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they become more integrated into Korean society. Some immigrants, like Hong, accept this 
concept as they learn it, but some immigrants show discontent with this concept because of its 
negative portrayal of South and Southeast Asians.   
Thus, both Korean public education and mass media teach race and racial ideology. 
Significantly, Korean education and mass media are influenced by old Euro-American racial 
categories and racial logics, which are organized by skin colour distinctions, racial attributes, and 
racial aptitudes. As N. Kim (2008: 11) explains however, "none of the cultural representations 
would carry the force that they do unless they made sense within South Korean cultural logics." 
Thus, by reorganizing the imported Euro-American racial logic with the Korean cultural system 
of ethnonationalism and hierarchism, South and Southeast Asian migrants are slotted into a new 
category of tongnama in South Korea.  
 
3.2 Mobilizing Korean Identity to Secure Resources  
Constructing national, ethnic, and racial identity is one of the strategies to access, or limit access 
to social, economic, and political resources. Throughout the recent history of racial identity 
formation, diverse forms of capitalism and immigration have been deeply involved with the 
formation of ethnic and racial identity not only for minority groups but also for dominant groups. 
Bonnett (1998) argues that British working-class people mobilized white identity to increase 
chances to access welfare resources under welfare capitalism. In Britain, for example, white 
identity used to be considered bourgeoisie identity, so working-class people were marginal to 
whiteness. However, British working-class people actively mobilized white identity when non-
white immigrants arrived in Britain (ibid). Similarly, in the 19th century U.S, Italian and Irish 
immigrants were not considered as racially white, but they were included in the white 
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community when Asian and African immigrants arrived (Roediger 2002). Another interesting 
study (Hage 2005) shows how Christian Lebanese people, conventionally considered as a non-
white group, actively construct themselves as European and white to separate themselves from 
Muslim Lebanese during the capitalist economic transformation of their country in order to take 
better economic and social positions.  
Immigrant receiving countries often show aggressively defensive positions against 
immigrants and perceived challenges to their social and economic status (Bonnett 1998). As the 
foreign population increases, Koreans’ understanding of immigrants and foreign migrant workers 
has gradually changed. Until the end of the 1990s, Koreans did not perceive immigrants and 
foreign migrant workers as social threats, and instead showed paternalistic sympathy based on 
the social images of foreign migrant workers as the helpless victims of labour exploitation and 
sex trafficking (G. Han 2003). However, Chung et al. (2016) show that Koreans started 
perceiving immigrants and foreign migrant workers as potential social and cultural threats by 
comparing several sets of national surveys from 2003 to 2015. According to their policy report, 
in 2012 around 35.4% of respondents agreed that immigrants were social burdens and threats. In 
the subsequent survey in 2015, this rate increased to 46.7%. Similar to what these surveys 
indicate, my Korean interviewees often expressed apprehension about perceived threats, such as 
economic burdens, political mobilization, social disorder, and intergroup crime. However, while 
Koreans seem to be socially and culturally overwhelmed by the increasing foreign population, in 
general Koreans do not consider immigrants and foreign migrant workers as job competitors 
because the majority of immigrants and foreign migrant workers are concentrated in low wage 
jobs or so-called 3D jobs, which Koreans avoid. Therefore, although working class Korean 
people, especially those who work in the 3D jobs, may experience job competition within the 
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minimum wage jobs, for average Koreans the worry of economic burden does not come directly 
from the job competition. Instead, it is related to the public social images of immigrants and 
multicultural families, so-called tamunhwa as low-income families and as welfare recipients, 
who may reap the benefits of welfare programs and who may need more social services than 
average Korean families.  
When anti-immigrant sentiment and working-class racism arise from the distribution of 
welfare resources, then Korean identity becomes essential for protecting the family, community, 
and nation from immigrants and multicultural families. The growing negative sentiment about 
immigrants and multicultural families is also associated with the perception of reverse 
discrimination; that those groups may receive social benefits more than native Koreans do. Ms. 
Yang, whose younger brother once married a Filipina wife but is now divorced, explains her 
feeling of potential reverse discrimination onto Korean people concerning the distribution of 
welfare resources.   
 
Lee: In your opinion, what could be the positive things about becoming a multicultural 
society, and what are your concerns about becoming a multicultural society if you 
have any?  
      Ms. Yang: I guess the benefits are to experience many different cultures without going 
abroad. But the drawbacks… I worry that Koreans might get fewer welfare 
benefits if there are too many foreigners and immigrants. Look, there are quite 
many community centers and multicultural family centers in Ansan for foreigners 
and multicultural families. These people move to Ansan to use these centers. 
These centers provide subsidies and free programs at the municipal level and 
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national level as well. Of course, as multicultural families and foreigners get more 
benefits, then we Koreans will receive fewer benefits.   
(Ms. Yang, Korean woman, age 36) 
Like Ms. Yang, several Korean interviewees expressed their concerns that free social programs 
may spoil immigrants and multicultural families, and eventually cause reverse discrimination 
onto underprivileged Koreans, such as low-income family, elderly poor, and orphans. Mr. Sang, 
a volunteer of Red Cross Korea also expressed a similar concern saying, “even though there are 
quite a lot of Korean people who need better welfare support, they are neglected compared to 
multicultural families and immigrants.” He hopes that Korea will become an advanced welfare 
state like northern European countries so that Koreans and immigrants would equally enjoy the 
social benefits. While Mr. Sang and Ms. Yang both express concern over the usage of welfare 
resources, Ms. Yang’s concerns are closely related to the perception that Koreans are taxpayers 
and immigrants/multicultural family are welfare receivers. For working-class Koreans, what 
immigrants and multicultural families receive is what they lose. The feeling of unfairness 
reinforces anti-immigrant sentiment concerning competition for scarce resources including 
status, institutional access, and education.  
When educational competition gets severe, racial and ethnic identity becomes important 
to take a better position in the competition. Scholars (Frey 1979, Olzak, Shanahan, and West 
1994, Renzulli and Evans 2005) document how racial/ethnic identity becomes predominant in 
education to maintain perceived social status. For example, in America "whites get social status 
not only from the neighbourhood they live in but also from the quality of the schools their 
children attend” (Renzulli and Evans 2005: 399). White Americans make decisions on residential 
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and school choice based on the actual or potential exposure of their children to ethnic minorities 
(James 1989).   
Since Koreans traditionally treat education as the main social ladder for upward mobility 
and also the essential means through which to maintain status, there is a culture of 
competitiveness from early education to university, which is often described with the term 
“education fever (kyoyungnyol)” (Seth 2002). Korea’s “education fever” is understood as one of 
the reasons why Korea could have achieved unprecedented economic success in such a short 
time. It also often causes public scandals, for example, some affluent families use fake residency 
to illegally transfer their children into schools in highly reputable school districts. Even though 
there is always an internal educational migration flow of young families, who move to a 
reputable district or city to provide a better education for their children, immigrants and 
multicultural families were not seen as a cause of the internal educational migration until 
recently. However, a new educational Korean flight is beginning to emerge in the inner-city 
neighbourhoods near Seoul and Ansan, where immigrants, multicultural families, and foreign 
migrant workers are densely populated.  
According to the newspaper, Segye Ilbo in November 2017, some Korean parents pulled 
their children out of an elementary school in an inner-city neighbourhood of Seoul, where 
relatively higher numbers of children of multicultural and immigrant families reside. These 
Korean parents worried about the low quality of education and the poor reputation of the school. 
As more multicultural children enrolled in this school, more Korean parents pulled their children 
out. The conversation with Mrs. Ko, who has two school-age children, shows her motivations for 
moving from “an immigrant neighbourhood” to “a more reputable neighbourhood” in Ansan. 
Since the housing prices in this newly developed neighbourhood are quite expensive, Mrs. Ko’s 
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family was not able to buy a new home even after selling their old house in the immigrant 
neighbourhood. In the end, they decided to rent a high-end four-bedroom apartment instead.   
 
       Lee: Do you know anyone who moved to another district where there are not many 
multicultural families?  
Mrs. Ko: Well… We did. I didn’t want to do that, but my husband…  My husband said, 
“why does this school have so many tamunhwa (referring to children of 
multicultural and immigrant families)? We need to move to a better 
neighbourhood. Look, isn’t it too obvious, the quality of this school?” So, we sold 
the house and then moved into the better neighbourhood. Actually, there was an 
aggressive kid in my son’s class, and his mother was a darker skinned foreigner. 
In general, Korean mothers complain if there are tamunhwa kids in the same class 
with their kids. Korean mothers think that tamunhwa kids can be needy in class 
and our kids may learn bad behaviours from them.   
(Mrs. Ko, Korean female cooking class instructor, age 38) 
 
Mrs. Ko moved to this newly developed neighbourhood where tamunhwa and foreign migrant 
workers are not likely to be residing because of the higher housing and living costs. Although 
moving into this middle-class suburb is pricey, they are quite satisfied with the new 
neighbourhood because of the better quality of school education, accessible private after-school 
tutoring industries, and trendy lifestyle. Like Mrs. Ko’s family, many parents would share the 
same concern for the perceived potential educational disadvantages that their children may 
experience. Korean parents, who believe that multicultural children and immigrant children 
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induce the low quality of education, also would believe that this might lower the chance of their 
children getting into a reputable university. Another Korean mother in her mid-30s, Mrs. Chun 
sympathizes with her Korean friend whose children attend schools with multicultural children 
commenting, “I understand my friend’s concern... If my children have to go to a school, where 
there are a lot of foreign mothers and tamunhwa kids, I would also worry.”  This Korean flight is 
not a widespread social problem yet. However, Mrs. Ko and Mrs. Chun's comments show how 
parents’ educational aspirations reinforce the symbolic ethnic and racial boundaries, and how 
Korean parents perceive immigrants and multicultural family to be a threat to their actual and 
potential social status.  
Political participation may be no different. Within the context of institutional political 
participation, several Korean interviewees expressed their anxieties surrounding potential 
competition with immigrants and the second generation of multicultural families.  Historically 
racist immigration policies have mobilized diverse strategies to restrict immigrants and 
ethnic/racial minorities from gaining political power. There is, for example, evidence of the 
United States limiting minorities’ and immigrants’ right to vote, including African Americans, 
Native Americans, and Chinese and Japanese Americans until “The Civil Rights Act of 1964” 
was passed and even beyond that.18 Conversations with several Korean interviewees show 
Koreans’ fear of losing control to immigrants and the second generation of multicultural 
families. These Korean interviewees have high school or community college degrees, and they 
have elementary school children. 
                                                 
18 From a section of “History of voting rights” in Mass Vote, a grassroot political advocacy group in the 




Mrs. Park: I agree that they (immigrants and multicultural children) need to enter Korean 
political institutions to make their own voice. Anyways we Koreans may not be 
able to understand what they need. But, but…. only if they will not become the 
leader of Koreans.  
Mrs. Sung: Quota restrictions would be okay to manage their political participation.  
   Mrs. Joo: I don’t know about the politics, but I think a few of them is okay. Multicultural 
children can become politicians soon. Anyways they are Koreans as well. But I am 
not sure about immigrant politicians. They are not really Koreans. This will deeply 
disturb our Korean identity and our roots. To be honest, I wish we maintained the 
Korean blood and lineage. The reason why I said that I accept tamunhwa children 
is, because we cannot avoid the current situation of international marriages and 
immigration to Korea. But this doesn’t mean that I support them to become 
politicians and gain political power. In 20 or 30 years, we Koreans may become the 
minority and tamunhwa will become the majority. Then we will lose the Korean 
identity. Because of this reason, I am actually against the political participation of 
immigrants and tamunhwa children. Maybe I am too conservative though. 
Mrs. Park: I agree with you. In the worst case, we may have to fight against the party of 
foreigners (meaning, immigrants and multicultural children).  
Mrs. Sung: That will be chaos. That’s why we need to make a quota system. We need to make 
sure that only a few of them can participate in politics.   
 Mrs. Park: Yes, we need to set a clear bar, which allows them to climb only to a certain level. 
(Korean women, Mrs. Park, age 34, Mrs. Sung, age 35, Mrs. Joo, age 36) 
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Although Koreans recognize the legal membership of immigrants, the above conversation 
reveals how Koreans understand immigrant political participation somewhat differently. While 
these Korean interviewees acknowledge the lower level of political participation of immigrants 
and multicultural children, they understand this as a threat if immigrants and multicultural 
children get institutional political power. For these Korean interviewees, changes of perceived 
ethnic/racial status and power relations mean social disorder that Koreans should prevent. Thus, 
these Korean interviewees suggest setting a glass ceiling and a quota system against immigrants 
and the second generation of multicultural families to reserve resources for those whom they 
consider real Koreans. Especially for working-class Korean people, like these interviewees, who 
are already disadvantaged in competition with middle and upper-class people for jobs and 
education, protecting the current political power dynamics may increase their children’s access 
to resources in the future. According to scholars who study the sociology of emotions (Kemper 
1978, Turner and Stets 2005, Cederman et al. 2010), such negative emotions are often aroused 
when a person or a group face an actual and potential loss of power (authority) and status 
(prestige), which change the distribution of resources. Korean working-class people, like Mr. 
Han (Korean taxi driver, age 58), have deep frustration and feeling of unfairness that they now 
have to compete for the resources against a group of immigrants and the second generation of 
multicultural families, which Koreans have not considered as their competitors before. Thus, 
these working-class Korean people do not think that restrictions on the political right of 
minorities reinforce political inequality; instead, they understand this as a way of protecting their 
rightful claims as Koreans for their family and community.    
Interestingly, the majority of Korean interviewees group immigrants and the second 
generation of multicultural families into one category - tamunhwa - even if they were born in 
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Korea and one of their parents is native Korean. This shows that the ideologies of Korean blood 
and ethnonationalism are still influential to South Korea. Thus, for Koreans those who believe 
the narrow definition of being Korean - that only a Korean person who is ethnically, legally, and 
culturally native may have full loyalty to the Korean nation – there is no doubt that they are 
politically in the in-group. On the contrary, immigrants and second generation of multicultural 
families are viewed suspiciously as potential political threats to the Korean nation because they 
may be legally Korean, but they may not fully embrace Korea ethnically and culturally. This 
implies that they may have less civic spirit and loyalty to the Korean nation. Until 2010, for 
example, the Korean military did not accept the tamunhwa people and honhyŏl - literally 
meaning ‘mixed blood’ for the mandatory military service if their skin colour is visibly different 
from native Korean. The military service law was revised in 2010, so now the Korean military 
recruits soldiers from the second generation of immigrants and multicultural families.  
In sum, until Korea opened the border for economic migrants to fill up labour shortages 
and for foreign women to fill the bride deficit, Korean-ness was understood without much 
association with racial identity. However, Koreans actively reconstruct Korean-ness to deal with 
the new ethnic, and racial diversity as marriage immigrants and foreign migrant workers arrived. 
In the contemporary context of economic migration to Korea, Korean identity is mobilized to 
access diverse forms of economic, social, and educational resources, and Korean identity is also 
used to justify limiting the access of immigrants and multicultural families to these same 




3.3 Making the Tongnama Other 
3.3.1 Travelling and Travel Writing 
Travelling and travel writing is one of the symbolic ways to create “less developed” spaces and 
sites. Pratt ([1992] 2008: 3) claims that European travel into and exploration writing about non-
European parts of the world around the 18th and 19th century created the imperial order for 
Europeans at home. Today’s imperial eyes look out on “less developed” spaces and see sites for 
industrial outsourcing, plantations for genetically modified monocrops, and dumping grounds for 
toxic waste (ibid:xiii). Travelling and travel writing in contemporary South Korea deliver the 
very same ideology to create tongnama as a less developed space. During my field research, 
many interviewees went on vacations or aid trips with churches or developmental NGOs to 
Southeast Asian countries. Southeast Asian countries and China have become popular vacation 
destinations for South Koreans because these destinations are relatively affordable and 
geographically closer to South Korea. In particular, budget package tours with relatively cheap 
accommodations are popular for Koreans. Korean aid-volunteers also tend to visit remote 
villages where infrastructure needs an update at their expenses.  
I found that there are two different patterns of how Korean interviewees reflect on what 
they saw and what they understood about the places they experienced during their trips. This 
suggests that travel can have opposite effects. Travelling can confirm and reinforce the existing 
stereotypes of South and Southeast Asian countries. At the same time, it helps people realize the 
truth of what might have been false rumours or exaggerations and encourages people to develop 
connections and sympathy. Mr. Sang’s experience show that while he developed sympathy and 
connections to the people whom he helped, he also saw what South Korea achieved in 
comparison to the remote villages where he volunteered. He worked for an auto factory for about 
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18 years before he started his own pig-farm in the outskirts of Ansan city. As an active volunteer 
for Red Cross Korea, he joined several overseas aid trips to Cambodia and the Philippines on his 
own expense.  
        Lee:  How did you feel when you went there for aid work?  
Mr.Sang:  Those places are very behind. It is almost like the Korean countryside in the old 
days. When we had meal services, there were always commotions like pushing 
each other without waiting in line. I really felt sympathy for them. At the same 
time, I realize how happy we are and well-off compared to them.   
 (Mr. Sang, Korean male pig farmer, ex-factory worker, age 44)  
 
Mr. Sang’s description of his aid-activities in Cambodia and the Philippines resembles the 
images of white American soldiers passing around aid-supplies, such as chocolate, sugar, and 
powdered milk to the local Koreans during the Korean War (han'gukchŏnjaeng). K. Choi (2009: 
41) points out that in the 1960s the American soldiers exercised their material power over the 
local Koreans, which reinforced the racial images of white American soldiers as benefactor and 
ruler, versus Koreans as beneficiary and subject. Although Mr. Sang’s generation and the 
younger generation have not directly experienced such material deficits, the refrain of “South 
Korea, once the world’s second poorest country is now one of the world’s biggest economies” is 
repetitively used to emphasize Korea’s economic success. J. Han (2015) points out that South 
Korea’s economic success allows Koreans to feel responsible for the poor in less-developed 
countries. Mr. Sang’s motivation for the overseas aid activities may be personal, but what he saw 
during his aid-activities reminds him of why he needs to help people in these countries. At the 
same time, seeing the poverty of others reminds him of how happy Koreans are. Another 
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interviewee, Mrs. Chun also learned about Southeast Asia through budget group tours to 
tongnama countries.  
 
   Mrs. Chun:  I travelled to tongnama countries like Thailand and the Philippines. Some places 
are quite modern, but behind these modern places, so many local people are 
suffering from poverty. So then I realized, these are the poor people come to 
Korea for a better life. I saw several shantytowns behind the buildings while I was 
sightseeing. Oh my god, people lived in tin houses that looked like ones that we 
had in the 60s right after the Korean War. I was so shocked, really.  
           (Korean woman, Mrs. Chun age 35)  
 
For Mrs. Chun, the travel to Southeast Asian countries seems to help her develop sympathy 
toward the people in the “shantytowns” and migrants in general. She tried to not generalize 
Southeast Asia as a place of poverty by mentioning the different local economic conditions. At 
the same time, she also compared the presence of “shantytowns” in tongnama countries to the 
one in the 1960’s South Korea.  Korea is delineated as a country that overcame poverty long ago 
and has now progressed into prosperity. Mr. Sang and Mrs. Chun remarked, “they” live in the 
past that “we” have already overcome. Portraying poverty as an undesirable condition of a 
painful past allows you to see what you have recently gained (J. Han 2015).  
However, these perceived images of poverty are often exaggerated, as another 
interviewee, Mrs. Kyung (age 54) points out, "I heard these countries are dirty, and some places 
have toilets without doors. People would believe it if you haven’t visited there. But when I 
travelled, every place I visited was quite clean and nice.” Similar to Mrs. Kyung’s comments, 
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one Chinese foreign worker, who worked for a travel agency in China before coming to South 
Korea, complained that Korean people who use cheap group tours usually stay at cheap hotels 
and eat cheap meals because they are cheap, but these people then believe that all of China is 
cheap and cruddy.  
 
3.3.2  Symbolizing the Ordinary and the Deviant: Normative Judgements 
Symbolizing the ordinary as a normative value plays an important role in constructing the Other 
and Self (Bonette 1998). To inscribe a new social meaning to the term tongnama, selective 
imageries and beliefs work to construct tongnama as deviant. In contrast, Koreanness is 
normatively considered ordinary and decent. As Hage (2005: 186) puts it, “the perception is the 
product of their practical experience.” Images and beliefs of tongnama that Koreans strategically 
choose are fundamentally limited as they are derived from their practical observation and 
experiences of everyday life. With strategically selected images and experiences, certain 
characteristics of foreign workers and immigrants from South and Southeast Asian countries are 
emphasized to make sense of these beliefs within Korean racial logics. For example, the tension 
around littering problems reveals how Koreans understand foreign workers and immigrants from 
South and Southeast Asia and from rural China through practical experiences of everyday life.  
When I visited W district in Ansan – where there is a dense population of foreign migrant 
workers and immigrants - I noticed that there were piles of garbage in black plastic bags on the 
street. Banners were hung nearby the garbage piles, warning “No Littering” in Korean, English, 
Chinese, and Vietnamese. The banner also included some information about disposal regulations 
and the amount of fines when not using a paid trash bag. A speaker repeated a recorded warning 
of disposal regulations. I could also see a CCTV nearby. In my interviews, several Koreans 
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complained about foreign migrant workers and immigrants’ poor manners about littering and 
public sanitation. Mrs. Hyun and Mrs. Kong demonstrate this point. 
 
Mrs. Hyun: We should use a paid clear trash bag. Otherwise, the city won't pick up the 
garbage. Now there are quite a lot of foreigners in my neighbourhood. Before they 
moved in, we didn’t have the garbage problem, but now I can see piles of garbage 
in black plastic bags in front of buildings.   
Mrs. Kong: Foreigners are like that. Probably every neighbourhood where lots of foreigners 
are living would have the same garbage problem. We keep the rules. We bought 
paid trash bags because we are Korean. But these foreigners just use black plastic 
bags from supermarkets and then dump on the street. Frankly speaking, they are 
shameless.  
            Lee: Maybe they don’t know the disposal rules?  
Mrs. Kong: No way, they still dump in a black plastic bag even after they were told.  
Mrs. Hyun: They knew the rules, but they don’t keep the rules because they are cheap.   
(Korean women, Mrs. Hyun, age 54, Mrs. Kong, age 47) 
  
In this conversation, Mrs. Hyun and Mrs. Kong both use the word ‘foreigner’ to refer to foreign 
migrant workers and marriage immigrants from Southeast Asian countries and China. These 
Korean interviewees contrasted the positive characteristics of being Korean and the negative 
characteristics of being foreigners by using normative judgements. For people, who believe 
Koreans’ moral superiority over foreign migrant workers and immigrants, Koreans are decent 
members of society, but foreigners are not.   
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A police officer - Mrs. Kim - from the W district police station explained how littering 
caused tension between Korean residents and foreign residents in daily life. According to her, the 
littering problem is a matter of civic education on basic social manners and public rules, which 
need to be learned from an early age. She emphasized, “the change of consciousness is an 
outcome of repetitive education. But these foreigners were not trained in that way, because their 
countries have different social and cultural conditions. So, many of them still don’t understand 
the basic public rules and manners, which seem to be so natural for Koreans.” She added, 
therefore, the police station and the district office regularly hold public campaigns to teach 
foreign residents from South and Southeast Asia and rural China about basic public manners, 
such as proper disposal treatment, recycling, and the public transportation rules, which, she 
hopes, eventually will help prevent the possibility of foreigners’ crime in this neighbourhood. 
Like the police officer’s concerns, many Korean interviewees associated foreign migrant 
workers and immigrants from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and rural China with a crime. 
Specifically, Korean women interviewees often express their fear of being victims of crimes 
committed by male foreign migrant workers.     
 
              Lee: You mentioned that you would not dare to go to W district.   
Mrs. Hwang: Yes. Because W district is known for its heavy crime. You might already watch 
TV news about these cases.  There were several murder cases already. It is too 
scary. I can’t imagine myself visiting there. I don’t like crimes committed by 
foreigners.  
  Mrs. Chun: We have a lot of Chinese and Southeast Asian foreign workers because of the 
industrial complex nearby. In my case, when I was a single girl, a bunch of young 
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foreign men, looked like Filipinos, followed me. I was super scared. And on 
another occasion, some foreign guys followed me again. If they asked me to have 
a coffee or something, then I would think they were interested in me. But one of 
the guys stared at me fiercely and followed me. I felt something terrible would 
happen. So I ran to a telephone booth, locked the glass door, and called my friend. 
They eventually took off after staring at me for a while. You know what? When 
foreign men follow you, you can’t be calm. It is so scary. That happened during 
the daytime, but that still gave me tons of chills.  
(Korean women, Mrs. Chun age 35, Mrs. Hwang age 38)   
 
As Mrs. Chun describes, during my field research I often heard from my Korean factory co-
workers, neighbours, and female friends about Korean women’s fear of foreign men. A recent 
survey on Korean multiculturalism documents that there is growing public concern about 
foreigners’ crimes in spite of official annual crime reports claiming that the crime rate of 
foreigners is always lower than the domestic crime rate (Y. Choi and S. Kang 2012). 
Media scholars (Gilliam et al., 1996, DeCuir and Dixson 2004) point out that portrayals 
of crime and race in mass media influence elevated fears of victimization among viewers, and 
that news programs often misrepresent certain ethnic and racial groups as the perpetrators. 
Korean mass media portrays foreign migrant workers from South and Southeast Asia, and rural 
China in association with illegality more often than their actual crime rate (S. Kim and E. Kim 
2008). Therefore, ethnic and racial stereotypes of foreign migrant workers and immigrants, 
which Korean interviewees already learn through media, are reaffirmed through Korean 
interviewees’ selective practical experiences.  
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3.3.3 Performative Characteristics of Race: Hairstyle and Fashion  
While skin colour is understood as a typical racial marker, performative characteristics of race 
are also used to draw a symbolic racial boundary in a hierarchical way. In this sense, not only 
skin colour but also hairstyle and fashion are used as a signal of membership within a specific 
ethnic or racial group. Roth (2012: 154-5) calls this “performing race”: using subtle cultural 
cues, such as hairstyle, dress, and gesture to indicate identity and belonging. These subtle cues 
often rely on the observer’s stereotypes and assumptions about different ethnic and racial groups. 
Many Korean interviewees said that they could guess people’s ethnicity and nationality by using 
a combination of skin colour and cultural cues, such as makeup, hairstyle, and dress. 
 
           Lee:  When you see foreigners, can you guess where they come from? Or their 
ethnicity and nationality? 
Mrs. Hyun: Yes, I can. First, their skin colour is different from Koreans. For example, 
Vietnamese or Indonesian’s skin colour and appearance are visibly different from 
Korean.   
Mrs. Kong: Chinese people have the very same skin colour as Korean, but I can identify them 
from their makeup, hairstyle, and fashion.    
Mrs. Hyun: Yeah, it is hard to explain, but somehow their style is different. Simply put, the 
way they dress up is a little bit outdated. But their style is getting better as they 
stay here longer.     




As this conversation shows, certain styles and fashions lead Koreans to classify immigrants as 
members of certain ethnic and racial categories. During my field research, I often heard the very 
same stories from Korean interviewees, factory co-workers, and neighbours about Southeast 
Asian women’s skin colour and styling. While the narratives typically include positive 
evaluations of Koreans’ whiter skin colour, attractiveness, and stylish dress, Southeast Asian 
women are described negatively as darker, unattractive and unstylish. Thus, for Koreans who 
believe in the advancement of Korean beauty and fashion, immigrant women’s unattractive 
characteristics can be minimized if they whiten their skin colour like Korean women and follow 
the newest Korean styles of hair and dress. These performative characteristics are used to 
indicate not only group identity but also cultural hierarchies between Koreans and South and 
Southeast Asian migrants in a symbolic way.  
Therefore, certain characteristics of Southeast Asian migrants are emphasized to separate 
them from what is considered ordinary and normal in the symbolic order of things, the social 
norms, and even the performative characteristics. Making the tongnama as “the Other” includes 
the creation and maintenance of imaginary representations of migrants from South and Southeast 
Asia, which is the other side of the imaginary representations that constitute the Korean-Self.  
 
3.4 Slotting Ethnic Status into a Racial Category 
The literal meaning of tongnama means Southeast Asia or people from Southeast Asia. 
However, Korean interviewees and long-term immigrants use tongnama to refer not only to 
Southeast Asia but also to South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, India and 
Sri Lanka. Therefore, interviewees from Bangladesh and Nepal - commonly known as South 
Asian countries - identify themselves as people from tongnama countries. Moreover, some 
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Korean interviewees even include China and Mongolia in tongnama. On the surface, this seems 
to indicate a misunderstanding of geography, but this interpretation misses how the racialization 
process works. Racialization is a form of categorization. Jenkins (1994: 201) argues that “while 
social groups define themselves, their name(s), their nature(s) and their boundary(s), social 
categories are identified, defined and delineated by others.” Thus, racialization is “problematic 
when social actors are characterized by others in a way that is inconsistent with their own self-
identity” (MacDonnell and de Lourenco 2009: 239). During the process of racialization, 
immigrants and migrants are slotted into levels on the Korean ethno-racial hierarchy depending 
on skin colour, ethnicity, nationality, and immigration category. 
As Edward Said ([1978, 1979] 1994) analyses in his book Orientalism, the “West” 
imagines and depicts the “Orient” as the inferior other in arbitrary ways that reflect their 
economic and political necessity. For several Korean interviewees, like Mr. Jang, the term 
tongnama is strongly associated with the perceived group position of foreign migrant workers 
and foreign brides. For these Korean interviewees, tongnama includes some East Asian and 
Eastern European countries, which are geographically obviously not a part of South and 
Southeast Asia. Mr. Jang who worked with diverse foreign migrant workers for several decades 
presented his opinion in the following excerpt:   
 
        Lee: In your opinion, which countries belong to tongnama?  
Mr. Jang: There are many countries. Vietnam, Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia.  
        Lee: Is China tongnama?  
Mr. Jang: Yes, China is tongnama. Uzbekistan and Russia too.   




Although they were not the first countries that came to mind for him, Mr. Jang includes 
China, Mongolia, Uzbekistan and Russia in the category of tongnama. This may be due to Mr. 
Jang’s lack of the geographical knowledge. However, the conversation with Mr. Jang shows that 
he understands tongnama based on his interactions with foreign migrant workers from all 
different part of Asia and the former Soviet Union through his factory job. For him, tongnama 
means people who came to Korea as foreign workers. During my field research, I found a similar 
tendency among other Korean interviewees. They identify tongnama by naming the countries 
where they believe foreign workers and foreign brides would come from without considering 
geography. However, it was entirely unexpected to hear some Korean interviewees include 
China and Russia, more precisely the former the Soviet Union in tongnama. Because China is 
considered an East Asian country and in terms of physical appearance, Chinese are similar to 
Koreans. Russians are less similar, it would appear. Ms. Yang, a sister-in-law of Filipina 
marriage immigrant comments, shows how and why some Korean interviewees think China and 
Mongolia are part of tongnama. 
 
          Lee: In your opinion, which countries belong to tongnama?  
Ms. Yang: China, Philippines, and countries like them. Is Japan tongnama? 
          Lee: I don’t know.  
Ms. Yang: Hum... I think Japan is not tongnama because Japan is wealthier than us. Also, I 
would include Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam, 
something like this.  




Ms. Yang includes South and South Asian countries in tongnama. She also includes China but 
excludes Japan based on her subjective images of each countries’ economic power. For her, one 
of the main criteria of tongnama is the perceived economic rank of each country or region. For 
those Korean interviewees, if a country exports massive number of migrant workers abroad, this 
indicates its economic weakness to other countries. Thus, these Koreans believe that China and 
the former Soviet Union countries must be located below South Korea on the global 
developmental hierarchy because foreign migrant workers and foreign brides come from these 
countries, even though China and Russia are leading economies in the world. For example, Mr. 
Kang (age 45), who married a Chinese woman from a small farming village, describes his 
Chinese wife’s hometown, “Roughly ten years ago, China was still behind, I mean, their 
lifestyle. I could see chickens in the yard. Cows were mooing. And people were still using 
bullock carts.” For Mr. Kang, a small farming village in China where his wife came from 
represents China.   
Mr. Kang’s comments reveal a critical aspect of how Koreans’ interactions with the 
people from very particular classes and segments of those migrant sending societies, a Chinese 
woman from a small farming village in Mr. Kang’s case, stand in for the entire nation. As a 
result, these Koreans associate the country with a less developed status in their mind, even if this 
is not empirically entirely accurate.  
In general, Korean people also do not include China and Russia as a part of tongnama. 
The majority of Korean interviewee use the term tongnama to refer to migrants from South and 
Southeast Asian countries. Thus, I do not read Mr. Jang and Mrs. Yang’s comments as evidence 
of China and Russia in the category of tongnama. Instead, Mr. Jang and Mrs. Yang's comments 
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tell us about how the perceived image and status of migrants can affect Koreans’ understanding 
of migrant-sending countries’ status. For example, the lower-class status of migrants in their 
home countries affects Koreans’ understanding of migrant-sending countries’ racial status that 
migrants impose on members of those societies. Therefore, for some Koreans those who believe 
that South Asia, Southeast Asia, China and Russia are less developed countries, everyone in 
these countries is getting tarred with the same brush. 
Most Korean interviewees understand tongnama as a racialized social category, which 
combines appearances with social status and immigration status. Although people from South 
and Southeast Asian countries have diverse social and economic backgrounds, and the majority 
of international students in Korea are from Southeast Asian countries, most Korean interviewees 
understand tongnama as foreign migrant workers and foreign brides. A group interview with 
three Korean women resulted in the following exchange:  
 
          Lee: What images come to your mind when you hear tongnama?  
Mrs. Park:  Um… tongnama reminds me of foreign workers who don’t have money from less 
developed countries.   
Mrs. Sung:  For me, it reminds me of international marriage. I don’t think tongnama countries 
are poorer or less-developed. I think that international marriages make people 
think tongnama countries are poor. Probably the majority of people in these 
countries wouldn’t be like the ladies who came to Korea for international 
marriages.  
  Mrs. Joo: For me, it is still less-developed countries, which need some help from Korea.  




As Mrs. Sung points out, the lower social status of foreign migrant workers and foreign brides 
overrepresents migrants from South and Southeast Asia, and this imposes the racial status of 
these countries in South Korea. Therefore, while tongnama remains a geographical term to refer 
to the Southeast Asian region, the term tongnama has gained a new socio-racial meaning since 
after Korea began receiving migrants from South and Southeast Asian countries and China. 
Some long-term immigrants also understand tongnama this way. Udaya, a Nepalese immigrant, 
who has a Korean wife and a child with her, shows this point clearly:     
 
Udaya:  One day on a subway train, I saw some Koreans avoiding sitting beside some 
foreign workers. Those workers looked like people from Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines. I was standing near the train doors, so I could 
overhear these Koreans complaining between them that tongnama nodongcha 
(South and Southeast Asian worker) were stinky. Those workers looked like they 
had just left their factory. Probably they didn’t have time to make themselves 
clean. 
     Lee: How did you feel after overhearing these Koreans?  
Udaya: I thought that these Koreans used the word tongnama to refer to foreign workers 
who work in factories. I felt that the word tongnama has a negative meaning. But 
everyone is different. Some people from tongnama are highly educated, and some 
people could be of low quality. So, I hope Koreans don’t say tongnama people are 
usually like this or like that.  




The conversation with Udaya shows how racial meanings attach to a group during the 
racialization process, and how immigrants also learn these racial meanings through daily 
interactions and encounters with Koreans as they integrate into Korean society. As Roth (2012) 
points out, generalizing physical characteristics of a particular group of people is one of the most 
common ways to draw a racial boundary between people. Miles and Brown ([1989] 2003: 52) 
also claim that “people have continued to identify the Other by reference to phenotypical features 
that therefore serve as indicators of an alleged significant difference.” The way “the Other” is 
represented is closely related to how “the Other” is imagined (Said 1978). In South Korea, the 
thought of tongnama as a unitary place and people is based on an imaginary representation in a 
hierarchal way. The following conversations with Korean interviewees show how Koreans 
conceive of tongnama bodies through the lens of a developmental hierarchy of countries.  
 
               Lee: What images come to your mind when you hear the term tongnama? 
   Mrs. Jeong: Well, some physical characteristics? Some images like short height, the 
double eyelid, and darker skin.  
Mrs. Kyoung: Some images like they are living in poverty. 
    Mrs. Jeong: Undeveloped countries, and small bodies. 
               Lee: What do you think about their temperament? 
Mrs. Kyoung: Nice and docile. Generally nice.   




These Korean women connect the physical characteristics of tongnama (small body, dark-
skinned) to the imagined docile temperament and economic developmental status. The image of 
tongnama as small, dark-skinned, poor, undeveloped, and docile South and Southeast Asians 
resembles European and American colonial/racial logic about racial and ethnic minorities. While 
the relationship between migrant-hosting Asian countries and foreign workers/marriage 
immigrants looks different from the relationship between European colonial powers and the 
colonized, the logic of modernity functions in much the same way by creating racial others. The 
skin colour and physical characteristics of migrants are racial markers used to differentiate 
people from South and Southeast Asia as tongnama. Koreans consider themselves to have a 
relatively lighter skin tone and better body type compared to migrants and they think that this 
light skin tone is associated with modernistic cultural advancement while the darker skin of 
migrants is related to backwardness and underdevelopment.  
As the earlier conversation with Udaya shows, long-term immigrants who have stayed 
more than five years, who speak Korean fluently, and who have more chance to interact with 
Koreans on a daily basis understand the term tongnama and its negative connotations. Many 
foreign migrant workers and marriage immigrants who have lived in Korea for a comparatively 
short time, who do not have much interaction with Koreans, or who do not speak Korean 
fluently, do not know even the term tongnama. Although one’s understanding of tongnama 
differs according to the individual’s personal experiences and their perceptions, long-term 
immigrant interviewees notice how Koreans use the term tongnama with negative connotations. 
The following excerpts are from two separate conversations with Bangladesh immigrants, Ali 
and Masum. Both know how Koreans understand tongnama, but they show slightly different 
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personal understanding of tongnama. Ali and Masum had both lived in South Korea for over ten 
years when I met them. 
 
Lee: Have you ever thought that you are tongnama?  
  Ali: I don’t feel personally offended by the word tongnama. But I used to think I am 
Asian, but Korean people suddenly called me tongnama. So I learned all these 
tongnama things in Korea.  
Lee: How did you feel when you heard of tongnama?  
 Ali: I just thought that Korean people don’t know geography very well. You know 
Koreans are easy going, so I didn’t think of it deeply. (laugh) 
Lee: Then, when you hear the word tongnama, what images come to your mind?   
 Ali: Ummm… well. A little bit, a sort of looking down on me. Korean people assume 
that tongnama people are all labourers, even if you come as a student for 
education. 
(Ali, Bangladesh male immigrant, age 32, 13 years in South Korea) 
 
Although Ali seems to understand the negative association with tongnama in South Korea, he 
does not articulate tongnama with racialization. In his eyes, tongnama is closer to a description 
of a location of Southeast Asia in a geographical sense. Ali even deliberately tries to overlook 
the moments when he heard the term tongnama. On the contrary, another Bangladesh immigrant 





      Lee: Have you ever thought that you are tongnama?  
Masum: Never. I’ve never thought of myself in that way. But I heard Koreans call me 
tongnama. That sounds like a swear word to me. They could say Southeast Asia 
and stop there. But Koreans usually add like, “they came to Korea to work cause 
their countries are poor.” I can feel that Koreans look down on us. And then they 
always add “those kids are from tongnama” That’s why I feel tongnama is a 
swear word. It is not the same as Southeast Asia.  
(Masum, Bangladesh male immigrant, age 35, 13 years in South Korea) 
 
Masum also learned the term tongnama from Koreans’ usage with negative evaluations of 
foreign migrant workers from South and Southeast Asian countries. As Masum remarks, 
tongnama is also different from the English term Southeast Asia. For him, tongnama is a 
derogatory term but the English term Southeast Asia is more neutral. Masum explained how he 
constantly experienced discriminatory treatments from his Korean colleagues at work, and from 
random Korean university students through online chatting apps. He explained that he used 
chatting apps to try to make male Korean friends outside the factory, but Korean university 
students usually dismissed him if Masum introduced himself as Bangladesh. To figure out if this 
was his misunderstanding, Masum did his own experiments with the chatting apps. He found that 
Korean university students accept him as online friends if Masum introduced himself as North 
American or European, but if he revealed his Bangladesh nationality, he was usually defriended 
immediately. Through these experiences, he also learned how Koreans differentiate Americans 




Masum: I know that Americans and white people have a good education, good money, 
and a higher position. I admit that we have no good education, no good money. 
But I don’t like Koreans look down on me. I feel that Korean people treat us like 
we are at the bottom, and Americans and white people are above.  
           (Masum, Bangladesh male immigrant, age 35) 
 
As Masum comments show, there are different social images of ‘white people’ and tongnama 
people that imply a hierarchical sense of group positions of each group in South Korea. While 
‘white people’ in South Korea are associated with positive images of middle-class professionals 
or at least English teachers from North America, Britain, and Australia, tongnama people in 
South Korea is associated with negative images of low skilled foreign migrant workers or foreign 
brides from lower income centuries. A university student, Subin explains.  
    
    Lee: if you were going to date someone from a foreign country, which country or race 
comes to mind when you imagine that person? 
Subin: Well…  I know this would sound terrible and sounds like racial discrimination. 
But somehow, somehow white people have better impressions compare to people 
from tongnama or Africa. My university has several white professors and 
sessional instructors (giggle), and they are tall and good looking (giggle). In my 
eyes, white people look better than other races.  
    Lee: Then, what about Southeast Asians as a dating partner?  




(Subin, Korean female 4th-year university student, age 22) 
 
With the positive evaluation of ‘white’ people’s class position and appearance, Subin’s 
comments show that the perceived position of each group is not solely about class, it is 
interrelated with racial hierarchies. While immigrants like Masum and Ali seem to understand 
the negative association with tongnama, they do not see tongnama as a racial category. However, 
Subin uses tongnama as if it is a racial category.  
In South Korea, immigrants and migrants are racialized for their ethnic status or 
nationality. In general, nationality is not often viewed as race, but in some cultures, people use 
nationality labels to classify races. In doing so, they adopt a cultural definition of race (Roth 
2012). For example, Roth (ibid) finds out that Puerto Rican and Dominican immigrants in New 
York assert their races as ‘Puerto Rican’ or ‘Dominican’ by using a nationality-based racial 
schema that associates racialized characteristics with specific nationalities, a schema that they 
already had in their home countries before they immigrated to the U.S. Such “nationality-based 
racial hierarchies (ibid:129)” are also found in East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea. 
In Japan, people often use nationality or ethnic status in a racialized way (Takezawa 2005). In 
Korea, people often use a nationality of a migrant as one of the indicators of their group position 
in the Korean ethno-racial hierarchy system. The ideology of economic development is deeply 
ingrained in Koreans’ understanding of global racial hierarchies. With its negative characteristics 
and imageries, the category of tongnama implies a lower position within the racial hierarchy 




               Lee: How would you feel if your children introduced someone from South and 
Southeast Asian countries as their marriage partner?    
   Mrs. Jeong: Oh, well. Not sure… I don’t think tongnama could be a good match for my family.  
Mrs. Kyoung: Me too. I’ve never imagined this possibility.  
   Mrs. Jeong: I might be unhappy if it would happen. The reason is that tongnama has the image 
of a little bit underdeveloped place, and also it is economically a little bit lower 
than Korea.    
Mrs. Kyoung: I think so too. Well, tongnama is…  Europe and North America have the image of 
wealthy countries, like America, Canada, and Australia. I know that not everyone 
is well off there, but at least Koreans generally think these countries are better 
than Korea. But, you know, people think tongnama is a little bit poor.   
(Mrs. Jeong, Mrs. Kyoung, Korean women, both 55 years old) 
 
For the majority of Korean interviewees, like Mrs. Jeong and Mrs. Kyoung, the perceived racial 
category is not solely skin colour or appearance. For them, each race and nationality imply a 
different level of superiority or inferiority, which is based on a combination of economic 
hierarchies and racial hierarchies. Although European and North American countries have a non-
white population, Koreans tend to imagine Europeans, North Americans, and Australians as 
white people. Koreans understand Whites as the dominant race of these regions and connect this 
to the advanced developmental status or comparatively higher economic ranking of these 
countries in comparison to tongnama and African countries.  
The racialization process is dialectical. Some long-term immigrants notice how Koreans 
slot immigrants and migrants into the Korean ethno-racial hierarchies. The following 
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conversation with a Vietnamese immigrant who acquired Korean citizenship and a Korean name 
-Sunhee after marrying a Korean man shows this point more clearly. She was working as an 
assistant for a local government job center when I interviewed her.   
 
      Lee: In your opinion, how would you define race? What would be the criteria to divide 
people into the groups like White, Asian, and Black?    
Sunhee: Criteria? I told you. There are three groups of people in my opinion. Including 
every race, wealthy people and people of high social position, ordinary people in 
the middle like us, and foreigners and poor people in the low level. 
      Lee: Who are the wealthy and high position people?  
Sunhee: Wealthy countries like America and wealthy high position Koreans.  
       Lee: Then who is in the middle group? 
Sunhee: Just ordinary people like my husband. I think most Koreans are in this group. 
Neither rich nor poor.   
      Lee: Then does it depend on an individual’s economic power, or a country’s economic 
power? 
Sunhee: First is a country. A country’s economy is more important. Even if I was well off 
in Vietnam, here people don’t acknowledge whether I was well off. Koreans see 
me as Vietnamese.     
      Lee: Did you think like this when you were in Vietnam? Or did you start thinking this 
after you came to Korea?  
Sunhee: After I came to Korea. In Korea, because people look down on me because of my 
nationality.                                           
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      (Sunhee, Female Vietnamese immigrant, age 31) 
 
Sunhee divides people into three hierarchical groups, which are based on the racial and economic 
status on a domestic and global scale. This statement about interconnected understandings of 
racial status and global economic status is not rare. Indeed, Koreans often conceive of their 
nation’s status as a middle power on the global economic and political stage. Therefore, 
tongnama is situated by comparing South and Southeast Asian countries to Western European 
and white settler countries, such as the U.S, Canada, and Australia. The discourse of economic 
development is used to justify Korea’s status in the racial hierarchy, which helps to draw a 
boundary between Korean and South and Southeast Asian migrants. Therefore, race is linked to 
the hierarchical relations of superiority and subordination not only through skin colour or body 
types but via a combination of physical traits and the conceived economic power of each group 
on a national and global scale. 
 
3.5 Racial Strategy: Positioning within New Global Racial Hierarchies 
During the afternoon break, while I was working at a hard-boiled egg packaging factory in 2013, 
a Vietnamese woman in her early thirties was saying goodbye to Korean workers as her contract 
ended. While she passed around bottles of orange juice, Korean workers gave her well wishes. 
The floor forewoman, a 60-year-old Korean lady, warmly patted the Vietnamese worker’s back 
and kindly said to her.  
 
“Have a nice trip to Vietnam. Vietnamese will achieve successful industrialization sooner 
or later as Korea did in the 70s. Then your people won’t need to go to foreign countries to 
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work. Look at what Korea has achieved. Vietnam follows Korea as Korea follows 
Japan.”  
 
Like this comment, the sentiment that “Korea is about 30 years behind Japan” (G. Han 2015:3) is 
quite a common narrative in South Korea. Interestingly Koreans add new narratives, such as 
“Vietnam follows Korea” to the old narrative. For those who believe in a linear progression of 
economic development, South Korea’s recent economic achievements allow Koreans to think of 
themselves as being socially and culturally more advanced than migrants from Southeast Asian 
countries. As the Korean female foreman said, South Koreans locate themselves higher than less-
developed countries. N. Kim (2008:85) analyzes South Korea’s position, writing “[d]espite their 
pride, South Koreans also constantly engaged the downside of their colour-class-ethnonational 
order: their position not on top but in the (invisible) middle of the racialized, gendered global 
economic order.” While Koreans indeed believe that they have a higher position than tongnama 
or Africa in the global racial hierarchies, this self-claimed position can be read as an active racial 
strategy that Koreans mobilize for several reasons. I argue that Koreans’ self-claimed higher 
position allows them to escape from racial trauma vis-à-vis the West. 
During my fieldwork, I unexpectedly encountered the Korean older generation’s racial 
trauma, experienced from the unequal relationship with American soldiers during and after the 
Korean War. Initially, I met a Korean mother-in-law, Mrs. Kum (age 82) to ask about her 
experience of living with her Vietnamese daughter-in-law. However, once the interview started, 
she changed the topic to the Korean War and war-related sexual violence. Mrs. Kum was a 17-
year-old teenage girl in a small farming village when the Korean War broke out in 1950. I 




Mrs. Kum: Every day the U.S soldiers came to the village to check out people. One evening, 
the Americans and blacks suddenly appeared everywhere in the village, but I had 
no time to hide. My mother quickly hid me under her long hanbok (traditional 
Korean outfit) skirt. The soldiers were repeating, girls, girls, where are girls? My 
mother didn't move at all, and she was standing like this for a long time until all 
the soldiers were gone. Then I hid in a big sauce jar for a while. But we had to 
escape from the village. The soldiers came almost every day. A lot of girls in my 
village got raped by the American soldiers and blacks. They all lost their 
virginity.    
(Mrs. Kum, Korean woman, age 82) 
 
To save her, Mrs. Kum’s family escaped from the village in the middle of the winter and had to 
sleep outside on the road. Mrs. Kum described white American soldiers as Americans, and 
African American soldiers as blacks. As N. Kim (2008) points out, the majority of Koreans 
learned about America through American mass media, such as television and movies that 
dominated the Korean airwaves. Mrs. Kum’s experience is not an isolated case or unique to her. 
There is a thick body of literature on Koreans’ racial trauma about the U.S military after the 
Korean War. One of the most popular themes of the Korean War literature was about the plight 
of Korean sex-workers and labourers near the US military camps (K. Choi 2009, D. Lee 2015). 
Korean writers in the 1950s and 1960s suffered from an inferiority complex in relation to white 
Americans. However, South Korean writers could not openly express their discontent about the 
U.S military because of South Korea’s heavy dependence on the U.S. military for security and 
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economy. As a way to express their discontent about “being racialized within their own territory” 
(N. Kim 2008), Korean writers often delineated African American soldiers as cruel blacks 
instead of criticizing white American soldiers’ power abuses in South Korea. K. Choi (2009: 39) 
points out that this shows how Koreans made black American soldiers a scapegoat to compensate 
for the nation’s inferiority complex and racial trauma.  
Interestingly, South Koreans see Japan as higher than Koreans are within global 
hierarchies, but still a bit below Whites/Europeans. According to research on Korean university 
students’ perceptions of six foreigner groups (D.S. Kim, D. H. Kim and Jung 2011), the Korean 
participants answer that Americans and Japanese are more likely to see themselves being higher 
than Koreans based on the perceived images of economic development and modern culture of the 
U.S and Japan. However, Japan follows the U.S in the research participants’ perceived ordering 
of different groups.  On the other hand, the Korean participants answer that tongnama, Chinese, 
Korean-Chinese are more likely to feel inferior to South Koreans.  
While Koreans have an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West, particularly the U.S, and 
Japan, Koreans have more recently started believing that Korea is the middle or upper middle 
class in the global economic hierarchy. This perception began to take shape after foreign migrant 
workers and immigrants started to arrive from South and Southeast Asian countries. Connecting 
class position and racial markers is a typical strategy to claim a group’s superior or inferior 
position (Lie 2001, Glenn 2002, N. Kim 2008). In the case of Korea, interestingly the connection 
between class position and racial hierarchies includes not only the domestic social status but also 
the global scale of economic and racial order. N. Kim (2008: 84) analyzed Koreans’ obsession 
with global economic rankings and national/racial hierarchies stating that “Koreans believe that 
South Korea is more middle class and whiter than the third world nations from which the foreign 
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workers hail in the world system.” As part of Koreans’ new racial strategy, improving South 
Korea’s position also helps Koreans gain recognition as members of the first world. Based on the 
combination of global class position and global racial hierarchies, Koreans see North American 
and western European countries as role models because of the economic status of these 
countries, which implies social advancements and modern culture. According to this hierarchy, 
Korea hopes to be recognized as part of the first world, or at least closer to the first world than 
other Asian nations. Mr. Sang, who runs a small pig farm after working in an auto factory over 
18 years, made these remarks:    
 
Mr. Sang: Anyways, Koreans are genetically smart, so we could achieve economic 
development in a short time. Now Korea’s economy size is around the top 10 in 
the world. But many countries still don’t know Korea’s achievement well. We 
didn’t adequately promote ourselves. We are like a frog in the well. 
        Lee: You mean that Korea has been underestimated on the world stage?  
Mr. Sang: Yes. We may look like an economically developed country, but we are not that 
influential in the world yet.  
     (Mr. Sang, Korean male pig farmer, ex-factory worker, age 44))    
 
Like Mr. Sang, many Koreans believe that Koreans’ inherited intelligence greatly helped to 
achieve the rapid economic growth. This kind of belief resonates with the Korean government’s 
emphasis on the importance of human resources and Koreans’ high intelligence, which was used 
to mobilize Korean people during the industrialization period in the 1970s and 80s. In the mid-
1990s, globalization became a new development slogan in South Korea. Globalization was 
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introduced to the public as a new policy slogan, Segyehwa (globalization), and one of the goals is 
to improve the image of Korea, which eventually would help to increase Korea’s global 
influence. A group interview with Korean women in their mid-thirties makes this point. They all 
had one or two school-age children from the same neighbourhood. For them, Korean identity, 
national strength, and Korea’s global competitiveness are inseparable. 
 
Mrs. Park: I hope we can speak Korean anywhere in the world.    
  Mrs. Joo: Then we have to be competitive. If we promote our own values and self-respect, if 
we become a powerful country, the world will come to us, and try to learn our 
things and our language.  
           Lee: I see. Whose competitiveness by the way?   
 Mrs. Park:  Our country’s.   
   Mrs. Joo: And, we need to raise children to be competitive and send them to the world. 
Then who knows, possibly Korean language could be one of the universal 
languages in the future. Then the world would try to learn Korean. Like Jewish 
people take over the important positions all over the world, if Korean children 
take important positions, they will represent Korea. I wish that Korean people 
play important roles on the global stage for the future of Korea.       
(Korean women, Mrs. Park, age 34, Mrs. Joo, age 36) 
 
Like Mr. Sang, Mrs. Park, and Mrs, Joo, many Koreans think that South Korea, in general, is 
underestimated by the world compared to its economic size and the advancement of its 
technology. This sentiment is not limited to a group of nationalists. Instead, the Korean state and 
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Korean people share this nationalistic sentiment. Nowadays, the Korean state actively promotes 
the image of Korea as a country of advanced technology and cutting-edge pop-culture with the 
well-maintained traditional culture. For example, the Korean government ran the Presidential 
Council on Nation Branding from 2009 to 2013 to increase the rank of the Nation Brand Index 
by promoting Korean food, K-pop and e-sports (Keith 2009). Besides the fact that these cultural 
products open up new markets, promoting Korean cultural products is also a new symbolic way 
of transforming people’s recognition towards South Korea. While reinventing Korean-ness is 
closely related to Korea's collective strategy to survive in the global market, reconstructing 
Korean identity acts to draw the symbolic boundary between Koreans and racial others to access 
or to limit the social, economic, and political resources in Korean society. Therefore, these 




This chapter has examined the dialectical process of mobilizing Korean identity and constructing 
tongnama Other. First of all, certain characteristics of foreign workers and immigrants are 
strategically selected to emphasize and to make sense of these beliefs within Korean racial logics 
and cultural system. Constructing the tongnama Other involves normative values and 
performative cultural cues, which symbolizes Korean-ness as ‘ordinary’ and ‘desirable’ and 
tongnama as ‘deviant’ and ‘unattractive’ through their practical observation and experiences of 
everyday life. Second, throughout the recent history, Korean identity and Korean 
ethnonationalism were actively reconstructed for diverse reasons from a defensive strategy 
against ‘western imperialism’, and Japanese colonialism, to an economic strategy for successful 
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industrialization. Before immigrants and foreign migrant workers come to South Korea, Korean 
identity was not associated with racial identity. In contemporary South Korea, however, Korean 
identity becomes one of the ethno-racial domains to access or limit access to social, economic, 
and political resources from multicultural families, immigrants, and foreign migrant workers.  
This chapter has also explored key aspects of the racialization of Southeast Asian 
migrants as tongnama by looking at how Koreans slot the ethnic status of migrants into the 
Korean ethno-racial system as South Korea - previously a migrant-sending country - becomes a 
migrant-receiving country. This process includes the inextricable relationship between economic 
developmental logics and ethnic/racial hierarchies on a global scale, what I call the global racial 
hierarchies. South Koreans’ perceived ordering of different groups in the global racial 
hierarchies complicates the conventional racial hierarchies, which place Whites on top, and 
Asians/Blacks at the bottom. Using not only the conventional racial categories but also slotting 
nationality and ethnicity into the ethno-racial system, South Koreans place Whites on top, 
Japanese lower than Whites but above South Koreans. South Koreans are above tongnama and 
Black. Within the category of Black, African Americans are seen as higher than Africans 
because of their desirable nationality as the U.S citizen. 
Racial formation of tongnama migrants is essential to South Koreans’ perceived new 
global racial hierarchies. Without the racial formation of tongnama South Korea might not be 
able to improve its own status in the global scale. Therefore, the racial formation of tongnama is 
South Koreans’ racial strategy to gain a better position in global racial hierarchies, and their 
desire to escape from an inferiority complex that has longed plagued Korea.  
While Koreans think of themselves as victims of global racism vis-à-vis Japan and the 
“West”, they adopt and apply “western” racial logic to make racial others in South Korea. In the 
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process of racializing tongnama migrants, the interconnected understandings of racial status and 
global economic status work by slotting the ethnic status of migrants into a racial category. 
Therefore, race is not solely about skin colour or body types. Instead, race is formed by 
combining physical traits with the conceived economic power of different groups on a national 
and global scale in a hierarchical way.  
In the following empirical chapters, I will demonstrate how patriarchy and gender 
inequality affect the racialization of marriage immigrants (foreign brides and foreign husbands), 




Chapter 4: Racial Others within the Family - Gendered and Racialized 
Integration of Foreign Brides and Husbands  
On a sunny day in April 2014, outside the foreign resident district office in Ansan city, a Korean 
woman in her late sixties approached me and asked if I knew where she could register her 
Vietnamese daughter-in-law for a Korean language class. I had spent the past nine months 
observing various classes and activities geared towards immigrant integration at the 
Multicultural Family Support Centre nearby, so I offered to accompany her, her daughter-in-law 
and her son to the Centre. While we were walking, she began telling me about her new 
Vietnamese daughter-in-law, who joined their family about a year ago. Her daughter-in-law did 
not speak much Korean yet, but she seemed confident that she would learn quickly by taking 
some basic language courses. I mentioned that the Centre also offered a Korean cooking class, 
but that it filled up very quickly. The Korean lady said softly, “Oh, I see. It is popular as they 
need to cook Korean food for their family.” The Korean lady then looked at her son and his 
foreign wife with a big smile as they held hands while walking towards their car. As I dropped 
them off at the entrance, the Korean mother mentioned that she would be back to pick up her 
daughter-in-law after the Korean language class ended. Indeed, it is very common for a foreign 
wife to be under the tutelage of her Korean mother-in-law for the first couple of years of the 
marriage. Perhaps she smiled when she imagined her foreign daughter-in-law speaking good 
Korean, taking good care of her husband, and even cooking Korean meals after taking some 
classes provided by the Center. Perhaps she enjoyed picturing her son growing old with his 
foreign wife surrounded by their many children.  
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 However, what if this Korean man had a Korean wife? Would the mother still accompany 
the couple and try to teach his new wife? Probably not. His Korean wife would no doubt 
complain. Would the Korean government still provide cooking classes for Korean wives who are 
not used to cooking? Probably not. The government would be criticized for patronizing women. 
Then why is this okay for foreign wives? Why does the mother assume the responsibility of 
teaching Korean culture to the foreign wife? Furthermore, I had never seen foreign husbands at 
the Center. Where were they? These curiosities eventually led me to questions that are more 
fundamental. Why do Korean men and their families import foreign wives even when having a 
foreign wife can diminish their social status? Why is the Korean government highly inclusive of 
female marriage immigrants from different racial and ethnic backgrounds, despite strong 
undercurrents of ethno-nationalism and the myth of ethnic homogeneity?  
   Since 2005, the Korean government has actively supported multicultural integration 
programs for marriage immigrants through Multicultural Family Support Centers. These Centers 
provide free Korean language classes, Korean culture classes, Korean cooking classes, parenting 
seminars, speech clinics for children, legal aid, translation services - usually in Chinese, 
Vietnamese, and Tagalog - and basic job training. There is no doubt that Multicultural Family 
Support Centers and their integration programs greatly assist marriage immigrants in adapting to 
Korean culture and society. Many couples of international marriages try to find housing near 
such locations. Yet, a closer look at whom the multicultural activities are geared for, and what 
they actually entail, reveals that multicultural programs are not about marriage immigrants’ 
integration in a neutral sense. In fact, multicultural activities are geared towards strengthening 
patriarchal family relations, which Korean women today are increasingly resisting. The State 
plays a key role in reproducing patriarchal family structures, but parents of working class and 
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rural Korean men, especially mothers, also play an active role by driving the process of 
integrating foreign brides as dutiful, submissive and servile daughters-in-law. 
 Racial hierarchies and racial logics play a central role in reproducing patriarchal family 
structures in Korean male-headed families with foreign brides. Working-class and rural Korean 
men can only reproduce patriarchal family structures through marriage immigration with women 
from lower-income countries. At the same time, reproducing Korean patriarchy as essential and 
ahistorical requires minimizing the foreignness of foreign brides. Thus, parents and husbands 
emphasize the cultural and racial similarities between specific groups of foreign brides and 
Korean women. On the other hand, the racial differences of foreign husbands are underlined to 
amplify their foreignness. 
 I call this active process patriarchal racialization. Patriarchal racialization is a gendered 
racialization process whereby patriarchal gender roles are emphasized to minimize racial 
differences for certain groups that need to be integrated into the existing socio-cultural system. 
At the same time, the racial differences of other groups are maximized to amplify their 
"foreignness" to delay their integration into the society. Patriarchal racialization involves 
multiple actors; such as the State, community, and family members in the microsphere of the 
household. Patriarchal racialization reinforces the continued ethno-racial belief in patriarchal 
blood lineage: the belief that Korean blood passes down through the father’s line. This belief 
creates a patriarchal biological link to the idea of race. The co-formation of patriarchy and 
racialization can be broadly observed even though the actual cases may appear differently in 
historically and locally specific contexts. Therefore, South Korea offers a prime example for 
studying how economic migration interacts with global systems of gender and racial inequality.  
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 In South Korea, the official definition of a marriage immigrant is a foreign national who 
marries a Korean citizen regardless of their gender and country of origin. However, because of the 
lower-class positions of marriage immigrants in their home countries and the high ratio of female 
marriage immigrants, for the majority of Koreans, a marriage immigrant means a foreign bride from a 
low-income family from Southeast Asia or China.  
 In this chapter, I explore patriarchal racialization to show that racialization processes are 
gendered, and patriarchal structures of multicultural families are racialized. First, I examine the 
role of the State by looking at the institutional conditions of marriage immigration and gendered 
settlement services. Thereafter I discuss the two categories of foreign spouses, foreign brides and 
foreign husbands and their everyday life experiences.    
   
4.1 Theoretical background of Patriarchal Racialization 
As one specific way of Othering, racialization imposes otherness on a certain group of people. 
According to Omi and Winant (1986: 64), the category of race is an outcome of a racialization 
process, which involves “the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified 
relationship, social practice or group.” Similar to Omi and Winant’s definition of racialization, 
Miles and Brown ([1989] 2003:102) define racialization as “a dialectical process by which 
meaning is attributed to particular biological features of human beings, as a result of which 
individuals may be assigned to a general category of persons which reproduces itself biologically 
[...]”. Racialization is problematic because it includes a dialectical process of the 
conceptualization of the Self (in-group) as a superior race, which simultaneously solicits the 
conceptualization of “the Other” as the inferior race by attributing a negative evaluation to “the 
Other” (Miles and Brown [1989] 2013).  
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Building upon Omi and Winant (1994)’s racial formation theory, Kandaswamy (2012:12) 
argues that “racial formation is fundamentally a gendered and sexualized process.” In this view, 
gender and race do not exist and create inequalities in isolation. Rather gender and race - as 
mutually constitutive powers - engage with one another in the distribution of uneven power and 
the creation of social inequalities. However, despite increasing recognition of the intersectional 
relations between gender and racialization, patriarchy as a social system of organizing gender 
and of privileging male authority is not typically analyzed in its co-formation with racialization. 
The role of patriarchy tends to be marginalized from the scholarly discussion of racialization, 
which overlooks the way various forms of patriarchy have intersected with other forms of 
inequalities such as racism.    
The intimate space of home and family is an important site for reproducing not only 
gender hierarchies but also racial hierarchies under the patriarchal order (Collins 2001, Stoler 
2002). The inseparable relationship between race and gender under patriarchal domination can 
be easily traced back to European colonial power in the 19th century. For example, Stoler (2002) 
examines how the management of sexual arrangements was fundamentally structured into the 
making of racial categories and racial hierarchies in colonial Indonesia by looking at sexual and 
racial dynamics among white Dutch men, white Dutch women, local Indonesian women, and 
mixed-race children. While returning to the Netherlands from colonial Indonesia with an Asian 
wife and mixed-race children was prohibited, Dutch bachelors in Indonesia were encouraged, or 
at least tolerated, to live with native Indonesian women. Their cohabitation was considered to 
help colonial development and expansion by stabilizing political order and colonial public 
health. When Dutch women entered colonial Indonesia, however, the boundary between white 
Dutch families and native Indonesians, and the hierarchy of the colonizer and the colonized 
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became much clearer. Mixed race children of Dutch men and native Indonesian women were 
located above the local population but below that of the Dutch colonizers. Thus, control over 
sexual activities, marriage, and reproduction was a critical colonial apparatus for constructing 
racial hierarchies between the colonizers and the colonized. Stoler (ibid:42) points out that 
“gender-specific sexual sanctions and prohibitions not only demarcated positions of power but 
also prescribed the personal and public boundaries of race." Along the same line, McClintock 
(1995: 56) describes a patriarchal racial order in the 19th century Britain in her book Imperial 
Leather:“the English middle-class male was placed at the pinnacle of evolutionary hierarchy. 
White English middle-class women followed. Domestic workers, female miners and working-
class prostitutes were stationed on the threshold between the white and black races”. 
 However, the main literature on racial boundaries under patriarchy is concentrated on 19th-
century European colonialism (e.g., Stoler 2005; McClintock 1995). There is little literature on 
the intersections between patriarchy and racialization in relation to contemporary migration in 
East and Southeast Asia. Therefore, building upon the discussion on gendered racialization, this 
chapter shows how patriarchal family structures reproduce racial hierarchy, and racialization 
reinforces patriarchal order in the context of gendered migration in East Asia.  
 Patriarchal racialization is an intersectional process of categorization. Analytically the 
level of gendered and racial meaning during the process of patriarchal racialization becomes one 
of the important facets to produce gendered racial hierarchies amongst groups. This facet allows 
two different ideological meanings to create a seemingly natural system of hierarchies. The 
outcome of patriarchal racialization involves both the production of a new racial category and the 
inscribing of specific gendered rules within racial hierarchies. Thus, patriarchal racialization is 
problematic because it justifies the unequal distribution of access to resources, such as job 
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market and education, and social, economic and political power under the implicit and explicit 
patriarchal ideology and practices.   
  
4.2 The Role of the State: Gendered Settlement Services 
In this section, I explore one facet of how patriarchal racialization occurs – the state, which 
institutionally controls migration flows, the settlement process, and membership through the 
citizenship and settlement policies. In South Korea, almost every city has a Multicultural Family 
Support Center to assist marriage immigrants’ successful settlement and their families’ cultural 
adjustment to the new relationship. However, these government-installed Centers are very 
gender specific venues. In other words, the Center is a place for foreign brides and their children, 
but not for foreign husbands. For example, Nepalese husband Udaya (age 30), who is in his early 
thirties, did not go to the Center near his house. Right after marrying a Korean woman, he visited 
the Center to see if he could use its programs and services. However, he thought that there were 
no programs and services for him. He explained, "it seems mainly foreign ladies go to the Center 
because they need to learn how to look after their babies, learn how to cook Korean foods, and 
how to deal with their Korean family-in-law. I heard that their Korean mothers-in-law give them 
lots of stress." 
Another foreign husband from Bangladesh, Ali (age 32) also did not use the Center even 
though he lived nearby one. Instead, he went to the Foreign Migrant Workers Welfare Center.  
During my field research, he was involved in a Bangladesh workers' group as a group leader. 
The group was organized by the local Migrant Community Center. This foreign migrant 
workers’ center provides labour counselling, free Korean language classes, free computer 
lessons, a monthly free medical clinic, foreign workers' gatherings, and picnics. In the lobby, 
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there were always a bunch of young foreign males hanging out and drinking coffee from a 
vending machine. The majority of visitors at the Migrant Community Center were male migrant 
workers who came to South Korea with a 3-5-year contract. Every Sunday, Ali went to this 
center to help and to hang out with young Bangladeshi workers.  
Although both the Multicultural Family Support Centers and the Migrant Community 
Center offer Korean language classes and some other useful services, the different centers 
function separately for two different streams of immigration: marriage immigrants and foreign 
workers. Moreover, these centers are highly gendered. Foreign husbands like Udaya and Ali still 
do not feel comfortable going to the Multicultural Family Support Center. Perhaps they see the 
Multicultural Family Support Center as not for them and see Migrant Community Center as their 
place.  
 By 2013, there were 211 Multicultural Family Support Centers across the country that had 
been installed under the Multicultural Family Support Act. These Centers are supposed to serve 
any family who is categorized as a multicultural family. However, not everyone does use these 
centers. The majority of the programs are designed to help foreign brides adapt to their Korean 
family’s culture and for Korean-born children to improve their Korean language proficiency. 
Thus, they provide Korean language classes, cooking classes, child rearing and Korean culture 
classes based on the assumption that visitors to the Center are full-time homemakers and primary 
caregivers. The Center also organizes foreign wives as volunteers and connects them to local 
charity groups in order to enhance their social integration. However, it is rare for these Centers to 
provide services in the evening or during the weekend for foreign husbands who usually work in 
the factories during weekdays. Therefore, while these Centers teach specific gender roles to 
foreign wives through their settlement programs, the Centers neglect foreign husbands. 
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 This gendered approach to marriage immigrants is clear even before foreign brides enter 
South Korea. Foreign brides are advised to take Korean cultural programs while they are waiting 
for their visas. There are several overseas Korean culture centers for new brides in the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries. These overseas Korean culture centers provide an 
overview of Korean society and Korean culture. In particular, they provide the new brides with 
information on how to have a successful marriage with a Korean man; for example, how to 
manage in-law relationships, and how to behave properly as a wife and a daughter-in-law.  
 In South Korea, as mentioned earlier the official definition of a marriage immigrant is a 
foreign national who marries a Korean citizen regardless of their gender and country of origin. 
However, female marriage immigrants from Southeast Asia and China are over-represented in the 
marriage immigrant population, so for the majority of Koreans, a marriage immigrant means a foreign 
bride or an oegugin myŏnŭri (foreign daughter-in-law) from a ‘poor family’ of a lower-income 
country.  On the other hand, Koreans tend to consider a foreign husband or an oegugin sawi (foreign 
son-in-law) as coming from an affluent family, or at least a decent family of a higher-income county. 
This is because the majority of foreign husbands are North Americans, Western Europeans, and 
Japanese men. Based on these gender biased public portrayals, while foreign brides are 
commonly misunderstood as obedient wives and good homemakers whose main duty is taking 
care of her Korean family, foreign husbands are expected to bring their Korean wives back to 
their country. Perhaps Koreans’ gendered understanding of marriage immigrants affects the 
government settlement services. However, when we look closely at the citizenship and immigration 
policies, it is clear that the Korean state plays a critical role in reproducing patriarchal family relations 
by controlling marriage immigrants’ gender composition. The state promotes importing foreign brides 
from lower-income countries but restricts the entry of foreign husbands. Accordingly, settlement 
117 
 
services are also geared towards foreign brides in order to strengthen the patriarchal family 
relations which contemporary Korean women are increasingly resisting.  
 
4.3 The Micro-politics of Household and Reproduction of Patriarchy 
4.3.1 Construction of Foreign Brides: Korean Men and Foreign Women  
On one occasion, I approached a Korean senior who came to the Multicultural Family Support 
Center to give a ride to his Cambodian daughter-in-law.  Hoping to have a chat with him, I told 
him that I was also married to a foreign man. However, he coldly replied, “We are different from 
somebody like you who was able to make a choice.” He told me that his 40-year-old son, who 
works for a local factory, had to get married to a foreign woman from Cambodia because no 
Korean woman wanted his son. Although he was not happy with this international marriage, he 
had to accept it. He did not want his son to grow old as a bachelor, without a wife and children. 
Then, he walked away.  
 As this anecdote reveals, having a foreign wife is considered a less-than-ideal situation in 
Korea. Both Korean men and women would be stigmatized for remaining unmarried. However, 
Korean men feel the pressure of marriage more than Korean women do, so to remain unmarried 
is to be seen as a total failure as a man (M. Kim 2014). Symbolically, an unmarried man is to 
some degree infantilized (ibid). He is not seen as the patriarch of his own household or a 
“respectable family [man]” (Freeman 2005). An unmarried man is also not able to contribute to 
family traditions (i.e., preparing family events and ancestral worships), which heavily rely on 
woman’s work. Without a wife, therefore, it is not easy for a man to take an important role 
within the family and kin circle. In addition, the parents of an unmarried man often feel a 
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responsibility to make sure their son has a wife in order to continue the family lineage, so it is 
not rare for parents to initiate international marriage for their sons.  
 However, international marriages, especially between a Korean man and a foreign woman 
from China and Southeast Asia, are stigmatized. Having a wife from a lower income country 
signals a man’s incompetence in the Korean marriage market compared to his middle-class 
white-collar counterparts and hurts a man's honour and his family's pride. The following 
interview quote shows how Koreans characterize international marriage and stigmatize Korean 
husbands and foreign wives.  
 
When I heard about them, ladies who come through marriage from tongnama (South and 
Southeast Asian countries), I feel so sorry for them. Well, Koreans, I think Korean people 
are terrible because actually Korean men buy these women with money. Marriage should 
be based on love, but this is almost the same as buying slaves because Korean guys pay 
money to bring these ladies here.     
   (Mr. Kim, Korean male shuttle bus driver, age 59) 
 
As this passage reveals, international marriage is seen as buying a wife from a ‘poor country.’ 
This stigma is partly based on a view of marriage choice that values modern marriage as 
romantic love and the free choice of two individuals but devalues arranged marriages or 
traditional marriages as an institutional arrangement for economic exchange (Giddens 1992). Yet 
arranged marriages or using commercialized matchmaking services within South Korea are still 
considered ways of meeting partners without such stigma. When it comes to the economic 
exchanges of marriage, the notion of “buying a wife” may not be so distant from the practice of 
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arranged marriages or using matchmaking services.  However, international marriages of Korean 
men and foreign women from Southeast Asia and China disproportionately take on such negative 
social stigma compared to domestic arranged marriages. This is partly due to stereotypes of 
foreign brides which are heavily influenced by the victim discourse that a foreign bride comes 
from a 'poor' family of a lower income country, who had to sell herself to a man to feed her 
family back home (Constable 2005). Her natal family’s economic status and her country’s 
developmental status are used to reinforce victimizing a foreign bride as a commodity or a victim 
of sexual exploitation. Thus, international marriages between a Korean man and foreign woman 
are seen as not only a deteriorated version of traditional marriages but also a type of human 
trafficking that implies the unequal exchange of a Korean man’s money for a foreign woman’s 
intimate care and sex.  
 In order to escape this perceived social stigma, Korean husbands and foreign wives 
mobilize defensive discourses. I observed that they often emphasized a wife’s agency in her 
choices: for example, that a foreign wife can refuse if she does not like the Korean man. They 
also defend themselves by criticizing Koreans’ double standards, which accept Korean couples' 
use of commercialized matchmaking services as a way of meeting a partner, while stigmatizing 
international marriage as commodified marriages. In addition, Korean men also mobilize 
masculine discourses to escape from the stigma, such as representing themselves as saviors of 
women from less developed countries (M. Kim 2014), or blaming unmarried Korean women for 
being too demanding, self-interested, avoiding responsibility and too materialistic (e.g., “the 
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kimchi girl”, or “the soy bean-paste girl” controversies).19 They believe that in any case, these 
kinds of Korean women would not be a good match for them, and they seek a young foreign 
woman who is more innocent, selfless, frugal, and obedient. Korean husbands who chose 
international marriages often express that they could get a much younger and more attractive 
foreign woman instead of an old, demanding Korean woman already past her marriageable age.   
 In South Korea, the category of foreign bride includes women from Southeast Asian 
countries, China, and Korean-Chinese women (chosŏnjok). Koreans generally believe that 
Korean-Chinese brides and Southeast Asian brides are from a low-income family of a low-
income country, so those brides may have the same economic motivation to marry up to Korean 
men. However, the belief that chosŏnjok and Koreans are of the same ethnic group allows 
Korean men and their families to minimize the perceived foreignness and cultural differences of 
chosŏnjok brides. This also allows people to believe that the second or the third generation of the 
union of a chosŏnjok woman and a Korean man will be culturally and biologically fully Korean. 
 Nonetheless, the stigma of buying a wife and being sold for money negatively affects both 
Korean husbands and foreign wives, and their family relationship. Foreign wives are often 
viewed suspiciously - women whose main intention may be using an innocent Korean man to 
snatch money and run away after acquiring residency or Korean citizenship.  
One afternoon, I saw several Korean seniors with their foreign myŏnŭri (daughter-in-law) 
from the Philippines, Vietnam, China, Cambodia, and Uzbekistan in front of a Korean language 
                                                 
19 “The kimchi girl” (kimchi- nyŏ) and “the soybean paste girl” (toenjang-nyŏ) are derogatory terms to call 
‘uppity’ Korean women. Since the late 2000s, both terms gained the misogynistic tendencies. The kimchi 
girl refers to a Korean woman who puts all the burdens on a man in dating or marriage but demands equal 
rights when it is convenient for her. The soybean paste girl refers to a Korean woman who is shallow and 
lavishly prefers expensive high-end products. (For further analysis see Song 2014)   
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classroom at the Multicultural Family Support Center. It is common for Korean parents to drop 
off and pick up their foreign myŏnŭri from these classes, while the Korean husbands are at work. 
One old Korean lady near the elevator looked very nervous, so I asked her if everything was 
okay. The Korean lady told me that her foreign myŏnŭri wanted to come to the class by herself. 
After sending her myŏnŭri, the Korean lady came to check if her myŏnŭri was in the class. 
However, her myŏnŭri had not yet come to the class. A few minutes later, her foreign myŏnŭri 
walked out of the elevator with some grocery bags, and the Korean lady exhaled a long breath. I 
could overhear the Korean lady saying “Oh my god, why are you late? My heart just about 
stopped! You should tell me if you wanted to go grocery shopping.”   
 It is very common for a Korean husband and his family to be anxious about the intentions 
of a foreign wife. Thus, a Korean husband’s control over his foreign wife is easily justified until 
his foreign wife proves her genuine intention of marriage and building a family. To prove her 
genuine intentions, a foreign wife is expected to become pregnant immediately upon her arrival, 
to learn Korean language and culture, to accommodate Korean in-laws, and to avoid meeting 
people of her own ethnic community. In particular, pregnancy helps a foreign wife prove her 
intention of integrating into Korean family culture and Korean society. Practically, the Korean 
government provides benefits for a foreign wife from the beginning of pregnancy, such as fast-
track residency and citizenship, childcare subsidies, and a free home visiting doula. Giving birth 
to Korean children signifies that she is ready to accept Korean family culture, and she can gain 
recognition as a mother within the Korean family structure.  
 Until a foreign wife proves her genuine intentions, a Korean husband and his parents tend 
to test her by controlling money, restraining social activities, and controlling sexuality. For 
example, Korean husbands or their mothers manage the home economics and give a foreign wife 
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only a small monthly allowance to prevent her from stealing money and escaping. Often a 
foreign wife is not allowed to get a job, or to meet people except while attending Korean 
language or Korean cooking classes. This is because the Korean family worries that their foreign 
wife could get involved in an affair or be exposed to information about runaways and divorcees. 
Ironically, these suspicions often cause serious tensions and conflicts between Korean husbands 
and foreign wives, sometimes resulting in divorces or runaways (Freeman 2005). Sometimes 
foreign wives interpret their Korean husbands’ suspicion as a way of showing his affection and 
concern about his wife. On top of that, Korean parent-in-laws’ interferences, such as frequent 
visits, phone calls, comments on housework and parenting style often aggravate their family 
relationships.  
 However, some international marriages between a Korean man and a foreign woman from 
Southeast Asian and China are relatively free from these tensions and Korean in-laws’ 
interferences. These marriages are so-called ‘love marriages’ (yŏnaegyŏrhon), which means a 
marriage without the involvement of a commercial marriage agency or a matchmaker. Although 
there is always social stigma against foreign brides from Southeast Asia and China, when it 
comes to love marriage, and when a foreign bride financially contributes to the marriage process, 
such as buying furniture and household goods, suspicion from in-laws is greatly reduced, helping 
to build a relatively better family and in-law relationships. Also, Japanese brides who marry 
Korean men for a religious reason mostly through church-arranged marriages, are also relatively 
free from the social stigma and the intention tests. According to M. Kim (2014), Koreans 
generally believe that Korean men married up and Japanese wives married down since Korea's 




4.3.1.1 Hierarchies of Foreign Wives  
While a Korean wife is ideal, if an international marriage is necessary, a foreign wife’s 
nationality and her homeland’s relative economic status are influential in determining her 
position in the hierarchy of foreign brides. The relative desirability of a foreign wife depends on 
her country of origin, whether she comes from a relatively developed country or a less developed 
country, and what ethnicity or race these countries represent. Mrs. Ko’s comments show this 
point well. As a Korean cooking class instructor, she has taught female marriage immigrants for 
several years through local community centers and the Multicultural Family Support Centers in 
Ansan and Siheung.   
 
Quite a lot of people pretend their myŏnŭri (daughter-in-law) is from Japan or America. 
This is because they think countries like Vietnam are economically less developed 
counties. So they lie that “my myŏnŭri is from Japan" even though their appearances are 
different. This is true of one of my Vietnamese cooking class attendees. She couldn't tell 
the neighbours that she is Vietnamese, in consideration of her Korean mother-in-law's 
reputation, so she just lives as a Japanese myŏnŭri. I felt really sorry for her. 
  (Mrs. Ko, Korean female cooking class instructor, age 38)  
  
As this conversation reveals, a foreign wife’s nationality and her homeland’s economic status 
become crucial components in securing a Korean man's honour and a Korean family’s pride. 
However, the majority of international marriages are unions of rural farmers or working-class 
Korean men and foreign women from Southeast Asia and China. Western European or North 
American wives who reside in Korea are not common. These Korean husbands of Western 
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European or North American wives are usually professionals – or at least middle class. 
Therefore, there is a clear class division in the international marriage market along the husbands' 
privileged class position and perceived hierarchies of wives' country of origin. Based on this 
hierarchy, expectations toward foreign wives differ. Wives from Western Europe and North 
America are treated as bi-lingual, cosmopolitans, and members of the global elite without much 
expectation of their domesticity (Hong and H. Kim 2010). A Caucasian wife is seen as more 
cultured and sophisticated. This is in sharp contrast to the way that wives from Southeast Asia 
are treated, as obedient wives and good homemakers whose main quality comes from their 
domesticity. Therefore, the relative under-development of a foreign bride’s home country and 
her natal family’s class background contributes to the expectation of their domesticity and 
loyalty to the Korean family.   
 Mrs. Yang’s case illuminates not only nation-specific global economic hierarchies, but 
also the level of poverty within a country of origin, and how these shape the expectations of 
marriage immigrants’ domesticity. Mrs. Yang’s younger, disabled brother had a Filipina wife, 
but they divorced after four years of marriage. All her siblings had initially protested when her 
mother arranged the international marriage for her brother. However, they reluctantly agreed to 
the idea when their mom explained she would not be able to take care of their brother soon. After 
the divorce, her aged mom is again taking care of her disabled brother and his young daughter. 
Mrs. Yang recalled that her mother chose a Filipina woman expecting the woman’s loyalty to her 
Korean family.  
 
They had communication problems because of my brother’s disability. But I think the 
main reason (for their divorce) ... well, other Filipina wives are doing well because they 
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come from really poor families in the Philippines. They really need to send money back 
home. That’s why they do their best for their Korean family and raise kids well too. But 
her family wasn’t really poor. My mom regrets choosing her based on her pretty and 
innocent looks. Things could be better if my brother had an ugly woman from a really 
poor family in the Philippines.” 
       (Mrs. Yang, Korean woman, age 36) 
 
In this interview, the Korean in-laws demonstrate a belief that the husband's unfavourable 
qualities in the domestic marriage market - such as disability and his working-class family 
background- are compensated by his Korean nationality in the international marriage market. 
The husband’s Korean nationality and its legal and potential economic advantages are 
understood as resources he can offer his Filipina wife. Regardless of the class status of a Korean 
family, Korean husbands and in-laws believe that they are superior to their foreign wives based 
on their nation’s position in the global economic hierarchy (Abelmann and H. Kim 2005, M. 
Kim 2014). On top of this, the option of buying the “poorest of the poor” foreign bride reveals 
that not only her home country’s economic status but also how the individual level of poverty 
within her country of origin works to construct the perceived inferiority of a foreign bride.  
Korean husbands are able to excise his power in the intimate relationship.  
 While Koreans generally believe that these foreign wives would benefit from learning 
Korean culture and traditional gender roles, Koreans characterize tongnama (South and 
Southeast Asian) women and chosŏnjok (Korean-Chinese) women somewhat differently. Mr. 
Kang (age 45), who married a chosŏnjok woman and has two Vietnamese sisters-in-law, 




Mr. Kang:  If a Korean man and his parents have strong personalities, well, a tongnama 
woman would be better for him. But if they have soft personalities, a chosŏnjok 
woman would be fine.  
        Lee: Why is it like that? 
Mr. Kang: Because chosŏnjok women are good at cooking and learn Korean things very 
quickly. But, there are things you should know about them. They will say “no” if 
they don’t agree.  If you don’t accept their hot temper, they may leave, or that 
may cause a family quarrel. On the other hand, Vietnamese women are softer, so 
they may be suitable for a man with a strong personality. But Vietnamese women 
need a longer time to adjust to Korean culture. It takes quite a bit of time for them 
to learn Korean foods too.    
(Mr. Kang, Korean male factory worker, age 45) 
 
Mr.Kang’s comments on the temperaments of tongnama and chosŏnjok brides may be based on 
his own family interactions, but his view reveals a lot about how Koreans conceive of foreign 
brides and what Koreans expect to them. In this conversation, the main comparison points are 
women’s temperaments -such as docile or stubborn personality- and the ability to learn the 
Korean culture -such as Korean language and Korean foods. While chosŏnjok women are 
portrayed as stubborn, hot-tempered, and somewhat independent, tongnama women are 
characterized as mild and docile but somewhat slow learners.  
These expectation of foreign brides’ domesticity and loyalty to the Korean family are 
closely related to the Third World images of foreign brides. Vietnamese marriage immigrant 
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Hong’s case illustrates this well. Hong has two children with her Korean husband who is a 
factory worker. In the past, she worked as a Vietnamese interpreter at banks and district offices 
for newcomers. When I interviewed her, she was working for the district public health center. 
She recalled how she met her Korean husband and why he chose her during his marriage trip to 
Vietnam.    
 
I asked him after we got married. Why did you choose me? Why didn’t you choose one 
of the pretty girls? Several girls cried because they didn’t get selected. That day, I was 
wearing Ao Dai (traditional Vietnamese dress) with long black loose hair. My husband 
said that he liked the image of me in white Ao Dai and that I looked like Korean girls 
used to look: neat and simple. He said that he doesn't like girls in sexy outfits. He likes 
simple style, like Korean girls in the past.     
     (Hong, Vietnamese female immigrant, age 29) 
  
Hong was thus seen as an innocent girl who appealed to a sense of nostalgia for the past. While 
contemporary Korean women represent the spoiled present (dirty and complicated), Hong 
represents the past (traditional, neat, and simple); a woman who conforms to the values of 
traditional gender roles. The idea that more traditional foreign brides are more appealing to 
Korean men and his families reveals the developmental logic of racism. The discourse of past 
and futurity is a key element of the developmental narratives (J. Han 2015). J. Han (2015) points 
out in her article of Korean and Korean American short-term missionaries in African countries 
“Our Past, Your Future” that seeing underdevelopment and poverty of others offers an 
opportunity to reflect on what you have recently gained and what you are currently enjoying. 
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Therefore, placing a marriage immigrant woman in the territory of the past is essential to 
recognizing the present superior position of Korea. The portrayal of foreign brides from 
Southeast Asia as docile, innocent, nostalgic, and exotic women resembles European and 
American Orientalism. In this sense, the logic of modernity functions in much the same way, by 
creating foreign brides in migrant-hosting Asian countries as inferior others.  
 
4.3.1.2 Performing Traditional Gender Roles  
Corresponding to this social expectation, migrant women have to learn to adjust by identifying as 
‘the good wife’ and mother. As Hyun-Mi Kim (2014) points out, however, migrant women are 
neither from the past nor intrinsically obedient and traditional. Rather many of them have 
previously experienced more gender equal relationships under the socialist regime or matriarchal 
family culture of their home countries. They, thus, have to adapt to Korean gender roles and 
perform ‘the good wife’ in order to integrate into Korean society. Filipina migrant Susanne’s 
case illustrates this well.  
 Susanne and her Korean husband Young-Hoon live on the outskirts of the city, with two 
young children (Min-Ju and Min-Hee) and Susanne’s Korean mother-in-law. Before the 
interview, Susanne served warm tea and cookies, as any host would treat her guests. We were in 
the middle of the interview when Young-Hoon came into the living room. Immediately he 
interrupted Susanne:  
 
Young-Hoon:  Min-Ju’s mom!   
        Susanne:  Yes?  
Young-Hoon:  Serve the homemade mook (acorn jelly) for the teacher. 
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        Susanne:  Okay. I will serve mook later after this interview.  
  (she tries to return to the interview)  
Young-Hoon:  Where is mother? 
        Susanne:  At the community center (tries to return to the interview again) 
 
The interaction between Susanne and Young-hoon was very natural and typical in a Korean way. 
Susanne was addressed by her son’s name, Min-Ju. In Korea, addressing a mother or father by 
their first child’s name is very common because within the family structure their parental role is 
considered more important than their own individuality. As well, asking one’s wife to serve the 
guests or checking up on other family members indicates that serving and taking care of family 
members are the wife’s duty. 
This kind of interaction between married couples is typical in Korean households. 
However, Susanne recalled that it took years to adapt to the Korean way of interacting with other 
Korean family members, especially with male figures. There were lots of arguments and tense 
situations until she finally adapted her husbands’ family culture: 
 
When I just got married, I could not understand my father-in-law at all. He asked me to 
serve every little thing, like serving water or coffee whenever he needed it. And my 
husband asked me to do everything for him too. In the Philippines, all the boys know how 
to do household work. But Korean men, they asked me even to serve water. I felt that it’s 
very unfair. One day I talked back to my father-in-law. This made him angry, and he 
overthrew the dinner table. It was tense. I was so frustrated and angry because of this 
culture where women should serve men. Why did they ask me to bring water in the 
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morning? (laughs) Now I understand it is just Korean culture. I learned that respecting 
seniors and listening to them is part of Korean culture. Also, I learned cooking, and 
serving meals are a wife's duty.  I think I have already adapted to the Korean culture well. 
      (Susanne, Filipina female immigrant, age 33)  
 
Susanne expressed that she has a good relationship with her Korean mother-in-law, and her 
neighbours complemented her cooking and hard work, saying she was just like a Korean. She 
seemed well-integrated into traditional Korean family culture. At first, she protested against 
traditional gender roles because she saw that it was an exploitation of women within the family. 
But she eventually accepted her role in the family as she understood it was Korean tradition and 
a cultural difference between the Philippines and Korea. Not every foreign bride accepts this 
traditional gender role though. For example, the patriarchal family culture of rural farmers and 
working-class men is one of the main complaints of foreign women about their marriage lives 
and patriarchal expectations often cause family troubles or divorces (Freeman 2005, Yu 2010). 
However, when a foreign bride adapts patriarchal gender roles, they tend to have a comparatively 
peaceful marriage life and decent relationships with their in-laws.  
 Performing the good wife and mother means taking over the primary caregiver role. 
Housework, care work, parenting, child education, and socializing for the extended family are 
essential to maintaining a Korean family. Vietnamese marriage immigrant Hong’s case illustrates 
this point well. Hong married a Korean man when she was 21 years old. She was the last child 
out of six in Vietnam, so she was not used to cooking and housework. While working part-time 
as a Vietnamese interpreter for the district public health center, Hong does all the housework, 
parenting, and care work for her two children. She also prepares huge meals for the family’s 
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ancestral worship table four times a year. In her Korean extended family, there is another Korean 
myŏnŭri (daughter-in-law) who could possibly help to prepare the ancestral worship tables, but 
she stopped participating in family events after Hong came into the family. Now Hong is the 
only woman in her Korean extended family, and she prepares ancestral worships for her Korean 
husband’s ancestors, and parents-in-law who passed away long before she came to Korea.   
 
During my second New Year family gathering in Korea, I got scolded by my husband’s 
oldest brother because I could not cook Korean food and properly set the ancestral 
worship table. At that time, I had a 3-month-old newborn baby, and she was crying all the 
time. I had to cook while I was holding a crying baby. My husband came to the kitchen to 
help me, but he also got scolded. We were told that kitchen work is a woman’s job so a 
man should not enter the kitchen. Whew~~, I realized this was a shijipsari (Korean 
women’s marriage life). I cried every day and regretted marrying a Korean man. But, I’ve 
tried hard to gain recognition. Now the oldest bother likes me a lot because I take care of 
all the ancestral worships. I cook Korean food, and I don’t ask my husband to help with 
the housework, at least in front of his brother.  
       (Hong, Vietnamese female immirant, age 29) 
 
 In her case, not only does her Korean husband relegate reproductive labour to Hong, but the 
other Korean myŏnŭri in the family does so as well. In particular, major Korean traditions, 
such as New Year, Ch'usŏk (Thanksgiving) and Chesa (ancestral worship) rely heavily on 
women’s work: cooking, cleaning, serving family and relatives. Hong undertakes these roles, 
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which even the other Korean daughter-in-law gave up, to get recognition as a member of the 
Korean family.  
  Besides the family, the community is also an important site where a foreign bride has to 
perform her domesticity and traditional gender role. Parreñas (2008:9) calls this, "the force of 
domesticity" which is "the continued relegation of housework to women or the persistence of the 
ideology of women's domesticity, in the labour market, the family, and the migrant community, 
as well as in migration policies and laws." Foreign wives of Korean men have always been able 
to attain residency or citizenship more easily than foreign husbands. However, legal residency or 
citizenship is not directly translated into social membership or belonging. Korean society only 
accepts foreign wives who perform the role of the good wife and mother. The following two 
cases provide a good comparison:  
 
All my neighbours are very nice to me. Nowadays even, I get compliments from 
neighbours and seniors. Last time, I treated them to lunch, and they said, “Minju’s mom 
(referring to Susanne) cooks Korean foods well, and it is delicious.”  
       (Susanne, Filipina female immigrant, age 33) 
 
Across from my house, there is a family of an old lady, her son, his foreign wife and their 
baby. The old Korean mother has to cook Korean foods for herself and her foreign 
daughter-in-law cooks separately. It doesn’t sound right. I feel sorry for the old lady. Of 
course, there must be cultural differences, but I wish the foreign myŏnŭri cook Korean 
foods and serves her mother-in-law. But it looks like she is not willing to do this.  




For foreign wives, one way of integrating into Korean society is performing these expected 
gender roles. As these cases reveal, judgements about migrant women are based on their 
domestic performance; such as cooking Korean food and taking care of in-laws. The good wife, 
the good mother, and a good myŏnŭri (daughter-in-law) translate into the decent neighbour, and 
the good immigrant. Thus, gender ideology functions as a normative tool for foreign wives’ 
social membership within the community.  
 While foreign brides are integrated into Korean society if they accept the role of a good 
wife, Korean husbands also have to perform the traditional gender role of “the respectable family 
man” (Freeman 2005). While a Korean husband relegates reproductive and domestic labour to 
his foreign wife, he is expected to be the main breadwinner and financially support his wife's 
natal family. However, since the majority of Korean men who chose international marriages are 
factory workers or rural farmers, being able to support a wife’s natal family financially is often 
quite difficult. Due to the traditional dowry culture whereby a groom buys a house, and a bride 
fills the house with furniture, a groom is expected to contribute to the marriage more than the 
bride financially. In the case of an international marriage, a Korean man is expected to pay all 
the cost of the marriage, including two wedding ceremonies (in wife’s country and in South 
Korea), honeymoon, dowry to wife’s parents, cost for his wife’s visa process, wife’s airfare to 
South Korea, a house, furniture and household goods. Sending remittances to the wife’s natal 
family is also expected even though not every couple can send remittances regularly, or at all. 
The case of Young-Hoon, who has a Filipina wife and sends remittance occasionally, 




I am really good to my wife’s family in the Philippines. My wife has nine brothers and 
sisters. I am the first son-in-law. My wife is the first daughter, the first daughter of her 
family! Think about how much money they need to live. I work hard to make enough 
money. It’s a headache actually, but I feel a great responsibility.  
       (Young-Hoon, Korean male farmer, age 48)  
  
Young-Hoon sends remittance whenever his wife asks him to help out her natal family to 
renovate their house, for her siblings’ weddings, and so on. Providing financial support for his 
wife’s natal family is a burden for Young-Hoon, but he feels an obligation as he assumes the 
patriarchal role as head of household and first son-in-law. Younger generations of Koreans in 
their 20s and 30s tend to be less patriarchal and more sensitive to gender equality. This means 
not only that young Korean women challenge their traditional gender roles as a wife, daughter-
in-law, and mother, but also those young Korean men do not want to take the full responsibility 
of sole breadwinner. However, Korean patriarchy is still influential in shaping family relations, 
especially for multicultural families who expect both foreign brides and Korean husbands to 
perform traditional gender roles, as foreign brides are integrated into Korean society through 
demonstrating their Korean-ness through the family. This makes for an interesting contrast to the 
situation that foreign husbands face in Korea.   
 
4.3.2 Forbidden Patriarchs: Korean Women and Foreign Men 
4.3.2.1 Struggles of Getting Married 
Marriages of Korean women and foreign men tend to be so-called love marriages 
(yŏnaegyŏrhon). However, they usually elicit strong protests from the Korean women’s family 
135 
 
members, regardless of the husbands’ nationality and race. Since the majority of foreign 
husbands are North Americans, Western Europeans, and Japanese men, a Korean woman’s 
international marriage is considered as a form of global ‘marrying up,' and these couples tend to 
reside in the husbands’ countries. On the other hand, couples who remain in Korea tend to be 
unions of Korean women and foreign husbands who initially came to Korea as foreign migrant 
workers from China, South and Southeast Asia. South and Southeast Asian men are considered 
the underclass due to their initial entry into Korea as foreign migrant workers, even if they have 
college or university degrees from their home countries. Thus, the union of a Korean woman and 
a South and Southeast Asian man is seen as the Korean woman’s ‘marrying down.' 
 In addition, traditionally a bride merged into her husband’s family culture upon marriage. 
Even though this traditional meaning of marriage is gradually eroding, there is still an old 
expression, “sijip gada”, literally means ‘moving into husband’s house,’ to describe a woman's 
marriage.  It is, thus, problematic for a Korean woman to marry a foreign husband because she is 
merging into a foreign culture. While a Korean woman’s international marriage, in general, is 
not acceptable regardless of her husband’s nationality and race, a White husband is somewhat 
more acceptable compared to a South and Southeast Asian husband, because the White husband 
is expected to bring his Korean wife back to his country. However, a South and Southeast Asian 
man is more likely to stay in Korea; he may become a burden to his Korean wife financially and 
socially. They may form an ethnically and racially different family in Korea. The case of Hye 
and Ali shows this point well. Hye is a registered nurse, and she married Ali who initially came 
as a foreign migrant worker from Bangladesh. In separate interviews they describe her family’s 




My mom said, “why do you want to marry a foreigner even though there are plenty of 
Korean guys? He is not even Canadian or American, why do you want a Bangladeshi 
man, of all men in the world? 
      (Hye, Korean woman, age 34) 
 
Her parents really opposed this marriage because I am tongnama. We couldn’t have a 
wedding ceremony because her parents protested. I couldn’t meet her parents for years. 
My wife said that we didn’t need to see them if they were not able to recognize me as her 
partner. She argued a lot against her parents, and she was always on my side. After we 
had a baby, her parents finally accepted me.    
       (Ali, Bangladesh male immigrant, age 32) 
 
Despite her family’s opposition, after Hye got married to Ali, her mother and sister started giving 
them money, gifts, furniture and even helped buy them an apartment just after their child arrived. 
She interpreted this as her family feeling sorry for her marrying down. 
When a Korean woman marries a South and Southeast Asian man, she struggles to 
convince her Korean family to accept her husband-to-be. She often threatens her parents that she 
will not contact her parents until they acknowledge her partner or her parents threaten their 
daughter that they will disown her if she follows through with the marriage. Udaya (age 30), a 
Nepalese immigrant who came to Korea as a foreign migrant worker recalls his experience of 
marrying a Korean woman. His Korean wife is very close to her mother, and they talk on the 
phone several times a week. When she planned to marry him, she told her family “I won’t see 
you any more if you protest this marriage.”  
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 While many Korean women dating tongnama men firmly demonstrate their will to marry, 
at the same time they also try to reduce protests from the family as much as possible. They 
sometimes do this by presenting their husband-to-be as a white-collar office worker. This is 
thought to compensate for a tongnama man’s low position. Since marrying a South or Southeast 
Asian man is considered as marrying down in Korea, Udaya’s wife was already concerned about 
her family’s reaction when they started dating. She thus asked him not to tell her family that he 
was a factory worker when she introduced him. She assumed that her family would never accept 
Udaya if they found out that Udaya was a foreign migrant worker, on top of his undesirable 
Nepalese nationality. Accommodating his wife’s wish, after their marriage, Udaya quit his 
factory job and moved to the government-funded migrant worker counselling center to take a job 
as a counsellor assistant. Even though the salary is quite a bit less than what he received doing 
factory work, his wife prefers him to be a poorly paid office worker rather than a better paid 
factory worker. 
   As these cases demonstrate, couples made up of Korean women, and Southeast Asian men 
have to struggle to get married. Having a foreign spouse is treated as a less-than-ideal marriage 
in general. However, there are huge differences between marrying a foreign bride and marrying a 
foreign husband. Although there are prejudices and stereotypes against international marriages 
between Korean men and foreign women, the Korean government actively recruits foreign brides 
based on the social consent that importing foreign brides is inevitable to maintain the Korean 
population and to solve the care deficit. Thus, a Korean man’s international marriage is 
considered a sacrifice for the nation. On the contrary, the general sentiment about the 
international marriage of Korean women is very negative. However, if you must accept an 
international marriage, then white men from the first world are acceptable, but not tongnama 
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men from the Third World. White men in Korea are seen as professionals or English teachers 
who may be financially more stable and culturally more advanced, and who, it is assumed, will 
eventually return their country with their Korean wives. Thus they may not compete as patriarchs 
with Korean men, nor form racially different families within Korea. However, tongnama men in 
Korea, who are associated with the image of the underclass, as foreign migrant workers who 
come from low-income countries, will most likely stay in Korea and they may even form 
ethnically and racially distinct families. They may attempt to become substitute patriarchs. These 
are what Koreans generally fear to foreign men, especially to tongnama men. Thus, while the 
marriage of a Korean man and a foreign woman is acceptable and even encouraged, the marriage 
of a Korean woman and a tongnama man is deeply frowned upon. 
 
4.3.2.2 Exclusion from the National Community 
 On top of the institutional exclusion from settlement services, foreign husbands are 
excluded from the Korean patriarch community because Korean men do not recognize them as 
members of their Korean family. So-Yong’s case illustrates this point clearly. So-Yong and Said 
had a small wedding party with their close friends, but none of their family members attended. 
Eventually after being together for ten years, eventually So-Yong's mother and sister accepted 
her Bangladeshi husband, but her father and brother still avoid meeting her husband.  
 
My dad and my brother still don’t see Said. So we could not visit my parents together. I 
realized that there is a difference between men and women. My mom and my sister try to 
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understand me and learn to be on my side. But for my dad and brother, their honour and 
pride seem to be more important.  
      (So-Young, Korean woman, age 40) 
 
As this interview demonstrates, while So-Young's female family members recognize Said as a 
member of the family, her male family members refuse to recognize him. The foreign husband is 
thus reminded of his place within the Korean family hierarchy.  
Nepalese husband, Udaya who works as a counsellor assistant for a local migrant workers 
counselling center, explained his place within his Korean family. According to him, he was quite 
satisfied with his life in Korea. However, he seems to feel intimidated by his Korean family-in-
law when he has to attend family gatherings.  
 
Lee: You might meet your Korean family and relatives during the Korean holidays. 
Have you ever had a moment when you feel different from your Korean family 
members? 
  Udaya: Well, sometimes I felt cultural differences. And also when the family and relatives 
get together, they don’t talk to me. Now I have good Korean, so I have a little bit 
more chances to talk with them, but usually, while Korean relatives talk together, 
I am quietly sitting nearby them. So I just wait for the time to go back home.  
       (Udaya, Nepalese male immigrant, age 30)  
 
As Udaya’s case shows, husbands, especially Southeast Asian husbands who initially came to 
Korea as foreign migrant workers, are permanent foreigners, regardless of their current legal and 
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economic status (Jung, 2007). While female marriage immigrants are considered myŏnŭri 
(daughter-in-law) who are accepted under their Korean husbands’ control, foreign husbands 
(sawi or son-in-law) are not accepted as members of society because Korean society cannot 
permit substitute patriarchs. Regarding the degrees of inclusion then, a gendered racial hierarchy 
is in the process of being constructed in which Korean men are followed by Korean women, who 
are followed by foreign brides and finally foreign men. 
 
4.4 The Racialization of Marriage Immigrants:  Ideology of Blood, Patriarchy, and Race 
In Korea, marriage immigrants have changed the ethnic composition of the population. A clear 
hierarchy exists within these international marriages according to a spouse’s appearance and skin 
colour and depending on what ethnicity or race they belong. During field research, my 
interviewees often mentioned the racial discrimination they experienced because of their 
partners' skin colour. They also expressed worry about possible discrimination against their bi-
racial children. However, the children of foreign women and Korean men are generally 
considered to be Korean. In this section, I further examine what I call “patriarchal racialization.” 
As discussed, patriarchal racialization is a gendered racialization process whereby, while foreign 
wives and foreign husbands are both considered non-Korean, foreign wives are considered ‘less 
foreign’ than foreign husbands. Therefore, children of a Korean father and a foreign mother are 
seen as racially closer to Koreans than the children of a foreign father and Korean mother. Two 
categories of marriage immigrants (foreign brides and foreign husbands) and their children show 
how Korean ethno-nationalism and continued belief in patriarchal blood lineage (Korean blood 




4.4.1 Racial/Ethnic Preferences of a Foreign Wife 
Koreans are highly perceptive of ethnic and racial differences. Depending on a wife’s skin colour 
and appearance, the family may be able to pass and possibly blend into Korean society, or they 
may continuously encounter strange gazes and discrimination. Thus, Koreans prefer East Asian-
looking brides such as Chinese or Vietnamese women to darker skinned brides from the 
Philippines or Thailand. The following excerpt from an international marriage online forum 
shows the racial/cultural preferences in choosing a foreign wife. This Korean man posted his 
experience of international marriage for the benefit of other Korean bachelors. He narrowed 
down his wife-to-be’s nationality to Vietnam and Uzbekistan. In the end, he chose an Uzbek 
bride because his parents would not accept a Southeast Asian woman as their daughter-in-law. 
The following excerpt of his racial/cultural evaluation of foreign brides is taken from the forum. 
It provides a snapshot of some shared cultural and racial stereotypes.      
 
China  
Pros: Similar appearance to Koreans, thus children easily blend into school life. 
Cons: High risk of fake marriage or divorce. There are huge cultural differences regarding 
caring for in-laws due to socialism. 
 
The Philippines 
Pros: Speak English so that they can teach English to children.   
Cons: Thick lips and flat nose. Their darker skin never becomes lighter even after living in 





Pros: Have Confucian culture so they can easily accept the Korean family culture, they are 
obedient. They have a bit darker skin, but it turns pale like Koreans after living in Korea. 
Cons: None 
 
Uzbekistan   
Pros: Not everyone but Islamic culture may share some similarities with Confucian culture 
(support parents, dominance of men over women). Their western appearance may satisfy 
Korean men’s sexual fantasies.  
Cons: Too stubborn because of former socialism and nomadic culture. 
Source: “Naega ujŭbek kukche kyŏrhonŭl haeyahaettŏn iyu (the reasons why I married a 




On the list, two prominent evaluation rubrics are foreign women’s racial attributes and cultural 
characteristics. The cultural characteristics indicate whether a foreign woman’s country has a 
patriarchal culture. This may help the woman accept Korean patriarchal family culture and carry 
out the traditional role of wife, as is the expectation.  On the other hand, the racial attributes 
describe a foreign women’s skin colour and facial features. Historically, light and dark colours 
were associated with class status in traditional agrarian Korean society long before Western 
racial hierarchies were introduced. Light colours represented ruling class, higher social status, 








cultural sophistication, intellectualism, while dark colours represented lower social status, 
cultural vulgarity, and ignorance. This was because the ruling class had a paler skin tone while 
peasants and labourers were tanned from working outside. Thus, historically Korean colour 
prejudice was closer to class prejudice rather than ethnic/racial prejudice. However, after racial 
hierarchies were introduced to Korea after the Korean war in the 1950s, this traditional Korean 
class-based colour prejudice was fused with skin colour distinctions in the making of racial 
others (N. Kim 2008). Thus, this classed and racialized colour distinction connotes that lighter 
skin equals superiority and darker skin is an indication of inferiority. A wife’s skin colour is one 
of the most important considerations when choosing a bride-to-be.  
 Mrs. Sun (age 82) arranged an international marriage for her bachelor son despite her 
husband’s protest. She hired an international marriage agency. At first, they needed to choose the 
country of the wife-to-be before her son travelled abroad for the marriage meetings. In order to 
give them some guidance, the marriage agency provided some photos of Filipina women, Thai 
women, and Vietnamese women. Given the limited information, her son chose a Vietnamese 
woman based on her skin colour and appearance. For him, “Filipina women or Thai women’s 
skin is too dark to live together with.”   
 A Korean family will accept an international marriage more easily if the foreign spouse 
has a relatively lighter skin tone. Anne is a Filipina marriage immigrant who did a so-called a 
love marriage. She met her husband at a private English school when she was his English teacher 
in Manila. Her parents and sisters immigrated to the United States about 10 years ago, and her 
brother is in Australia when I met her. She recalled that her Korean in-laws did not object to their 




Anne: The good thing is that I look like a Korean. So my father-in-law accepted me.  
   Lee: Because you have lighter skin?  
Anne: Yes, I look like you, not like other Filipinas. Other Filipinas are darker than me.  
      (Anne, Filipina female immigrant, age 29) 
 Regardless of the type of marriage - an arranged marriage or a love marriage - a wife's skin 
colour is carefully considered for different reasons. Most families want to avoid unwanted 
attention and reduce potential discrimination against their family and children. Sometimes, 
however, a Korean family prefers a very dark-skinned wife with the belief that her unfavourable 
appearance would reduce her chance of running away and would increase the ‘pitiful woman's’ 
loyalty to her Korean family because no other Korean man would like to live with her. Thus, 
Korean families’ attitudes seem to also depend on their own socioeconomic status and whether 
they are seen as a desirable family for a foreigner to marry into. Therefore, racial/ethnic 
preferences and expectations that foreign brides from less developed countries will accept 
patriarchal culture reinforces the gender ideology of the traditional good wife and mother.  
 
4.4.2 Foreign Husband’s Skin Color 
A foreign husband’s ethnic and racial background is one of the reasons why a Korean family 
may not accept him as the legitimate partner of their daughter. In general, as the foreign 
population and the mixed-race second generation increases, racial discrimination has become a 
growing social issue. However, foreign husbands’ ethnic and racial backgrounds are considered 
more negatively than foreign brides’ are. While a Korean man’s international marriage is 
understood as a choice made under conditions of necessity and foreign brides are expected to 
accept Korean culture, a Korean woman’s international marriage is questioned because it is a so-
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called love marriage (yŏnaegyŏrhon), which indicates that the Korean woman has voluntarily 
chosen to form an ethnically or racially inferior family. Hye recalls how her mother protested 
and blamed her for wanting a Bangladesh man as her husband; “You will have a dark-skinned 
child, then how will you take responsibility when your child will face discrimination?” To 
understand Korean families’ worries about discrimination, like Hye’s mother, we need to look at 
how South and Southeast Asian skin colour is understood, and how Korean women with foreign 
men were perceived historically.   
 In Korea, brown or even light brown skin is considered to be closer to the black skin than 
Korean skin colour. Koreans regard their skin to be lighter than the South and Southeast Asian 
skin tone. As a result, while Koreans consider their skin colour to be closer to that of Caucasians, 
South and Southeast Asian’s skin is considered closer to black skin. During my field research, I 
often met interviewees who used the black/white colour frame to describe South and Southeast 
Asians, and mixed-race second generations. Young-Hoon who had a Vietnamese wife described 
his friend’s case in terms of the black/white colour frame.   
 
My friend has a Vietnamese wife, but their child is “kŏmdungi (‘Negro’)." That kid 
couldn't live in Korea. A kŏmdungi was born between a Korean father and Vietnamese 
mother, how could they live with this black skin child? Their child got bullied all the time 
at school. Kids kept asking him, why is your skin so dark?  Finally, they sent their child 
to Vietnam. The parents are still in Korea, and they send money to the Vietnamese 
grandparents to take care of their child.   
       (Young-Hoon, Korean male farmer, age 48) 
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In this conversation, the skin colour of a child from a Korean and Vietnamese couple is depicted 
as black (kŏmdungi). Why is brown skin seen as black in South Korea? To answer this, we need 
to take into an account U.S military involvement in modern Korean history as discussed in 
chapter 3. Nadia Kim (2008) also points out, contemporary Korean skin colour distinction is 
influenced by the American black/white binary racial order, which was introduced to Korea after 
the Korean War in the 1950s.  
So-Young who is a manager at a publishing company got married to a Bangladeshi man 
named Said, who initially came to Korea as a foreign migrant worker. Their case illustrates this 
point well. 
 
My dad expected that Said was some sort of Asian, but when he saw the photo of Said, he 
got a shock. "He is not even Asian. It is such a shock to me. I cannot allow this 
marriage." (loudly laughs) For him, Said is not Asian; he is almost black and a very 
different race. My dad was in the Korean army, so he saw lots of American soldiers in 
camp towns. In his words, American "kŏmdungi (negros)” harassed Korean girls, to be 
specific Korean prostitutes. I think his generation has a huge racial trauma about this. Do 
you remember the American TV drama, “Roots”?  There is a scene where the main 
character scrubbed his body very hard to bleach his dark skin. My dad said that was a 
very sad scene, and he thought being born with black skin meant having lots of obstacles 
and difficulties in life. That person will become my daughter’s partner, and your child 
will be kŏmdungi who will be looked down on and neglected. He wrote in his e-mail that 
these were the reasons why he could not accept this marriage.  




In this conversation, So-Young’s father opposed her Bangladeshi husband-to-be because his dark 
skin colour reminded him of the racial trauma that the older generation in their late 50s or older 
experienced after the Korean War. So-Young’s father interpreted this Bangladeshi man’s race 
through the American black/white racial hierarchy that he had learned from the U. S military 
camp, and from American TV, which was dominant in South Korea until the 1990s.  
The issue of honhyŏl also shows this deep suffering from racial trauma since the Korean 
War. Until the mid-1980s, many Korean women worked as sex-workers near US military 
camps.21 The child of a Korean woman and an American soldier was called a ‘honhyŏl’ - literally 
meaning ‘mixed blood.’ While the Korean government has not kept statistics of the honhyŏl 
population, K. Park (2007:13) estimates that roughly 11,000 honhyŏl have lived in Korea, but the 
actual size of the honhyŏl population could be 7-10 times larger.22 Scholars point out that Korean 
men felt emasculated by the US military after the Korean War and honhyŏl were a living symbol 
of Korean men’s impotence under the regime of the US military (K. Choi 2009, K. Park 2007). 
Korean society, especially in those days, was very patriarchal, so women were blamed for 
sleeping with US soldiers and giving birth to honhyŏls. As they were considered byproducts of 
prostitution, honhyŏls were placed at the bottom of the social stratum and called ‘twiggi,' 
meaning a hybrid between two different animals. They had very high school dropout rates, faced 
extreme discrimination in the job market and found it difficult to get married. In the 1980s, many 
                                                 
21 Now this job has been passed on to foreign women, mainly from Russia and the Philippines (J. Han 
2014) 
22 From the late 1980s, the number of children born to American soldiers and Korean women has 
dramatically decreased. (K. Park 2007)  
148 
 
honhyŏl children were adopted or immigrated to America to avoid a life of severe 
discrimination.23 Remarkably, according to K. Park (ibid), even until the 1990s, honhyŏl were 
categorized as disabled people in the Korean government’s adoption records. Amongst honhyŏl 
children, a racial hierarchy existed according to the father’s race. Honhyŏl children born to a 
Korean woman and a black American soldier faced far more discrimination than honhyŏls with a 
white father. Koreans learned the racial hierarchy that was visible within the US military and 
American media.24 Korean sex workers were also treated differently depending on their 
customers’ race. Korean sex workers who did business with black American soldiers were 
considered inferior and were not supposed to sleep with white American soldiers (Moon, 2002). 
  Therefore, a foreign husband’s ethnic and racial background is judged more seriously than 
a foreign bride’s. Since the patriarchal idea of marriage is still influential in shaping family 
culture, a Korean woman’s international marriage to a tongnama man is understood not only as 
marrying down but also as the voluntary formation of an ethnically and racially inferior family 
whereby the Korean woman’s racial/cultural attributes may be absorbed into the foreign 
husband’s. At the same time, the American Black/White racial binary is influential in shaping 
Koreans’ understanding of foreign husbands and their location within Korean racial hierarchies. 
In the making of tongnama husbands, therefore, there is a complex intersection of foreign 
husbands’ race and Korean women’s gender roles under Korean patriarchy. The intersectionality 
                                                 
23 The US passed a special law (Public Law 97-359) in 1982 which facilitated the adoption and 
immigration of bi-racial children from Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia who were left behind by 
American soldiers. (K. Park 2007:13) 
24 Until the 1990s American soap dramas and movies made up over 50 percent of total Korean broadcast 
airtime (K. Park 2007).   
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of race and gender in the racialization process of tongnama becomes more prominent when we 
see how the second generation of multicultural families are understood in Korean society.   
 
4.4.3 Racial Proximity of the Second Generation   
In Korea, there exists a strong sense of ethno-nationalism, often expressed as hanp'itchul (one 
blood) and tanilminjok (single ethnic nation). The idea of one blood and a single ethnic nation 
arose comparatively recently as a way to mobilize the country as it aimed to achieve 
modernization after independence from Japanese colonialism (K. Choi 2009). Ethnonationalism 
is so pervasive that non-ethnic Koreans are not recognized as Korean citizens even if they 
acquire legal citizenship status (H. Lee 2008; Jo 2011). Even though Korea is transforming into a 
multicultural and multiethnic society, the dominant ideology of ‘one nation' and ‘pure blood' 
creates the category of han'guksaram (Korean) (N. Kim 2008). The following conversation 
shows this clearly:  
 
          Lee: What is the most important thing for Korean identity?  
Mrs. Park: I really think that a father and a mother should be ethnic Korean, then the children 
can be han'guksaram (Korean). Living in Korea, and knowing Korean culture is 
not enough to be han'guksaram. Having a Korean father and a Korean mother, 
this is the most important thing for Korean identity.  
      (Mrs. Park, Korean woman, age 37)  
In general, foreign husbands are treated as contaminators of Korea’s ‘pure blood’ and nation, 
regardless of the foreign husbands’ ethnicity. As a result of this view that sharing Korean blood 
is the most important ingredient for Korean identity, multicultural families (tamunhwa gajok) are 
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treated as almost Korean, but not quite. However, relationships between Korean men and foreign 
women are acceptable because the child of such a partnership is considered to be more Korean. 
The following excerpts are from two separate conversations with Korean interviewees. These 
conversations illustrate patriarchal understandings of nationhood and race:  
 
    Lee: Well, is a child of a Korean father and a foreign mother, Korean? 
Mrs. Kim: (Raises voice) Of course, Korean! That’s obvious.   
  Mrs. Seo:  Of course. They have Korean blood.  
Mrs. Choi: Because the foreign mother came to Korea.   
   (Korean women, Mrs. Seo, age 63, Mrs. Choi, age 59, Mrs. Kim, age 54) 
  
         Lee:  Do you consider foreign wives Korean?  
 Mr. Han:  I consider them foreigners. But, they speak quite good Korean. Those foreign 
wives are very nice people. 
         Lee: Then what about the children between Korean men and foreign women? Do you 
consider them Korean? 
Mr. Han: It depends. Some kids look like Koreans - similar to their fathers - but some kids 
look like foreigners - similar to their mothers.   
         Lee:  Then, there are foreign men get married to Korean women, do you consider them 
Korean or foreigner?  
 Mr. Han: Yeah, there are some Korean ladies get married to Filipino Manila hubbies and 
Bangla hubbies. These guys have a small business, so they have some money, 
they speak good Korean. But, I still don't feel that they are Korean. 
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         Lee:  What do you think of the children between them?  
  Mr. Han: I don’t feel they are Korean, to be honest.  
    (Mr. Han, Korean male taxi driver, age 58) 
  
The above conversations show that while foreign wives and foreign husbands are both 
considered non-Korean, foreign wives are considered ‘less foreign’ than foreign husbands are, 
because they are supposedly under their Korean husbands’ control, and therefore they are able to 
assimilate. Moreover, the children of foreign women and Korean men are generally considered 
to be Korean because Koreans still believe that blood is passed down paternally. Lee Jungmin 
(2008: 176) also points out in her study of Korean schoolteachers that children from Korean men 
and foreign women are seen as Koreans “because their fathers are Koreans” and “in Korea, such 
a patriarchal society, the mother’s side is absorbed into the father’s.” The interviewees 
nevertheless make a distinction between children who resemble Korean fathers and those who 
take after foreign mothers. However, the children of a Korean woman and a foreign husband are 
considered less Korean despite their looks and their legal status as Korean citizens, for ‘Korean-
ness’ is not passed on by the mother.  
 Thus, Korean ethno-nationalism and continued belief in patriarchal blood lineage result in 
patriarchal racialization, as foreign wives are considered to be more adaptable than foreign 
husbands. Therefore, the children of a Korean father and a foreign mother are seen as racially 




4.5 Conclusion: Patriarchal Racialization 
This chapter explores the inextricable relationship between patriarchy and racialization in the 
contemporary context. The reality of growing numbers of “non-ideal families," such as 
multicultural families, female-headed families, and single-parent families challenges the 
traditional patriarchal family norms. Therefore, Korean society has to deal with these new 
challenges to solidify the overall structure of patriarchal family norms.  
  In contemporary Korea, patriarchy becomes one of the domains through which rural 
farmers, working-class Korean men, and their families recover their dignity and power in the 
micro-sphere of the household by mobilizing foreign brides from Southeast Asia and China. In 
order to create the perception of Korean culture as conservative and homogenous, reproducing 
patriarchy requires several different components; such as structural arrangements (government-
sanctioned importation of foreign brides, marriage, immigration law), social activities in the 
public and community, and everyday practices in the family. In this regard, the reconfiguration 
of racial hierarchies has a very critical role to play in reproducing patriarchal hierarchy. Thus, 
there are two processes intertwined in patriarchal racialization, which result in creating 
patriarchal racial hierarchies between individuals and families.   
 The first is connecting the ideology of patriarchy to race, which normalizes the patriarchal 
racial hierarchies in family and society at large. In Collins’s words:   
 
[O]ne important component of the naturalization process concerns how presumptions of 
‘blood ties’ frame the perceived links among blood, family, kin and race. […] Families 
are mechanisms for perpetuating blood ties via maintaining blood lines through 
reproduction. Whereas the legal system is deeply implicated in legitimizing marriages for 
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heterosexual partners, the importance given to the seemingly natural bonds between 
mothers and children, brothers and sisters, grandmothers and grandchildren signal the 
importance of blood in crafting biological and therefore naturalized definitions of family 
as well as those of race. (Collins 2001, p15) 
 
The ideal Korean family is constructed as a marriage of two heterosexual Koreans, who are both 
ethnically and culturally Korean, so presumably sharing Korean blood and Korean cultural 
values. The rhetoric of the ideal Korean family and the racial stereotypes of foreign spouses 
work to normalize the racial hierarchies between Korean families and multicultural families. 
Especially the ideology of Korean ethno-nationalism idealizes the blood tie as the natural link 
connecting family, kin, and national community. The Korean national community is still seen as 
an extended blood tie.  Consequently, while the ideal Korean family is at the top of the racial and 
patriarchal hierarchy, a multicultural family is located at the bottom. Amongst multicultural 
families, one of the parents should be a natural born Korean, who is biologically and culturally 
Korean, in order to keep his/her family members within the Korean national community. A 
multicultural family of non-Koreans is excluded from the national community because of a lack 
of biological and cultural ties. Here again, a father’s lineage is considered more dominant and 
superior than the mother’s blood and lineage. Thus, a multicultural family with a Korean father 
is located in a better position than a multicultural family with a Korean mother within the racial 
hierarchy of multicultural families. In multicultural families with Korean fathers, the hierarchical 
order differs based on the foreign mothers’ race and nationality. 
  The second part is gendered racialization. The excerpt from the online forum about the 
pros and cons of four different groups of female marriage immigrants shows how Koreans create 
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the bounded understanding of regional and country-specific developmental stereotypes, racial 
stereotypes, and the patriarchal rhetoric of the ideal Korean family. It also illuminates how these 
stereotypes work to normalize racial and gender hierarchy over the course of tongnama racial 
formation. Koreans’ racial and cultural stereotypes of Southeast Asian women (innocent, exotic, 
frugal, obedient) are related to Koreans’ understanding of what tongnama is (economic 
underdevelopment, powerless), and who tongnama people are (dark-skinned, small, pure, meek). 
In the process of normalization of these racial and cultural differences, very specific and 
particular images of women are chosen to delineate Southeast Asian women. For example, in the 
excerpt of female marriage immigrants discussed above, the physical characteristics of Filipina 
women are negatively described as dark-skinned, thick lips, and flat nose. Vietnamese women 
are generalized as light brown skinned. These selective images are overstated based on what 
Koreans want to see from them and used for constructing a lump category of tongnama women.  
 Dialectically, this is also a process to construct the racial characteristics of the ideal Korean 
woman who has a taller height and paler skin than Southeast Asian women, which contributes to 
building Korean's racial identity.  This reflects Koreans' self-confidence about their ability to 
achieve economic development compared to Southeast Asian countries, which allows Koreans to 
translate the logic of economic advancement into their cultural superiority over tongnama others. 
For example, Korean women's skin colour and physical characteristics become highly regarded 
in relation to Southeast Asian women's, so those marriage immigrant women are expected to 
whiten their skin to make them similar to Korean women’s skin. Thus, these stereotypes and 




 As a consequence of patriarchal racialization, a gendered racial hierarchy is constructed in 
which Korean men are followed by Korean women, who are followed by foreign brides and 
finally foreign husbands. Thus, the sharp contrast between these two categories of marriage 
immigrants shows how Korean ethno-nationalism and continued belief in patrilineage result in 
patriarchal racialization. Such patriarchal racialization is a gendered racialization process 
whereby children of a Korean father and a foreign mother are seen as racially closer to Koreans 
than the children of a foreign father and Korean mother. Finally, the process of racial formation 
in Korea is deeply intertwined with not only patriarchy but also with global classism, as race 







Chapter 5: Manufacturing Race - Immigrants and Foreign Migrant Workers 
at Work   
In May in 2014, I visited a government-funded labour counselling center to interview a Nepalese 
immigrant, Udaya, who was working for the center as a counselor’s assistant. His stylish outfit 
seemed to fit well with the clean, modern style of the center. Since the majority of male 
immigrants tend to work in manufacturing industries, I was curious about how he started 
working for the center as a staff member. I learned that he initially came to Korea through the 
Employment Permit System (a Korean guest worker program) with a short-term work permit, 
then married a Korean woman a couple of years ago and, soon after, he quit factory work. At 
first, he was hesitant to take this contract office job because the overall salary for doing factory 
work was quite a bit higher. However, he eventually quit the factory for his Korean wife. He 
explained, “Well, I didn’t want my wife to feel embarrassed. Her friends have quite decent jobs. 
She would feel ashamed if she had to tell her friends that her foreign husband is a factory 
worker. You can lie a few times and say that my husband is an office worker or a businessman. 
But you can’t lie for so long.”  
After meeting him, I was struck by how the social images of occupations compel people 
to embrace economic disadvantages, in this case, a smaller income. Why does his Korean wife 
feel embarrassed about her foreign husband working in a factory, even though his factory work 
earns a higher income? If he were Korean, would his Korean wife still feel ashamed of his 
working-class factory job? What does his case tell us about ethnic and racial hierarchies in the 
occupational structure in Korea? This curiosity brought my attention to a more fundamental 
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question: how do racial logics intersect with economic logics in the production of a racialized 
immigrants and foreign migrant workers? 
 Words such as white-collar and blue-collar may describe the functional differentiation of 
occupation. However, labour scholars (Koo 2001, J. Kim 2013) point out that these words often 
imply a hierarchical relationship, with white-collar workers usually assuming a superior status to 
that of blue-collar factory workers. Indeed, it is quite common in South Korea that people 
describe white-collar jobs as comparatively more desirable than blue-collar jobs, even though a 
growing number of white-collar jobs are underpaid, short-term contracts or part-time positions. 
Although the social status of blue-collar workers has improved, the social stigma of blue-collar 
jobs has a long history around the world, and it remains an indicator of social position within the 
vocational hierarchies. 
A careful observation of the interactions among workers reveals how Korean workers use 
diverse strategies to draw symbolic boundaries between themselves and “foreign workers,” as 
Korean workers call them, which refers to immigrants and foreign migrant workers from South 
and Southeast Asian countries (tongnama) and China. These migrants are in the lower-tier of the 
Korean working class in the manufacturing, agriculture, fishing, construction, service industries, 
assuming the position of “underclass.”25   
                                                 
25 While the concept of underclass has been debated in the context of unemployment and urban poverty of 
inner-cities (e.g., Wilson 1987), scholars generally use the term underclass to describe the segment of the 
population below the main body of the working class (Wright 1994, Wilson 1987, Anderson 1990). The 
underclass is concentrated in the unskilled and lowest paid jobs, and they experience high levels of 
precarious employment, or chronic repetitive semi-employment and unemployment (Giddens 1973). 
Thus, although there are multiple characteristics to define underclass in economics, socio-phycological, 
behavioural, and spatial dimensions, the economic dimension of the underclass in reference to the labour 
market is widely agreed amongst scholars. Thus, I use the term underclass in the economic dimension to 




I argue that Korean workers draw hierarchical boundaries from immigrants and foreign 
migrant workers in the labour market. Racial logic plays an essential role in drawing these 
boundaries between Korean workers and foreign workers. Thus, the case of foreign workers in 
South Korea shows how a social and behavioural dimension of boundary making appears in 
everyday interactions at work. In other words, boundary drawing occurs during the process of 
creating a split labour market. This is not only because of policies that funnel foreign workers 
into these low wage and insecure jobs, but also because of further interactional boundary 
making, which reinforces the way foreign migrant workers are seen in Korean society. As a 
result, foreign migrant workers are push into the further split of the labour market.  
By incorporating the concept of boundary making into labour market theory, this chapter 
contributes to a body of scholarship that updates Bonacich’s (1972, 1979) influential split labour 
market theory, which has been widely criticized for assuming a static labour market (Olzak 1983, 
Chun 2008). This chapter shows that South Korea’s split labour market is actively created and 
reproduced through boundary making practices by multiple actors (the Korean state, supervisors, 
and co-workers) at multiple scales from national labour immigration policy to business 
community demands, to everyday interactions.  
To better understand the complexity of the Korean split labour markets, this chapter 
examines state labour policies and the experiences of foreign migrant workers, immigrant 
workers, and Korean workers. I begin by reviewing the debates in the literature about boundary 
making and race issues in the split labour market to scrutinize the complexity of the racialized 
labour market. Next, I show the central role of the state in deploying racial logics to channel 
foreign migrant workers and immigrants into downgraded forms of irregular and flexible 
employment. Then, I discuss how Korean employers prefer foreign migrant workers and 
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immigrants to native-born Korean workers to fill extremely low-level jobs. These workers are 
supposedly not only cheaper and more obedient, but also more flexible than Korean workers are. 
Through ethnographic research in several different factories and interviews with foreign migrant 
workers, immigrants, Korean workers, and managers, I document the tensions and stereotypes 
amongst groups and analyze the interpersonal, cultural, and structural racism experienced by 
immigrants and foreign migrant workers from Southeast Asian countries and China. In this 
chapter, I use the term “foreign worker” to indicate both immigrants and foreign migrant workers 
from South and Southeast Asia and China, since Korean workers use the term in this way.     
 
5.1 Debates on Race Issues in the Labor Market 
5.1.1  Racial Dynamics in Split Labour Markets  
Bonacich’s influential split labor market theory (1972, 1979) provides important explanations for 
how economic competition results in racial/ethnic antagonism. According to Bonacich (1972: 
553), “if the labor market is split ethnically, the class antagonism takes the form of ethnic 
antagonism. […] while much rhetoric of ethnic antagonism concentrates on ethnicity and race, it 
really in large measure (though probably not entirely) expresses this class conflict.” Bonacich 
(ibid: 549) argues that when a labour market contains at least two groups of workers whose price 
of labour differs for the same work, the labour market becomes split. In split labour markets, 
conflict develops between three key actors: employers, higher paid labour (the upper tier), and 
cheaper labour (the lower tier). First, employers aim at having as cheap and docile a labour force 
as possible to compete effectively with other businesses. If labour costs are too high because of 
organized workers and labour unions, employers turn to cheaper sources, such as ethnic 
minority, immigrant and migrant workforces that are usually unorganized. Second, higher priced 
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workers are threatened by the introduction of cheaper labor into the market so higher priced 
workers “not only used the strength of their collective organizations to secure better wages and 
benefits, but they also used them to secure exclusionary immigration legislation and 
discriminatory employment laws against lower-priced racial-ethnic and/or migrant labor” (Chun 
2008: 436). Finally, employers use lower priced workers - mostly racial-ethnic minorities and 
migrant labour - not only for cost cutting but also partly to undermine the position of more 
expensive labour. Through the dynamics of three major actors in split labour markets, we can see 
that split labour markets include two interrelated dimensions; 1) employment status (the upper 
tier, the lower tier) and 2) ethno-racial status, which is primarily determined by nationality, 
ethnicity, and skin colour. The co-constitution of these two-dimensions results in the creation of 
racialized migrant labour in split labour markets.  
In the split labour market, comparatively large numbers of ethnic minority and migrant 
workers use labour agencies to find jobs, which happen to be precarious and low-paid jobs.  The 
concentration of ethnic minority and migrant workers in precarious and low-paid casual jobs 
exhibits the new migrant division of labour in split labor markets (Sherman 2007, Janta and 
Ladkin 2009, Hudson et al. 2017). For example, Sherman (2007) reveal the spatial and racial 
division of labour in the luxury hotel industry: while white workers are involved in front office 
activities, non-white migrant workers are assigned for janitorial work. The ‘sticky floor’, which 
describe a discriminatory employment pattern that keeps a certain group of people at the bottom 
of the job scale, is a common issue for ethnic minority and migrant workers who are assigned 
low paid jobs (Browne and Misra 2003, Yap and Konrad 2009). These workers commonly 
experience more part-time work and horizontal job mobility, but less vertical mobility (Aker 
2009). In particular the ethnic minority and migrant workers in the lower tier experience 
161 
 
informality and discrimination in access to jobs and promotions (Hudson et al, 2017). As the 
labour migration literature shows, ethnic minority and migrant workers experience significant 
inequalities, and the increasing use of labour agencies intensifies the degree of inequality in the 
labour market.  
The South Korean labour market began to receive a more ethnically and racially different 
labour force in the early 1990s when precarious/irregular employment was expanded under the 
process of neoliberal labour market transformations. The South Korean state thus also has an 
essential role to play in producing and reproducing racialized foreign migrant workers.  
Sassen (1988:37) argues that by controlling national boundaries under the system of 
global labour supply, the state creates migrant labour as a distinct category of labour, which is 
characterized by the institutional differentiation and a particular form of migrant workers’ 
powerlessness, associated with formal or attributed foreign status. In this sense, “migrant labour 
is not something to be taken as given but is created and recreated by the state” (Burawoy 
1976:1076). In South Africa, for example, the state organized a dual labour market so that one 
sector was primarily composed of white workers and the other by African migrant workers from 
the counties (ibid). Therefore, the South African state’s function was to maintain the flow of 
African migrant workers as a source of cheap labour-power by making it difficult for Africans to 
settle permanently in urban areas (Wolpe 1972). The apartheid regime was thus utilized to secure 
and develop the capitalist mode of production (ibid). According to Wolpe (ibid), the state’s 
intervention in the internal migration flow and the dual labour market was enacted through law 
and policy, and through the repressive apparatus (police, army, prisons, courts) to coerce workers 
on behalf of or in support of employers in order to guarantee the perpetuation of capitalist laws.  
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Split labor market theory – and dual and segmented labor market theory more broadly – 
show how a political economy perspective importantly explains the material basis of racism and 
ethnic antagonism in the labour market. However, split labor market theory has been criticized 
for assuming static, two-tiered labor markets (Olzak 1983, Chun 2008).  
Instead, labour markets are actively produced and reproduced by multiple actors. In this 
way, the Korean split labour markets are in line with Jamie Peck’s (1996: 4-5) concept of the 
labour market: “labour markets are socially constructed and politically mediated structure of 
conflict and accommodation among contending forces.” Therefore, labour markets are power-
laden sites of conflict and contestation among multiple actors in locally specific places (ibid). 
Therefore, I move to boundary making theories to explore how workers’ boundary making also 
actively affects South Korea’s split labour markets.   
 
5.1.2 Boundary Making in the Korean Labour Market 
Korean split labor markets were created in the early 1990s through neoliberal labour market 
transformations. These transformations resulted in the mass lay-off of regularly employed 
workers and in increasing irregular employment. In South Korea, there are multiple distinctive 
boundaries among workers in the manufacturing industries, which are often very hierarchical. 
Korean labour scholars (Song 2002, Y. Kim 2015, Y. Kim and Cha 2016) point out that these 
hierarchical boundaries among Korean workers became much more prominent after split labour 
markets were created. Since South Korea imported foreign workers into the Korean labour 




The making of ethnic or racial boundaries among workers is well documented. J. Kim 
(2013: 79) observes that South Korean managers draw ethnic boundaries between Korean 
workers, Korean-Chinese workers, and Han-Chinese workers in a hierarchical way. Delineating 
distinctive group characteristics is often used to justify existing hierarchical relations. In the 
process, the group characteristics deemed to be superior or desirable establishes its prevailing 
status over those without such characteristics, thus marking clear hierarchical boundaries among 
workers (ibid).  
In the U. S context, Michèle Lamont (2000) examines in her book, The Dignity of 
Working Men, how the white American working class makes a racial boundary between 
themselves and the black American working class by mobilizing the concept of morality to gain 
recognition as better workers and better citizens, which symbolically protects their dignity and 
pride. Lamont and Molnár (2002: 168) point out that "[s]ocial boundaries are objectified forms 
of social differences manifested in unequal access to, and an unequal distribution of resources 
(material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities.”  
According to Wimmer (2008), boundary making includes constant grouping and 
regrouping of individuals. Therefore, boundaries change over the course of this process.  
 
A boundary displays both a categorical and a social or behavioural dimension. The 
former refers to acts of social classification and collective representation; the latter to 
everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of connecting and 




In Wimmer’s understanding of ethnic boundaries, we see the same process of group 
making as in Bourdieu’s process of classification: both have practices of connecting and 
distancing, and constant adjustments of boundaries. Bourdieu (1987) points out that groups of 
individuals are divided into several different classes in such a way that agents in the same class 
try to be as similar as possible, while they try to be as distinct as possible from people in the 
different class.  Often, these social distances are made by subjective strategies, which may be 
totally unconscious (ibid).  
The fact that different social groups, which are organized by different principles, such as 
ethnicity, race, nationality, occupational and local divisions share the very same group making 
process provides us with an opportunity to investigate how boundary making works in the 
creation of a new racialized class position of migrants in South Korea.  
To explore this conjunction, I pay attention to what Bourdieu (1987) calls the theoretical 
illusion between the analytical construct and the folk category. These two are often confused: a 
theoretical class is an analytical construct, while a folk category is a class seen as a real and 
abjectly constituted group. However, a theoretical class cannot be a real class, because there are 
many other organizing principles in reality, such as ethnicity, race, nationality, gender, 
occupational and local divisions (ibid). This theoretical illusion may appear as a difficulty of 
studying the issue of class and race, but where this confusion occurs is possibly where we can 
analytically approach the complexity of race and class. In other words, the complexity where 
multiple organizing principles appear is the place where we can analyze the relations between 
race, class, and nationality at least in the case of Korean factory workers.  
In the next section, I will examine how the Korean state intervenes in the expansion of 
precarious employment categories through the temporary worker policy (p'agyŏnbŏp), Korean 
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guest worker programs - EPS (Employment Permit System) and ITS (Industrial Trainee System) 
for foreign migrant workers.  
 
5.2 Foreign Workers in the Korean Manufacturing Industry  
On my first day at the hard-boiled egg packaging factory, a female Korean foreman in her early 
sixties approached to me. She directly asked my age, and she talked about the general problems 
of the older workforce in this factory. According to her, the average age of Korean workers was 
in the mid-fifties, but instead of hiring young Koreans, the company hired foreign workers. She 
believed that young Koreans don’t want to work in factories. She warmly stroked my back and 
added, “we need more young Korean workers like you.” 
 Indeed, the phenomena of an older Korean workforce and the use of foreign workers are 
very common in the manufacturing industry. The Korean government and scholars often explain 
that the labour shortage and the older workforce are due to the low birth rate combined with an 
ageing society (J. Lee et al. 2012, S. Lee 2012, Son 2014, An and D. Kim 2014). However, 
critical labour scholars point out that we need to pay more attention to the dramatically 
exacerbated labour market situation under increasingly business-friendly labour policies (Hwang 
2003, Cho et al. 2004, Chun 2008, 2009, Bae 2009, Jung 2013, Han and Chun 2014). The 
reliance on cheap labour is one of the cost-cutting strategies of capital (Bonacich 1972, 1979). 
As one of the latecomers to industrialization, South Korea faces severe competition on the global 
market. Like other industrialized countries, South Korea has adopted new strategies to survive 
global capitalist competition through the restructuring of overseas production sites as well as the 
domestic labour market. Small businesses and subcontractors in the manufacturing, construction, 
and agriculture industries, which are unable to establish overseas production sites, especially rely 
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on irregular workers and foreign workers in South Korea to keep their labour costs down (B. 
Kim 2011).   
Since the early 1990s, the South Korean labour market has exacerbated the work 
conditions and exploitation of irregular workers under the neoliberal economic transformation. 
Chun (2009:536) points out that “[a]lthough there are certainly exceptions, most people 
recognize that accepting an irregular versus a regular job translates into lower wages, fewer 
benefits, and heightened job insecurity.” As a consequence, small and medium size businesses in 
the manufacturing, agriculture, and fishing industries, which are increasingly filled with irregular 
employment and foreign workers, have experienced a low-skilled workforce shortage, even 
though the unemployment rate among young adults is increasing each year.26 The growth of 
irregular and precarious jobs results in the labour market polarization between the upper tier and 
the lower tier. Within the manufacturing industry, the major factory jobs like Hyundai Motors, 
Kia Motors, and Samsung, which are still considered good jobs, are also becoming increasingly 
out of reach for Korean men due to the ongoing mass layoffs of regularly-employed workers. 
The world of regular work in the major factories (the upper tier) is getting smaller. It is mainly 
restricted to Korean men and is impossible for foreign workers who are at the further split in the 
small and medium manufacturing firms. 
 During my field research, Korean interviewees often expressed their concerns about the 
disappearance of decent jobs, increasing precarious jobs, and the growing body of foreign 
workers who are willing to take degraded jobs in the manufacturing industry. Mr. Jang and Mr. 
                                                 
26 According to Statistics Korea 2017- the trend of (un)employment (shirŏpchasu/shirŏmnyul ch'ui), 
the unemployment rate for people aged 15 to 29 was 7.5% in 2012, but it is increasing every year. It 
reached 10.6% in 2016.   
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Nam have worked for the same auto company for over 20 years as regular workers (jŏnggyujik), 
but they were laid off when their company enforced mass layoffs of regularly-employed workers 
several years ago. Mr. Jang found a job in a small factory again, and Mr. Nam was working as a 
janitor with an irregular employment (bijŏnggyujik):  
 
Mr. Jang: Factories hire foreigners to save money. Foreigners are cheaper than Koreans 
because they are all irregular workers. If you hire a Korean with a permanent 
contract, it is much more expensive. You have to subsidize four social insurances 
(medical, employment, occupational safety, and national pension), benefits, and 
the annual bonus.  Irregular workers and temporary workers are increasing now, 
and it will get worse and worse. Irregular workers get paid only half of what a 
permanent worker receives for the same work. Look, the government allows this 
to happen. Irregular workers and foreigners will increase more.   
Mr. Nam: This is a problem. As brother Jang explained, the government created irregular 
workers, temporary workers, on-call workers, and now foreigners take over our 
jobs. We Koreans have to prepare for retirement by age 50 or something.     
Mr. Jang: The government is responsible for this. There are tons of illegal foreign workers, 
but the government closes its eyes. Because the government believes that factories 
won’t be able to run without them. Especially 3D (difficult, dirty, dangerous) 
factories use lots of foreigners and illegals, so the government probably isn’t able 
to deport them all.   




As the conversation between Mr. Nam and Mr. Jang shows, how Korean workers understand 
foreign workers is closely related to the role of the government in the labour market situation — 
for example, its involvement with the expansion of irregular workers and importation of foreign 
migrant workers. Therefore, to understand the sentiments of Korean workers when it comes to 
foreign workers, it helps to look at the migrant labour policies within the context of business-
friendly labour policies and the expansion of labour market flexibility.  
Officially, the foreign migrant worker program was introduced in the early 1990s as one 
of the forms of irregular employment, when irregular employment (bijŏnggyujik) began 
dramatically increasing among Korean workers. Foreign migrant workers came through the 
Industrial Trainee Programs (ITP) — the earlier version of low-skilled foreign labour 
importation. Under the ITP, foreign trainees were considered officially students; therefore, they 
were not subject to the Labor Standards Act. Foreign industrial trainees voluntarily became 
undocumented workers because of extreme labour exploitation, such as low wages, long working 
hours, and inhumane treatment under the trainee system (Seol 2000, S. Lee 2005, K. Park 2005). 
As the majority of foreign trainees escaped from their programs, these industrial trainee 
programs were abolished in 2007 (HRDKorea 2013).  
  To replace the industrial trainee program, the Korean government introduced the 
Employment Permit System (EPS) in 2004 (ibid). Under the EPS, foreign migrant workers can 
be protected by the Labor Standards Act and can access social benefits such as medical 
insurance, industrial accident compensation insurance, and national pension.27 Despite the 
                                                 




gradual improvement of foreign labour policies, one of the characteristics of EPS is the 
immobility of foreign workers (Gray 2004). These foreign migrant workers have to be hired 
before they enter South Korea through the government job centers, and they are not allowed to 
change their employment arrangements during their period of contracts, except in cases of 
unpaid wages, physical or sexual harassment, factory shutdown, contract termination, or if the 
employer gives a foreign worker permission to move to another factory (HRDKorea 2013). 
These exceptions are limited to three times over three years. Even after getting permission, 
foreign migrant workers must find jobs only through the government job centers that monitor 
and control the whole process (ibid). If a foreign migrant worker finds a job without going 
through a government job center, the foreign migrant worker immediately becomes an 
undocumented foreign worker and is in danger of being deported.  
 While the EPS restricted the overall mobility of foreign migrant workers, interestingly 
foreign migrant workers were able to utilize some degree of autonomy when they changed 
workplaces. Until 2013, the government job centers provided a list of up to 30 to 40 factories for 
foreign workers, so that a foreign worker could contact factories for job interviews. However, 
this limited autonomy was eliminated when the government revised regulations in response to 
small factory owners’ complaints about the turnover of foreign workers. To reduce the turnover, 
government job centers stopped providing lists of factories with job openings to foreign workers. 
Instead, foreign workers are now required to register their names in the labour pool when the 
government job centers allow a workplace change, and then wait until a factory contacts them 
first for a potential job interview (HRDKorea 2013: 91). The main change is that EPS does not 
allow foreign migrant workers to search for jobs themselves. However, if they are not hired 
within 3 months, they are deported. According to the executive manager of a government-funded 
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foreign worker counselling center whom I interviewed, “Since this revision, the number of 
applicants for workplace transfers has dropped quite a bit and the labour shortage of the small 
factories looks somewhat alleviated.” The revision to EPS regulations shows how the state and 
its institutions play essential roles in micromanaging the supply of foreign migrant workers and 
the overall work conditions of the foreign labour force. 
However, the use of foreign workers under the EPS still requires employers to go through 
the long process of recruiting overseas workers and at least minimally complying with the Labor 
Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and the Industrial Safety and Health Act. To secure a 
higher level of labour flexibility and to cut costs, one of the common strategies used by factories 
is to hire temporary workers through labour agencies (p'agyŏnŏpch'e), which is one of the oldest 
and most common forms of labour exploitation in history (Chun 2009). In the manufacturing 
industry, temporary workers who are hired through labour agencies are usually considered day 
workers who are not eligible to receive benefits and job security from their factories. Often, they 
are not able to apply for unemployment insurance either, because their short-term contracts 
cannot meet the minimum requirement of six months’ employment.    
 In the industrial complex where I conducted my field research, 68% of foreign workers 
were temporary workers, mostly Korean-Chinese, marriage immigrants, and so-called “illegal” 
migrant workers who do not have proper work permits (Ansan Contingent Workers’ Center 
2013). “Illegal” migrant workers include people who have overstayed their EPS contracts, people 
who arrive through smugglers, and people who engage in unauthorized work on tourist visas and 
international student visas. Even though the use of temporary foreign and Korean workers is 
prevalent across small and medium-sized factories, there are no precise statistics on temporary 
factory workers. Recent research on actual conditions of using temporary workers in Ansan-
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Siheung city shows that the majority of factories in this industrial complex use temporary 
workers (ibid).  
There are indeed exceptions, however; using temporary workers through labour agencies 
is illegal in the manufacturing industry because it may worsen already vulnerable working 
conditions and job security in the manufacturing industry, according to the Enforcement Decree 
of the Act on the Protection of Temporary Agency Workers (Korea Ministry of Government 
Legislation [1998] 2015), better known as p'agyŏnbŏp. Although the South Korean state has 
officially declared that it wants to protect irregular workers, there has been little legal 
enforcement exercised against illegally operating temporary labour agencies (Chun 2009, Ansan 
Contingent Workers’ Center 2013).  
It is noteworthy that Korean-Chinese migrants form one of the major groups of 
temporary workers. Unlike other foreign migrant workers who cannot change their workplace 
easily, the Korean government has allowed some degree of job mobility for Korean-Chinese 
people within low-skilled jobs across the manufacturing, agriculture, construction, fishing, and 
service industries since 2007. The government sanction for Korean-Chinese is not only based on 
their high level of Korean language proficiency, but also on Korean ethno-nationalistic 
preferences that favour Korean-Chinese people over migrants from other places (HRDKorea 
2013:3).  
 
5.3 Making the New Underclass: The Political Economy of Racialization   
5.3.1 Employer’s Cost-Cutting Strategies and Classification of Workers 
The government’s business-friendly practices establish structural conditions for the 
creation of hierarchal boundary making practices between Korean workers and foreign workers. 
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Capitalists always seek to hire cheap and docile workers, such as women and ethnic minorities, 
and exploit divisions across race, gender, skill, nativity, and other lines (Glenn 2002). In South 
Korea, business owners use several cost-cutting strategies, including diverse forms of irregular 
employment (bijŏnggyujik). As irregular employment increases, discriminatory treatment and 
exploitation of the irregular workers has become one of the significant social issues in Korea (J. 
Sohn 2003, Chun 2009, J. Seo 2015, B. Cheon 2014, S. Baek 2014, Y. Lee 2015).  
The discriminatory division of Korean workers (regular vs. irregular) allows the 
exclusion of irregular workers from workplace regimes, which often translates into irregular 
workers becoming the second-class workers (Son 2004, Chun 2009). During my field research, I 
often witnessed irregular Korean workers in the lower tier sarcastically describing their own 
position in the deteriorating working conditions as “people below” in comparison with Korean 
workers who are in the upper tier of employment and white-collar jobs. But they described 
foreign workers as the “3D ilkkun (labourer)” who takes the jobs that even the lower tier 
irregular Korean workers do not want to take.  In the contemporary usage, the word ilkkun is not 
strongly offensive, but it still implies a certain degree of derogatory social position as the word 
ilkkun traditionally refers to a day-labourer or a servant. Indeed, the government’s business-
friendly practices play a crucial role in placing foreign workers at the bottom of the vocational 
hierarchies in the labour market.  
Linda, a 27-year-old female Cambodian worker who was working for a hard-boiled egg 
packaging factory for three years, shows this hierarchical placement clearly. While I was 
working with Linda, she was searching for a new factory where she might work fewer hours than 
in the egg factory. In the egg factory, only foreign workers were assigned to cover the morning 
overtime (7:00–8:30), the evening overtime (18:00–22:00), and the night shift (22:00–7:00), 
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upon the management’s request. Linda complained that the factory was running almost 24 hours 
a day for several months, and frequent overtime and night shifts were harsh on her body. Despite 
the physical hardship, foreign workers often prefer overtime and night shifts because the hourly 
rate is 1.5 times higher for overtime and two times higher for the night shift, by law. Thus, Linda 
might earn a good salary at the end of the month, even if it was a very intense work schedule. 
However, she explained that the factory only paid her the regular rate, even when she worked 
overtime, night shifts, and weekend shifts. Soon, I learned that approximately half of the foreign 
workers in this factory had agricultural work visas, for which the government had sanctioned 
some exceptions to the Labor Standards Act for the agriculture industry’s convenience, including 
paying a regular rate for overtime, night shifts, and weekend shifts. To take advantage of these 
exceptions, the company forced foreign workers with agricultural work visas to switch from its 
poultry farm to this food factory without reporting to the job center. Although the company was 
responsible for the violation of immigration regulations, if immigration found out, the foreign 
workers with agriculture visas would be deported because working in a factory with agriculture 
visas is illegal. Therefore, foreign workers in this food factory worked on the border between 
legal and illegal employment with the government’s collusion, which resulted in labour 
exploitation.   
In the manufacturing industry business owners use several cost-cutting strategies, 
including diverse forms of legal and illegal flexible employment like subcontracting and using 
temporary workers through intermediary agencies, as well as using documented and 
undocumented foreign workers. It is common that employers use a mixture of Korean workers, 
Korean-Chinese migrants, immigrants, and foreign workers to maximize the efficiency and 
flexibility of their labour force at a lower cost. On top of this, there is a complex classification of 
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workers according to visa status, gender, ethnicity, and race in the hiring practices of immigrants 
and foreign workers in manufacturing industries. This classification predetermines a temporary 
foreign worker’s employment placement and even the chance of getting jobs. The following 
explanation by an ex-labour agency manager during an interview clearly illustrates this:   
 
Mr. Choi: We can classify people the moment a job seeker enters our office. We sort people 
based on whether they are Korean or not, whether they have a visa or not, whether 
they have lighter skin or darker skin, whether they are a woman or a man, whether 
they are old or young. It’s very simple. If we have to pay the same wage, less 
dark-skinned workers are preferred in the factories. Well, to be honest, no factory 
owner prefers to hire brown or black people. 
        Lee:  Is skin colour the most important determinant in getting a job? 
Mr. Choi: Well, first language is important for communications. So, if possible, chosŏnjok 
(Korean-Chinese) are preferred. If not, less dark-skinned workers are preferred. 
And roughly 80% of factories look at visa status and the remaining 20% don't 
care about visa status. So, we send the illegal foreigners to those factories. Among 
illegal workers, workers have divided again by skin colour. Again, chosŏnjok or 
Uzbekistani-Koreans are preferred because they have lighter skin colour and 
speak good Korean. But Black people and dark-skinned Asians, like Cambodians, 
are not preferred. So, we send these illegals to more dangerous factories like 
plating, leather, press machine, and chemical factories. It’s toxic and smelly, so 
no one wants to go there.  




His explanation reveals that there are hierarchies in the minimum wage job market along the 
lines of skin colour, gender, nationality, age, and migration status. The hierarchies in this 
minimum-wage job market determine what you can and cannot do based on who you are and 
where you are from. The ethno-racial stereotypes are prevalent in low-wage sectors. Preibisch 
and Binford (2007) documents that in the Canadian agricultural sector that significantly relies on 
seasonal agricultural migrant workers from Mexico and the Caribbean, employers’ use of racial 
stereotypes associated different groups of workers with particular crops: such as Jamaicans are 
more efficient at picking peaches than Mexicans.  
Indeed, using Korean and foreign temporary workers through labour agencies has 
become a dominant practice in small factories to cut the cost of labour without dealing with the 
employees’ needs. Factories’ legal and illegal use of labour agencies creates conditions of 
structural and institutional discrimination of irregular workers, in terms of wages, job security, 
and quality of work. As one of the typical flexible and indirect forms of employment, dispatch 
employment intrinsically creates the conditions of labour exploitation by externalizing labour 
costs and legal employment responsibilities to a separate entity. The workers have employment 
contracts with a labour agency, rather than the factory owner, but the factory management 
supervises the temporary workers. Thus, the workers in this irregular and flexible employment, 
who are predominantly immigrants, racialized people, women, and the elderly, are facing “a 
pervasive state of legal liminality – that is a state of institutional exception in which workers are 
neither fully protected by nor fully denied the rights of formal employment” (Chun 2009:537). 
Importantly, since the Korean government imports foreign migrant workers mainly from China 
and so-called ‘less-developed’ Southeast Asian countries, perceived developmental differences 
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justify discrimination of migrants. Racial and ethnic conflicts are often rooted in the competition 
for resources and jobs (Bonacich 1972, 1979).  
Conventional theories of race argue that racial/ethnic minorities experience disadvantages 
in the labour market because of their race (Jenkins 1988; Boyd 2000; Reitz & Verma 2004). 
However, the case of South Korea shows that Southeast Asian workers are structurally racialized 
to justify their low wages, long working hours, and intensive, precarious working conditions. At 
the same time, different ethnic groups are explicitly slotted into Korean ethno-racial hierarchies 
in the labour market. Thus, social and economic inequalities between native Koreans and new 
migrant populations result from the dynamics of neoliberal economic restructuring and the 
creation of guest worker programs. Therefore, while the Korean state plays a key role in setting 
the institutional conditions of limiting the rights of foreign workers in the labour market 
according to their legal categories, the government’s business-friendly practices and labour 
exploitation create the hierarchies between workers by classifying foreign workers as the new 
underclass in South Korea.     
 
5.3.2  The Politics of Labor Control: Making Hyper-Flexible and Docile Foreign Workers 
Using technology for managerial control is becoming popular in South Korea. Several of the 
factories I worked at used fingerprint identification machines to document the ins and outs of 
workers and to automatically calculate individual workers’ working hours. Often, to increase 
productivity, factory management banned workers from having or checking cell phones or 
talking to each other. With or without new technology, floor managers, foremen, or CCTVs are 
always watching workers. Controlling labor is one of the key elements of successful 
management. Munoz (2004) documents that in the tortillas industry in Los Angles, racialized 
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despotic factory regime is maintained through a system of intense monitoring and surveillance 
on the Mexican legal and illegal migrant workers, as well as the employer's use of immigration 
status to create fear and increase productivity.  
In this context, the question of who controls the workers and who are controlled becomes 
important. Questions, such as which ethnic groups are likely to be managers whose duty it is to 
control and discipline workers, which ethnic groups are most likely to stay as floor workers, and 
which groups of people are most likely to enter the labor market as temporary irregular workers 
reveal how the functional divisions of workers come to form boundaries among workers.   
In general, Korean factories have certain authoritarian and paternalist components in their 
management style and everyday work culture. The authoritarian characteristics of Korean 
factories originate from military culture in the 1970s, which many developing countries tend to 
have. Labour scholars point out that, in the early industrialization period of Korea in the 70s, the 
authoritarian factory regime utilized paternalist ideology and military culture to efficiently 
control workers (Janelli 1993, Koo 2001, Chun 2003, J. Kim 2013). In contemporary Korean 
society, the authoritarian work culture has slowly faded away, but there are still some 
components of authoritarian ideology and male-oriented work culture that justify the Korean 
male’s dominance in the labour market in general.    
While Korean female workers or Korean-Chinese workers sometimes take low-level 
foreman positions depending on the gender and ethnic composition of a factory, the majority of 
managers and floor foremen are still Korean men. Since management practices in South Korea 
heavily rely on a seniority-based system for setting wages and granting promotions, non-Korean 
male workers — such as immigrants and foreign workers – as well as Korean female and elderly 
workers, all of whom figure disproportionately in temporary or temporary employment — face 
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disadvantages in wages, job tenure, and promotion. For example, in 2016, 41% of female Korean 
employees were temporary compared to only 26.4% of male Korean employees (Statistics Korea 
2017)28. In the same year, 68.2% of employees aged 65 and over were temporary (R. Jones and 
K. Fukawa 2016).  
It is quite common in the labor market that managers look for certain characteristics of 
workers. However, the motivation of business owners and management to hire foreign workers 
contributes to ascribing certain characteristics to foreign workers, such as the perceived 
flexibility and docility of these workers. These characteristics are not intrinsic to individual 
foreign workers; rather, they are attributed to the workers to justify managerial controls. As J. 
Kim (2013:79) points out, delineating distinctive group characteristics is one of the common 
methods to make hierarchical boundaries between workers. Korean managers believe in Korean 
workers’ dominance over chosŏnjok and tongnama foreign workers because these foreign 
workers are viewed as more docile than Korean workers.  
In the egg factory where I worked, there were around 40 foreign workers mainly from 
Vietnam and Cambodia, while a few were Mongolian or Chinese. An assistant plant manager, 
Mr. Chang, who had joined this factory around 5 years ago as a manager, explained the reasons 
why he prefers to work with foreign workers over Korean workers:   
 
Mr. Chang: Personally, I like to work with foreign workers. 
           Lee: What do you like about them?  
                                                 
28 Employment trends in 2016 (shirŏpcha su/shirŏmnyul ch'ui) 
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Mr. Chang: Depending on the person though, they listen to your instructions better than 
Korean workers do. Once you get to know them for a long time, they care for you. 
When I hesitate to ask people to do overtime or night shifts, usually foreign 
workers say “yes” to help me. You know, Korean floor workers tend to challenge 
their managers and sometimes they think they know more than managers do. But 
foreign workers never act like that. They don’t cross the line.  
    (Mr. Chang, Korean man, assistant plant manager, age 41) 
 
In this conversation, the manager expressed his preference for foreign workers based on what he 
perceives to be the docility of foreign workers. According to him, Korean workers are not docile 
enough. Sometimes Korean workers even disrespect his authority, but foreign workers show 
their respect and loyalty to the manager. Immigrant host countries often expect passivity from 
immigrants and migrant workers. For example, Mary Waters (1999) documents that white 
managers in the American food industry prefer to hire new immigrants over African Americans 
for entry-level jobs. White managers expect new immigrants’ loyalty to a job, which means 
accepting the managers’ requests or doing anything that someone in a higher position asks them 
to do (ibid: 110–111). Often, foreign workers and immigrants take advantage of entering entry-
level jobs easily because they meet the industry’s expectations, but this is the same reason why 
they also face disadvantages in wages, labour protection, promotion, job security, and daily 
unjust treatments. An ex-auto factory worker, Mr. Park’s comments back up this point:     
 
Koreans usually don’t want to work on less automatized lines, and Koreans express their 
complaints right away. Then, the management assigns Indonesian workers on these lines. 
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They just do whatever the management orders because they can’t leave until their 
contracts end. But, they always have grievances.  
    (Mr. Park, Korean male ex-auto factory worker, age 39) 
        
As Mr. Park notes, the docility of immigrants/migrant workers is not intrinsic; rather, the labour 
market conditions and South Korea’s foreign labour policies make them accept whatever is 
available for them, which often limits the opportunities of workplace changes. Thus, to get work 
in such an environment, foreign workers are forced to perform certain characteristics - such as 
docility and flexibility. Foreign workers from China and Southeast Asia are increasingly 
understood as cheap and docile labour, which connotes being the new underclass in Korean 
society.  
 
5.4 Cultural Dimensions of Racialization at Work 
5.4.1 Emerging Ethnic and Racial Boundaries of Workers 
The case of foreign workers in South Korea shows how a social and behavioural dimension of 
boundary making appears in everyday interactions at work in addition to the employer’s cost-
cutting strategies. Therefore, it is important to understand how working-class Korean people 
perceive and secure their social positions by differentiating their Korean identity from tongnama 
and Chinese workers.  
While I was working for several different factories, I noticed that workers usually 
forming several small groups during the lunch and afternoon breaks. In the egg factory, for 
example, there were several instant groups formed in the cafeteria: Korean male managers 
formed one group, Korean women office workers another, Korean women factory workers yet 
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another, and then Vietnamese as one group, and Cambodian as another. It may look quite normal 
for people to hang out with the co-workers they feel most comfortable with. Maybe they sit with 
the co-workers they work alongside with. Vietnamese and Cambodian workers in the cafeteria 
probably sit together because of language. However, these small groups are generally formed 
along gender, nationality, ethnicity, and job status. Workers rarely sit together across these 
invisible lines. The small groups that form in the cafeteria say alot about distinction and 
boundary making between workers (Bourdieu 1987, Wimmer 2008).   
During the process of boundary making between the workers, certain characteristics of 
groups are carefully selected to establish prevailing status over those without such 
characteristics. The tasks of the low-level workers are often described as simple and repetitive. 
During my field research, Korean workers and managers commonly evaluate foreign workers 
and immigrants as good manual workers who are more suitable for repetitive manual work. 
Korean managers often place immigrants and foreign workers in the low-level tasks, which 
makes job promotion difficult. Mr. Chang, a food factory manager, shows this point well in his 
comments:  
 
Mr. Chang: We really need workers who understand the entire production process. Now we 
don’t have enough core workers who could possibly substitute me in an 
emergency.  
            Lee:  Why don't you train some foreign workers?   
Mr. Chang: I’ve never given them managerial tasks so far. Well… unintentionally, maybe I 
consider them not capable of performing managerial tasks. Actually, they show no 
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difference from Korean workers on the shop floor, but they are a little bit slower 
when they have to perform high-level tasks, which require more intelligence.  
           Lee:  Is it because of the language barrier?  
Mr. Chang: It is not about language. They are good at manual work, but somehow they don’t 
understand other tasks. So, I did not try to train them for anything except for 
manual work.  
(Mr. Chang, Korean man, assistant plant manager, age 41) 
 
The conversation with the Korean manager, Mr. Chang, reveals that he contrasts the 
characteristics of Koreans and foreign workers. This contrast shows how the management uses 
racial/ethnic characteristics to distinguish foreign workers from Korean workers and justify the 
superior status of Koreans. The previous conversation with Korean manager - Mr. Chang shows 
two sets of racial and ethnic characteristics: Korean intelligence versus foreign workers’ 
slowness, and Korean defiance versus foreign workers’ obedience. J. Kim (2013) also points out 
in his book, Chinese Labor in a Korean Factory that Korean management uses national and 
ethnic characteristics of workers to justify the superior status of Koreans, which helps to control 
Chinese workers.  Therefore, the struggles over drawing boundaries are collective political 
struggles because these are not only about how to represent self and others but also about how to 
rearrange power relations in the real and symbolic world (Bourdieu 1987:13-4).  
While Koreans subscribe to these racial/ethnic characteristics of foreign workers, 
Koreans understand chosŏnjok somewhat differently from Southeast Asian workers; Korean-
Chinese workers are understood as smarter than Southeast Asian workers, but still slightly 




Mr. Kang: For me, working with Koreans is easier. Koreans, even newly graduated high-
schoolers, learn very quickly. But foreign workers need time to learn.  
          Lee: Why is that? 
Mr. Kang: I think … they are a little bit lazy, and not that bright. Maybe it is because of 
language, but somehow they can’t learn certain things. So, it looks like they are 
slow in my eyes. But chosŏnjok workers learn quickly. They are smarter than Han 
Chinese and other tongnama foreigners like Vietnamese and Indonesians.         
(Mr.  Kang, Korean male factory worker, age 45) 
 
The comments of Mr. Kang, who is a regular floor worker in a textile factory, reveal the ethnic 
and racial stereotypes Korean workers generally have about Korean-Chinese and Southeast 
Asian workers. Probably, the perception of the relative intelligence of young Korean high-
schoolers comes from the fact that they grew up in the same social and cultural system as Mr. 
Kang. However, Mr. Kang identifies Koreans’ intelligence and foreign workers’ slowness as 
racial and ethnic characteristics; the somewhat better performance of Korean-Chinese in 
comparison to South and Southeast Asian workers is understood as a quality of Korean ethnicity. 
Mr. Kang’s view on Korean-Chinese migrant workers resonates with what J. Kim (2013) and S. 
Yoon (2014) observed in South Korean factories in China. South Korean managers believe that 
Korean-Chinese workers perform better than Han-Chinese workers because of the inherited 
quality as ethnic Koreans and cultural affinities even though Korean-Chinese workers were born 
and went school in China. But Korean managers believe that in comparison to South Korean 
workers, Korean-Chinese workers are somewhat less qualified workers. As a result of the 
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connection between these views of a hierarchy and a belief in racial essentialism, Mr. Kang 
creates a clear hierarchy among workers in the following order: Koreans, followed by chosŏnjok, 
and finally South and Southeast Asian workers.   
Based on these ethnic and racial stereotypes, there is an elaborated differentiation 
between the work of Koreans and the work of foreigners even in low-skilled jobs. The job 
placements of workers show a distinction between Korean workers and foreign workers on the 
micro-space of the shop floor, and Korean factory workers also accept this hierarchy. While 
Korean workers understand the position of immigrants and foreign workers on their teams as 
assistants (or seobu, a Koreanized English word using the prefix “sub”), they believe that their 
roles are more important and require more responsibility. Therefore, Korean workers consider 
their roles and positions as comparatively closer to the managerial level. This understanding 
translates into the Korean workers’ authority over immigrants and foreign workers. A 
Bangladeshi immigrant, who worked in several factories for over ten years in Korea, recalls his 
experience:    
When I work with Koreans, I can’t give them instructions. I can’t do it. Or if I do, Korean 
workers get offended. They would say, “what do you know, huh?” Koreans think they 
know everything, and we know nothing (laughs). 
(Masum, Bangladeshi male immigrant, age 35) 
 
This often appears as a conflict between Korean and foreign workers, and Korean workers feel 
offended about what they perceive to be foreign workers’ disrespect. In another example, Mr. 




 On one occasion, there were Indonesian workers who had worked there for over 2 years, 
and a Korean trainee who had just started 2 months ago. The problem was the new 
Korean trainee assumed that the Indonesian workers should listen to him. Of course, the 
Indonesian workers felt offended when this Korean trainee gave them instructions. So, 
there were some arguments between them. Well, some people (Koreans) supported the 
Indonesian workers because they had more experience than the Korean trainee did, but 
some people supported Korean trainee by saying things like, “Indonesians are foreigners, 
so they have to accept it. They cannot expect the same treatment as Koreans.” Of course, 
some Korean workers said that it was unfair, but they were just a few. 
    (Mr. Park, Korean man, ex-auto factory worker, age 39) 
 
While Korean workers perceive the complaints from foreign workers as a sign of disrespect for 
Korean workers’ authority, foreign workers see the same incident as Korean workers’ abusive 
and discriminatory treatments. Thus, they express complaints about the intrusive manner of their 
Korean co-workers in several different ways. One of the common ways is pretending not to hear 
their Korean co-workers. A Cambodian worker, Arun (age 29) who worked for five years in 
Korean factories, often pretend not to hear when he felt that his Korean co-workers were too 
intrusive. Korean workers also complain about foreign workers pretending not to understand the 
Korean language. However, these Korean workers seem to understand the reason why foreign 
workers pretend not hear them. Mrs. Kim (age 54), a Korean female worker said that “Well, 
sometimes foreign workers become nasty to Korean workers, and intentionally not help Koreans 
to show that they are not happy with Korean workers.” Sometimes, foreign workers also directly 
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make arguments against Korean workers or managers when they feel that Korean workers treat 
them unfairly. Arun’s comments show this point clearly.  
 
  Lee: In what situation did you feel that you get discriminated?  
Arun: For example, Korean managers usually give foreign workers more difficult and 
physically hard tasks that Korean workers don’t want to take. But if something is 
not going well, the Korean managers blame the foreign workers as if we are the 
bad workers, because usually we are quiet, and we don’t speak out. But I felt 
unfair, so I started arguing against my floor manager. I argued a lot.  
  Lee: How? 
Arun: I did overtime work almost every day. Once I told my floor manager that I was 
too tired, so I didn’t want to do overtime that night. Then the floor manager yelled 
at me that I am lazy. That made me really pissed off. So I also raised my voice 
and asked him. “Am I lazy? I take overtime every night. I take the dirtiest and the 
most difficult task because you don’t want to take. But you really think that I am 
lazy. Then why did you give me all the difficult work to me, huh?” He couldn’t 
answer, of course. He just said, “shut up!”  
  Lee: What? Did he really say, shut up? (loudly laugh)  
Arun: Yes, “shut up!”    
(Arun, Cambodian male worker, age 29) 
 
As the comments throughout this section show, Korean management and Korean workers share 
certain ideas about the characteristics of foreign workers, which distinguish them from Koreans. 
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In general, Koreans are described as responsible and reliable workers, who are suitable for more 
important tasks and positions. On the other hand, foreign workers are described as bottom-level 
workers who do not need much responsibility. Once again, Koreans somehow differentiate 
chosŏnjok workers from tongnama foreign workers. In the process of boundary making, Koreans 
believe in their dominance over chosŏnjok and tongnama foreign workers. The Korean workers’ 
feeling of superiority comes not from Korean workers’ seniority or work experience, but from a 
sense of who is a native Korean and who is an outsider. The fact that one is born into a Korean 
family and grew up in Korea is enough to believe their authority over chosŏnjok and Southeast 
Asian workers. Korean workers’ subjective but collective strategies of boundary making often 
mobilize moral judgements about work ethic to distinguish themselves from foreign workers in 
the symbolic world.  
 
5.4.2 Who’s the Better Worker? Symbolic Boundaries of Workers 
In general, Korean workers believe that a deficient work ethic is one of the problems of foreign 
workers and Korean-Chinese workers. In contrast, these Korean workers believe themselves to 
be more trustworthy, responsible, and caring and understand themselves as having a stronger 
work ethic. In the factory workers’ world, moral judgments are a common means of making 
boundaries between workers. Lamont (2000:8) points out that white American workers use 
moral judgments to draw boundaries between workers, which help to define who shares the same 
values and with whom they are ready to share resources.  Indeed, the moral ideals of a good 
worker are evident in boundary-making between Korean workers and foreign workers. A group 
interview with female Korean factory workers, who were working with foreign workers for a 




          Lee: Was there any moment you felt that they were different from Koreans? 
Mrs. Kim: Well, unlike Koreans, foreign workers usually don’t offer to help us. They only do 
their own work. We Koreans often try to help other workers, because we can’t 
leave people alone who need help. But foreign workers don’t care about their 
colleagues.        
Mrs. Choi: Yeah, they never help even when they are just killing time. And, we clean the 
shop floor at the end of the day, but it is hard to say they help clean.  
 Mrs. Seo: They have already gone even before we start cleaning.    
Mrs. Choi: You know, we Koreans usually organize the workstations neat and tidy after the 
shift for the workers of the following shift. It helps in continuing the work 
smoothly. But these foreign workers never care about their colleagues.  
 Mrs. Seo: Never.  
Mrs. Kim: Foreign workers are always like that. It doesn’t matter which companies and 
factories they are working for.  
(Korean women, Mrs. Seo, age 63, Mrs. Choi, age 59, Mrs. Kim, age 54) 
 
These negative evaluations of foreign workers from China, South and Southeast Asia are based 
on moral judgements about having or not having a sense of community and the loyalty to the 
company. Boundary work involves specific sets of comparisons, which includes aspects of the 
self and other (Lan 2000). Therefore, Korean workers define who they are by constructing moral 
characteristics of themselves as thoughtful, caring colleagues, and as having a strong sense of 
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community in contrast to foreign workers, who are constructed as self-centered or even selfish 
and only have a sense of community among their co-ethnics.  
However, foreign workers believe that Korean workers are the ones who do not have a 
good work ethic. Cambodian worker, Arun (age 29) shows this point well.  
 
I often feel frustrated when I work with Koreans. We, foreign workers, are good workers. 
Always work hard. But Korean workers work slow when the managers are not there, but 
they suddenly pretend work hard and pretend to teach us if the managers appear. This is 
ridiculous.  
 (Arun, Cambodian male worker, age 29) 
 
Several foreign workers described their Korean co-workers as unreliable workers who often 
relegate their work to foreign workers, frequently take breaks for smoking or drinking coffee 
when managers are not on the shop floor but pretend to work hard only in front of the managers. 
On top of that, foreign workers often complain that Korean workers usually help other Koreans 
but not foreign workers. The general relationship between Korean workers and foreign workers 
seems often antagonistic.  
 
5.4.3 Racial/ethnic Hierarchies of Workers: Derogatory use of language  
The daily usage of the Korean language among workers shows how the factory work culture 
shapes the location of foreign workers within the hierarchies of workers. One evening around 8 
or 9 pm in the dormitory of the egg factory, I overheard a young Cambodian female worker 
asking a Korean male manager to move her into a less crowded dorm room because she had to 
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share a tiny room with two other Cambodian girls. She said, “Sir, could I move into a bigger 
room, please?”  The manager said, no to her. But the Cambodian worker kept asking him.  After 
saying no several times, suddenly the Korean male manager raised his voice and yelled at her, 
“You, bitch! I already told you. My answer is no.” The Cambodian woman became silent.      
A manager’s yelling at their workers does not happen very often, but it is also not a rare 
incident on the shop floor. The interaction between a Korean male manager and a Cambodian 
woman worker shows a clear hierarchy. The Korean male manager used panmal (informal 
speech) to the Cambodian woman worker, which is a form of Korean language used among peers 
or to people who are younger. On the other hand, the Cambodian woman used chondaemal 
(polite speech) to the manager, which shows the speaker’s respect and politeness.  As this 
anecdote illustrates, foreign workers often complain that Korean colleagues and managers 
usually use informal speech to them at work. On the contrary, I observed in the factories that 
Korean managers use formal speech to other Korean workers including me, unless they feel 
personally very close to that worker, or if the worker is much younger than the manager.  
I found that not only Korean managers, but also Korean workers, often use informal 
speech and sometimes swear words when speaking to foreign workers, especially to workers 
from South and Southeast Asian countries, regardless of their age. Some foreign workers stopped 
helping Korean workers after having personal conflicts with Korean workers who yell or use 
swear words. Udaya, an immigrant from Nepal who worked at several factories for 5 years, 
recalls his experience:  
 
Udaya: There was a Korean ajŏssi (middle-aged man) who referred to me in a bad way. I 
guess he did that to me because I am a foreigner, especially because I am a 
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foreigner from tongnama countries. He often referred to me like, "hey you, saekki 
[similar to ‘asshole’ in English], come here.” 
     Lee: Did he call other Koreans in that way?  
Udaya: No. He never said that to other Koreans. He only said it to foreign workers. For a 
while, I didn’t know what he actually meant because my Korean was not that 
great. Later, when I found out the meaning of saekki, I felt terrible. After that, I 
didn't want to help him anymore. One day, I said no to him when he asked for my 
help. Then he got angry that I did not listen to him. He almost grabbed my neck, 
so I had to push him back. That night, I was so upset and I couldn't sleep. 
(Udaya, Nepalese male immigrant, age 30) 
 
As the conversation with Udaya shows, Korean workers often use informal speech with swear 
words when speaking to foreign workers. This may be due to the fact that Korean workers are 
usually older or in a higher position than foreign workers. However, Korean workers often use 
polite speech with other Korean workers to prevent unnecessary friction. 
In the 70s, the early industrialization period of Korea, the authoritarian factory regime 
utilized paternalist ideology and military culture to efficiently control workers (Janelli 1993, Koo 
2001, Chun 2003, J. Kim 2013). Since the paternalist ideology sees a company as an extended 
version of family or kinship, young workers from traditional rural areas showed less resistance 
when the authoritarian factory regime was introduced to Korea (Koo 2001). Therefore, while the 
managerial practices often adapted military arrangements for its labour control, the daily 
interpersonal interactions go back and forth between pseudo-brother/sister relationships and co-
worker relationships. Of course, contemporary Korean factories’ work cultures is more liberal 
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than in the previous industrialization era under the authoritarian government. After the 
democratic labour movement in the 1980s, a more liberal regime was introduced in general. 
However, the top-down military-like culture and the patriarchal ideology are still prevalent in the 
Korean work culture, especially in the 3D industries.  
 Then, are foreign workers the only ones who are spoken to with informal speech by their 
Korean co-workers? Probably not. Since the hierarchical work culture is still influential in 
factories, there are several different layers of hierarchies, such as gender, age, seniority, and job 
rank. While gender and seniority are more influential to institutional hierarchies at work, 
especially job promotion, age and job rank more influential to daily interpersonal interactions. 
Therefore, usually older workers, even one year older or more, use informal speech to younger 
workers, and people in the higher job positions or managers use informal speech to their worker. 
When the manager is younger than their workers, they selectively use informal speech or polite 
speech depending on the situation. However, Korean management and Korean workers tend to 
use informal speech or swear words more often with foreign workers than with Korean workers, 
especially to workers from South and Southeast Asian countries, regardless of their age. For 
example, although I was just a floor worker in the egg factory, the plant manager and the floor 
manager, who were much older than me, always used a Korean honorific to refer to me: 
“Seonok-ssi” (same as ‘Mrs.’ in English). They did so because I am Korean. However, both 
managers called foreign workers by name or often call them “ya” (similar to ‘hey you’). 
 In regard to chosŏnjok (Korean-Chinese), Korean workers use the mixture of polite 
speech and informal speech in a careful way, because partly they speak fluent Korean, so they 
can defend themselves, and partly they are from the same ethnic culture, so they can read the 
cultural references better than other Asian workers.  
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Interestingly, while foreign workers see Korean workers’ use of informal speech and 
swear words as disparaging or a type of abuse, Koreans understand this as a necessary work 
culture. Mr. Kang, a factory worker’s comments show this clearly. 
         
         Lee:  How can you describe the relationships between foreign workers and Korean 
workers in your factory? 
Mr. Kang: Usually people from the same country get along well, but they don’t hang out with 
Koreans and Korean managers. I guess, Korean managers and other Koreans 
always command them to work harder. Well, these foreign workers probably never 
worked so hard in their country before. Perhaps they lived in nature and ran freely 
here and there. And they may consider everyone is a friend in their culture, but 
Korean culture has the age hierarchy, so we call hyŏng (older brother) to people 
who are older than you.    
        Lee: You mean, the foreign workers have a hard time to understand Korean work 
culture?   
Mr. Kang: Yes, let’s say, if a manager says, “hey you, you do this.” Sometimes, managers use 
panmal for workers. Then the foreign workers complain like "why do you use 
panmal to us?" Whenever we have new foreign workers, they always complain 
about this. Eventually, Korean managers use some chondaemal to them because 
these foreign workers seem not able to understand Korean work culture at all. I 
heard that they learned Korean with the polite speech in their country so they may 
wonder why Korean managers and Korean foremen use panmal to them. They 
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even think Koreans abuse them. But if they want to work in Korea, they have to 
learn Korean work culture.  
(Mr. Kang, Korean male, factory worker, age 45) 
 
Indeed, Korean workers understand that the use of informal speech or light swear words among 
male workers, such as saekki, to tongnama workers is not only a part of factory work culture but 
also Korean culture. Especially, in a male dominant factory, using rough language displays male 
workers’ masculinity and indicates interpersonal hierarchies of workers. Foreign workers and 
immigrants are expected to adopt this masculine factory culture and age hierarchies as a general 
Korean work culture. Since foreign workers are usually younger than Korean co-workers, or in 
the lower level positions than Korean co-workers, accepting Korean work culture means 
becoming the lowest ranked in the workers’ hierarchies on the shop floor. When a foreign 
worker adopts this hierarchical work culture well, which is determined by age and job position, 
Korean workers show some degree of intimacy to tongnama workers as a reward. A Vietnamese 
immigrant, Hong (age 29) who worked as a Vietnamese interpreter assistant for banks and 
district offices recalls her working experience as a good memory.  
 
I have lots of good experiences working with Korean ŏnni (older sister). Because I am a 
foreigner, I always feel shy around Koreans. But these Korean women were so nice to 
me. They came and talked to me. Even when I made mistakes, they gave a break and 
taught me again. In the break, they offered me a coffee, and saying “let’s get along well 
like ŏnni-tongsaeng (older sister and younger sibling).”       
              (Hong, Vietnamese immigrant, female, age 29) 
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As Hong’s comments show, the analogy of family structure helps to determine the hierarchies of 
workers.  According to age, workers often call each other brothers and sisters (i.e., hyŏng, ŏnni, 
tongsaeng) as if the company is an extended version of a family or a kin circle. Using family 
ideology for managerial practices is not rare to observe in East Asian countries. In Japan, for 
example, management often utilizes the idea of the company as a community or an extended 
version of kinship, which is often explained as intrinsic Japanese culture (K. Han 1991). 
Contrary to this cultural explanation, K. Han (ibid) observed that the management constantly 
emphasizes the family ideology to mitigate the labour unrest and to maximize the management’s 
control over their workers at a medium size business in Japan.   
Korean management and Korean workers expect a foreign worker or immigrant to adapt 
to the hierarchical work culture. According to this expectation, Korean management and Korean 
workers justify their use of panmal or swear words as a necessary managerial practice. When a 
foreign worker well accepts the hierarchical work culture, Koreans recognize the foreign worker 
as a younger brother or younger sister, who need care and guidance of the older Korean workers.  
I have illustrated how the Korean state’s business-friendly practices result in producing 
disadvantages for foreign workers in wages, labour protection, promotion, job security, and daily 
unjust treatments, thus reinforcing the discriminatory social position of foreign workers. Also, 
Koreans workers draw symbolic boundaries by stressing the ideals of a good worker and making 
their own moral judgements on the work ethic of foreign workers. Thus, these symbolic 
boundaries help Korean workers relocate themselves in the hierarchy of workers. Inferior class 
position and racial logic contribute not only to constructing foreign workers as flexible and 
docile workers, but also to drawing boundaries between Korean workers and foreign workers. 




5.5 Racialized Class Position: “Tongnama Nodongcha” (South and Southeast Asian 
Workers) 
Throughout the recent history of immigration, scholars have examined racialized class 
formation. For example, in the U.S., low-skilled, non-white immigrants tend to become a new 
urban underclass, which experiences relatively lower earnings and poverty (Clark 1998). 
Especially when the low-skilled immigrant workers are people of color, racial logics play a 
central role in drawing class boundaries by categorizing certain ethnic groups into lower-class 
position jobs (Bonnett 1998). Similarly, in South Korea foreign workers are seen to be taking the 
jobs that no one else wants, but also contributing to a higher unemployment rate for Koreans. In 
South Korea, the process of racialized class formation of foreign workers, more precisely South 
and Southeast Asian migrants, takes place.  
The term tongnama nodongcha (Southeast Asian worker) illustrates well how 
racialization and classification struggles take place simultaneously, beyond workplaces. Koreans 
often call foreign workers tongnama nodongcha with negative class and racial connotations, 
which implies their lower social status. The social position of foreign workers is described by 
their racial position as tongnama (South and Southeast Asian) and class position as nodongcha 
(worker, or labourer).  
To better understand the term tongnama nodongcha, we need to look at how nodongcha 
and factory workers are understood in Korea in general. Koo (2001) points out that although 
factory workers contributed significantly to South Korea’s rapid industrialization during the 
1960s and the1970s, these occupations were still regarded as low, menial, and unrespectable. 
The 1980s’ militant democratic unionism achieved comparatively higher wages and better job 
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security in the manufacturing industry, which led to the improvement of the societal image of 
factory workers in general (D. Kim 1995, Koo 2001). However, the negative evaluation of 
physical labour is still influential in the contemporary Korean occupational structure, partly 
because of the legacy of the traditional conception of physical work, and partly because of the 
comparatively poor working conditions and job security. In the contemporary Korean labour 
market, the overall level of inequalities between regular and irregular workers is increasing 
(Chun 2009, Y. Kim 2015).  
In South Korea, job positions within the organizational structure not only determine the 
wages and working conditions but are also crucial to achieving social recognition and respect in 
the broader society (Y. Kim 2015). Therefore, while some of the stigmas were reframed by 
workers’ struggles to assert pride and confidence in one’s identity as a factory worker, the stigma 
persists around this category and has been revitalized with the prevalence of foreign workers in 
3D manufacturing jobs. Even within factory work, the world of regular work in the major 
factories like Hyundai Motors, Kia Motors, and Samsung is an impossibility for foreign workers 
who are mostly employed in small and medium-sized factories which are mostly subcontractors 
of the major factories, or the second subcontractors of the first subcontractors.  
In this context, tongnama nodongcha, who are considered as occupying the bottom of the 
vocational structure, experience a lack of social respect and racial discrimination in Korean 
society. Udaya explains how he felt differently about himself after he quit factory work:  
 
Well, the difference between working for factory and now is, when I worked for 
factories, Koreans looked down on me because they only saw me as a factory labourer 
and migrant worker who come here to sell his labour. But now I have a residency visa 
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after marrying a Korean. So, I can work as an office worker if I satisfy the qualifications. 
This is an absolutely wonderful thing. When I was a factory worker, I was like a dust ball 
on the dirty floor. But now I feel like I am flying in the sky.    
  (Udaya, Nepalese male immigrant, age 30) 
 
Korean factory workers often express a feeling of pity for tongnama nodongcha because of the 
discriminatory conditions those workers endure. However, Korean workers, who work with 
foreign workers at small factories, are also very likely to experience some degree of 
disadvantage in terms of wages and treatment compared to regular workers (jŏnggyujik) in major 
factories like Hyundai Motors, Kia Motors, or Samsung. Therefore, pitying tongnama 
nodongcha helps Korean workers escape from their own degraded social positions as factory 
workers, as they reposition themselves above the foreign workers from China, South and 
Southeast Asia within the hierarchy of workers.  
 As the Korean government imports foreign workers and immigrants from China, South 
and Southeast Asia to fill the unattractive minimum-wage jobs, these workers take over the 
lowest stratum of the labour market. This means that they have gradually replaced the position of 
the lower-tier working class, as their status now implies not only inferiority in class positions but 
also in racial positions.   
 
5.6 Against the Racialized Class Position 
The immigration and labour migration policy, and deteriorating labour market conditions play a 
crucial role in helping the Korean split labour markets manipulate ethnic and racial antagonism 
between Korean workers and foreign workers. Under such circumstances, foreign workers have 
199 
 
resisted the racialized class position of tongnama nodongcha. I found that there are several 
different strategies from micro-level individual strategies to more organized collective actions. 
This shows how migrant workers or immigrant workers navigate the complexity of racialization 
in the workplace.  
     Several migrant interviewees, mostly who were once foreign migrant workers but later 
acquired residency after marrying Korean citizens, eventually left the manufacturing job world, 
or plan to leave. In addition to Udaya, who took office work in order to not embarrass his wife, a 
Bangladesh immigrant, Ali was planning to open a South Asian food supply store near the 
industrial complex. A Filipina immigrant, Carole who got married to a Korean man, did not mind 
working at factories, but her Korean husband did not want her to work as a factory worker. He 
explained the reason saying that “you know, I know, and everyone knows that only jobs that a 
woman from tongnama countries can take are factory jobs or cleaning works. But I don’t want 
my wife to get looked down on and neglected.” He was planning to open a small nail shop for his 
Filipina wife when he saves up enough money. Their strategy is opting out of the manufacturing 
job world. These immigrants could leave or plan to leave the manufacturing world mainly 
because they have immigrant status as spouses of Korean citizens.  
    However, not everyone can opt out of the system of exploitation in the manufacturing job 
world. Most foreign migrant workers who came to South Korea with three to five-year contracts 
accept a certain degree of discrimination and exploitation because they know that they will go 
back to their home countries with some savings when their contracts end. These foreign workers 
see that their low position in Korean society as just a temporary phase of their life. I found that 
these foreign migrant workers also look down on and pity Korean factory workers who are most 
likely less educated, and who may not be able to leave the factory world for the rest of their life. 
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In the egg factory, Vietnamese workers told me that “we will be okay when we go back to 
Vietnam. We work for the factory only for three years, and we can bring some good money back 
home, but maybe ŏnni (older sister, referring to me) has to work in a factory forever to make 
ends meet. I feel really sorry for you.” Several Vietnamese workers in the room nodded their 
heads to agree with her. These foreign workers accept the racialized class position because they 
know that it is a temporary position for them.  
     While most foreign workers develop strategies at the individual level, such as opting out 
of the factory work and accepting the low position temporarily, some foreign workers are more 
actively involved in organized political actions through foreign migrant workers’ advocacy 
groups. There are several foreign workers’ organizations which are closely working with human 
rights advocacy groups in Ansan-Siheung area. For example, with the help of a foreign migrant 
workers’ advocacy group - the Earthians’ Station, Cambodian foreign migrant workers created a 
group called “Sa-ma-com” to help other foreign migrant workers and to promote Cambodian 
culture in South Korea. Sa-ma-com helped the Korean advocacy group to hold several media 
conferences to disclose inhumane working conditions that foreign farm-workers from Southeast 
Asian countries face. These foreign workers stay in South Korea only for three to five years. 
Since members’ turnover is quite frequent, there are clear limitations on their activities. 
However, they supported the anti-racism protests and attended the convention of World Migrants 
Day in South Korea.      
 
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter sheds a different light on Udaya’s story about being a foreign worker, with which I 
began this chapter. As a foreign worker in Korean people’s eyes, Udaya contends with a social 
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world that subjects him to racialized stigma in a hierarchical social status order. In this racialized 
social status order, Koreans assumed that Udaya is poor, unskilled and has lower levels of skills 
and aptitudes when compared to Korean workers and Korean-Chinese. Even though Udaya holds 
a university degree and he had experiences working with the UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme) in Nepal, he is looked down upon. This racial stigma also subjects 
him to outsider status. As an outsider in the Korean workers’ community, he is not the 
beneficiary of workers’ solidarity and reciprocity by his Korean co-workers. Moreover, his self-
worth is constantly mediated by powerful forms of racial stigma, and eventually, it led him to 
choose a lower-paid job for a higher social position in Korean society.  
This chapter has examined the creation of a new underclass - racialized foreign migrant 
workers in South Korea. These migrants have gradually formed at the bottom of the traditional 
working class, assuming the position of the new underclass. I argue that diverse strategies of 
boundary making are used in the creation of this new underclass in the South Korea’s spilt labour 
markets. In this chapter, I have also explored how South Korea’s split labor market is created 
along two inter-related dimensions: 1) employment status under the expansion of precarious 
employment categories and Korean guest worker programs (EPS and the industrial trainee 
system) for migrants and 2) ethno-racial status, which is primarily determined by shared 
language, ethnicity, and skin color.  
First, the dimension of employment status shows how downgraded forms of employment 
are crucial for understanding the construction of foreign workers as the new "underclass," and 
their economic marginality and social exclusion in South Korea. Korean workers draw symbolic 
boundaries between Korean workers and foreign workers, and among Korean workers as well by 
using the vocational hierarchies.  
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Second, the dimension of ethno-racial status demonstrates how Korean workers use skin 
colour, language, and ethnicity to draw symbolic boundaries between Korean workers and 
foreign workers. Not all Korean workers are managers or white-collar workers in the 
manufacturing industry. However, Korean workers often assume their authority over foreign 
workers, and they also assume that this is the main reason why Korean workers should get paid 
more than foreign workers even when they carry out very similar tasks. Therefore, the politics of 
managerial practices reveal how business owners utilize racial logics to justify the long working 
hours and low wages of immigrants and foreign migrant workers in split labour markets. At the 
same time, daily interactions between Korean workers and foreign workers show how cultural 
distinctions contribute to constructing the superiority of Korean workers as white-collar or 
supposedly closer to managerial positions, and the inferiority of immigrants and foreign migrant 
workers as substitutes for the traditional working class.  
Reproducing and maintaining South Korea’s split labour market through hierarchical 
boundary making indicates the inequality in the labour market. At the same time, the ideology of 
race/ethnicity and nationality is embedded in constructing foreign workers, especially in this 
racialized class position of tongnama nodongcha symbolically as the new underclass. 
The Korean State plays an important role in making underclass foreign workers through 
the Korean guest worker program (Employment Permit System, or EPS), and business-friendly 
labour practices. Until the 1980s, small and medium-size Korean factories could survive severe 
global competition through the cost-cutting strategy of using a cheap Korean workforce. Now 
immigrants and foreign migrant workers have replaced this segment of the Korean workforce.  
  This chapter contributes theoretically to an extended discussion of the political economy 
of racialization, which produces inequality in the labour market as well as in the broader society. 
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By incorporating boundary making into labour market theory, this chapter contributes to a body 
of scholarship that updates Bonacich’s (1972) influential split labour market theory. This chapter 
shows that South Korea’s split labour markets are actively created and reproduced through 
boundary making practices by multiple actors (the Korean state, supervisors, and co-workers) on 
multiple scales from national labour immigration policy to business community demands, to 
everyday interactions. The division among workers in the Korean labour market shows how the 
ideology of race/ethnicity and nationality is embedded in constructing foreign workers, 
especially tongnama workers as a racialized “underclass” in Korean society. These findings ask 
for further analysis of the global and local inequalities that underpin the racial formation of 







Chapter 6: Conclusion – A Global Racial Hierarchy 
On June 30th, 2018, several hundred South Korean citizens held an anti-Yemeni refugee protest 
in the heart of Seoul, South Korea. Only 70 meters away, an anti-racism vigil was held as a 
counter-protest. These events were in response to the sudden arrival of 500 Yemeni men two 
months earlier on Jeju Island - a visa-free tourist island just south of the Korean mainland. The 
anti-Yemeni protesters denounced the ‘fake’ refugee applicants and called for South Korea’s 
secession from the 1951 Refugee Convention. Denying they were racists, the protestors argued 
that South Korean citizens and children needed protection from Yemeni men, who were likely to 
steal jobs and disturb the social order. This anti-refugee group also posted an online petition to 
appeal to the Blue House (the Korean presidential house). Within only two months, over 700,000 
South Korean citizens supported this petition: the second most supported petition since the Blue 
House started the online petition program in 2017.  
At the same time, counter-protestors at the anti-racism vigil down the street held pickets 
with messages that read “Welcome Refugees”, “Refugee Lives Matter”, or “Implement the 
Refugee Convention.” These participants believed that the anti-refugee protest revealed racism 
and xenophobia toward migrants in general. They argued that discriminatory treatments toward 
migrants and refugees are a result of racist views.  
The fact that South Korean citizens organized an anti-refugee protest is somewhat 
unusual because it is typically foreign migrant workers, migrant women, and refugees that 
organize protests and vigils, with the help of the South Korean advocacy groups. Indeed, from 
the mid-1990s there have been frequent foreign migrant workers’ sit-in struggles and protests 
against labour exploitation, the annual migrant workers world convention, migrant women’s 
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vigils against sexual and domestic violence, and annual anti-racism protests. These protests 
indicate that migrants are experiencing inhumane treatments and discriminations.  
As the above cases reveal, South Koreans are aware that their country is in transition 
from an ethnically homogenous society to a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, and that 
there exists discrimination toward migrants. However, the majority of Koreans still do not see 
this as racial discrimination. Instead, they believe that this is a problem of prejudice or 
stereotyping. In general, South Koreans still believe that they cannot be racists. From this 
perspective, racism is a problem of white people and a problem of the U.S, Europe, or South 
Africa. 
However, as my research has detailed, a new racial category is being produced in South 
Korea, and this racialization process is taking place through interactions between South Korean 
people, foreign migrant workers, and marriage immigrants. This dissertation has examined the 
racialization of tongnama migrants in South Korea by looking at the institutional conditions, the 
family, the labour market, and society.  
 I found that exploitative capitalist practices in the Korean labour market and state-
facilitated gendered recruitment of foreign brides shape and reshape South Koreans’ 
understanding of this new racial category. These two interrelated factors - capitalist labour 
exploitation and patriarchy - work as a system for organizing migration flows and gender 
relations in South Korea. Therefore, the racial formation of tongnama migrants reinforces the 
marginalized social position of Southeast Asian migrants as cheap labour in the production 
market and as obedient wives in reproduction. As one of the strategies to survive severe global 
economic competition, migrants are racialized in order to create cheap and obedient workers. At 
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the same time, marriage immigrants are racialized in order to replace the traditional Korean wife: 
an essential component to maintaining patriarchal family relations.  
My findings show that several elements contribute to the process of racialization of 
tongnama migrants in South Korea: the Korean State, the South Korean cultural system, gender 
and patriarchy, and the Korean split labour market. These elements are interrelated and 
organically work towards the racialization of tongnama migrants in South Korea. 
   Concerning the role of the state: citizenship and Korean ethno-nationalism play an 
essential role in constructing migrants from South and Southeast Asia as tongnama. The Korean 
State and migration policies create the conditions for the racialization of migrants in South 
Korea. While the state and migration policies limit migrants’ rights so that migrants are 
differentiated from Koreans in the judicial system, Korean ethno-nationalism provides the 
cultural ideology for drawing boundaries between Koreans and tongnama migrants by 
emphasizing Korean ‘blood’ lineage as the most important element of becoming a member of the 
national community.   
The racialization of tongnama migrants occurred as South Korea’s economy became 
more deeply intertwined with the global economy. Thus, I consider the racialization of tongnama 
migrants as a post-industrial phenomenon. However, South Koreans’ understandings of new 
racial hierarchies, which includes tongnama migrants as a new racial category, did not suddenly 
appear in response to economic development. There are certainly Confucian ethos and residues 
of the authoritarian regime that provide cultural foundations for racialization in South Korea. 
This hierarchical culture is imbedded in everyday interactions among people, which in turn 
creates an acceptance for the hierarchical relations between Koreans and tongnama migrants. 
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Thus, racial logics are deployed within South Korea’s cultural system of hierarchies. This culture 
forms the basis for judging ethnic/racial others.  
Gender and patriarchy also contribute to the racialization process. More precisely,  
the inextricable relationship between patriarchy and racialization in the context of international 
marriages reveals that racial logics are mobilized to re-entrench patriarchal family relations as 
essential and ahistorical. In contemporary Korea, patriarchy becomes one of the domains through 
which rural farmers, working-class Korean men, and their families, recover their dignity and 
exercise power in the micro-sphere of the household. They do this by mobilizing foreign brides 
from Southeast Asia and China. In order to create the perception of Korean culture as 
conservative and homogenous, reproducing patriarchy depends on structural arrangements, 
social activities in the community, and everyday interactions in the family and extended 
kinships. Working-class and rural Korean men attempt to reproduce patriarchal family structures 
through marriage immigration with women from lower-income countries. At the same time, 
reproducing Korean patriarchy requires deliberately excluding foreign husbands, especially those 
husbands who came to South Korea as foreign migrant workers from lower income countries. 
Reproducing Korean patriarchy as essential and ahistorical requires minimizing the 
“foreignness” of foreign brides. Thus, Korean parents and husbands emphasize the cultural and 
racial similarities between specific groups of foreign brides and Korean women by emphasizing 
their traditional gender roles. On the other hand, the racial differences of foreign husbands are 
foregrounded in order to amplify their “foreignness” so that they are prevented from entering the 
Korean patriarchy. As a result, children of a Korean father and a foreign mother are seen as 
racially closer to Koreans than the children of a foreign father and Korean mother. Patriarchal 
racialization reinforces the continued ethno-racial belief in patriarchal blood lineage – the belief 
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that lineage passes down through the Korean father’s line. In this regard, the reconfiguration of 
racial hierarchies has a very critical role to play in reproducing patriarchy. The sharp contrast 
between these two categories of marriage immigrants shows how Korean ethno-nationalism and 
the continued belief in patrilineage results in patriarchal racialization.  
The labour market is another site where racialization takes place. The ideology of 
race/ethnicity and nationality is embedded in the process of constructing foreign workers as the 
new "underclass”, especially in the racialized class position of tongnama. The creation of this 
new “underclass” reveals that racial boundary making also works to reproduce and maintain 
South Korea’s split labour market. At the same time, South Korea’s split labour market is 
actively created and reproduced through boundary making practices by multiple actors at 
multiple scales from national labour immigration policy to business community demands, to 
everyday interactions. South Korea’s split labour market is created along two inter-related 
dimensions: 1) employment status under the expansion of precarious employment categories and 
Korean guest worker programs (EPS and the industrial trainee system) for migrants and 2) ethno-
racial status, which is primarily determined by shared language, ethnicity, and skin colour.  
    In sum, I found that there are four components mobilized in the racial formation of 
tongnama in South Korea. 
(1) physical characteristics (e.g., skin complexion, appearance, height) 
(2) a group’s class position (e.g., foreign migrant workers) 
(3) status in the gender and patriarchal social order 
(4) developmental status of the country of origin within the global economic hierarchy  
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Clearly, in South Korea, this new racial category is constructed through the emphasis of 
physical characteristics, a group’s class position, status in the gendered and patriarchal social 
order, and through the economic developmental status of the countries of those racialized.  
However, the racial formation of tongnama migrants is not only about the creation of a 
category. More importantly, the racialization process tells us about how racial hierarchies are 
produced and reproduced, and how racial hierarchies reinforce systems of inequalities in South 
Korea and beyond. In other word, the racialization of tongnama migrants is about the role of 
power in shaping the meaning and the boundary of racial categories, and the uneven distribution 
of power and resources. In this sense, the racialization of tongnama migrants changes the way 
South Koreans see themselves and others in hierarchal ways through racial logics. South Koreans 
see themselves as not only ethnically and racially distinct from tongnama migrants, but also as 
somewhat superior to them. These hierarchical thoughts are produced through social spaces and 
social relations: through the labor market, patriarchal family relations, education, and media. 
Therefore, the racialization of migrants matters to every individual in society. It not only reveals 
current ethnic and racial inequalities in the family, labour market, education, media, and society 
at large, but also how this racialization process will continuously shape and reshape social 
relations amongst all members of society. 
From an empirical perspective, my findings show how racialization - in a broader sense, 
racial formation - takes place in East Asia; where race has long been under-researched. These 
findings demonstrate that racial formation in South Korea shares similar racial logics with racial 
formation in European and white settler countries, such as an emphasis on the physical 
characteristics of groups, race as a group position, and the gendered racialization process. Yet, 
my findings also suggest that racial formation taking place in South Korea exhibits a different 
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trajectory from Euro-American racial formation. Different from the Euro-American experience, 
in South Korea, migrants’ countries of origin and the economic developmental status of these 
nations within the global economic order appears to be a critical factor in racial formation. Thus, 
the political economy of race is central for understanding the racialization of migrants in the East 
Asian context.  
Theoretically, therefore, the case of South Korea contributes to the theory of race by 
shedding light on the political economy of race and the importance of economic migration for 
theories of racial formation. After achieving comparatively successful industrialization and 
condensed capitalist development since the 1970s, the discourse of economic development 
became dominant in Korea. Therefore, it is not surprising that the discourse of economic 
development has been central to Koreans’ understanding of hierarchies of nations and countries, 
and in turn that this is often understood as the essential component for judging the superiority of 
self and inferiority of migrants in South Korea (N. Kim 2008, G. Han 2015). G. Han (2015) 
introduces the term ‘nouveau-riche racism’ to refer to emerging racial discrimination against 
migrants in South Korea. According to G. Han (ibid: 4), Koreans “not only use their capitalist 
production system to exploit foreigners, they feel they have the right to discriminate against 
others economically and beyond […] The poorer the nation a foreign worker comes from, the 
more (this worker) suffers from Korean xenophobia.” Thus, the racial formation of migrants in 
South Korea, and Koreans’ understanding of racial hierarchy, are a phenomenon of the post-
developmental society of advanced capitalism.  
Therefore, the political economy of race demonstrates a whole new dynamic of 
racialization and opens up a new way of understanding racial hierarchies on a global scale, at 
least from the South Korean perspective. South Koreans’ new understanding of racial hierarchies 
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is based on locally specific experiences within the East Asian context. However, this new 
understanding of racial hierarchies helps South Koreans to reposition themselves on a global 
scale. This new way of seeing racial hierarchies is inextricable from Koreans’ aspirations toward 
the broader world. In this sense, South Koreans develop a sense of global racial hierarchies, 
which inevitably sees the world as one system. 
The idea of a global racial hierarchy is thus a symptom of the racial inequality which 
contemporary global economic migration reveals. A global racial hierarchy is an ideological 
system based on conceived racial hierarchies and economic developmental status amongst states 
and regions that reflects an understanding of the world order through racial logic. My study has 
attempted to explain the new dynamics of race in a non ‘western’ context. Especially when we 
acknowledge the growing participation of Asia in the world economy and in geopolitics, we need 
a more global explanation to understand the new dynamics of racial formation and racial 
inequality that are now taking place everywhere.  
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: List of respondents  
 
    Ethnicity Birth     Sex  Notes     
Ali   Bangladesh 1984 M  undocumented → marriage immigrant 
Khan   Bangladesh 1972 M undocumented, foreign migrant worker  
Masum Bangladesh 1981 M undocumented, foreign migrant worker 
Udaya  Nepal  1984 M  labour counselor assistant, ex-factory worker    
Bhan   Vietnam 1979 F foreign migrant worker → marriage immigrant  
Chi   Vietnam ? F marriage immigrant  
Hong    Vietnam 1988 F marriage immigrant  
Ngoc   Vietnam           1984 F marriage immigrant     
Anne   Philippines 1986 F marriage immigrant   
Camilla Philippines 1974 F marriage immigrant  
Denny Ann Philippines 1990 F marriage immigrant 
Jennifer Philippines 1973 F marriage immigrant 
Rosie   Philippines 1988 F marriage immigrant  
Belle   Philippines 1959 F marriage immigrant  
Medellin Philippines 1980 F marriage immigrant 
Susanne Philippines 1982 F marriage immigrant 
Arun   Cambodia 1988 M foreign migrant worker 
Sita   Cambodia 1982 F marriage immigrant  
Sunhee Korean Chinese1979 F foreign migrant worker → marriage immigrant  
Yunhee Korean Chinese1978 F foreign migrant worker → marriage immigrant  
Sook   Korean-Chinese1977 F marriage immigrant 
Mr. Kim Korea  1956 M shuttle bus driver, ex-factory worker  
Mr. Park Korea  1976 M community educator, ex-factory worker   
Mr. Han Korea  1957 M taxi driver, ex-factory worker  
Mr. Sang Korea  1970 M pig farmer, ex-factory worker  
Mr. Nam Korea  1963 M factory worker 
Mr. Jang  Korea  1955 M factory worker 
Mr. Kang Korea  1969 M spouse of marriage immigrant   
Mr. Jo  Korea  1966 M spouse of marriage immigrant 
Mr. Chang Korea  1973 M executive production manager 
Mr. Choi Korean 1981 M Ex-labour agency manager 
Young-Hoon   Korea  1965 M spouse of marriage immigrant   
Mrs. Jeong Korea  1960 F ex-factory worker  
Mrs. Kyung Korea  1960 F ex-factory worker  
Mrs. Ko Korea  1977 F cooking class instructor 
Mrs. Seo Korea  1951 F factory worker 
Mrs. Choi Korea  1955 F ex-factory worker       
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Mrs. Kim Korea  1960 F  housewife, ex-factory worker   
Subin   Korea  1992 F university student, part-time work in factories  
Mrs. Hyun Korea  1960 F  housewife, ex-factory worker   
Mrs. Kong Korea  1967 F  housewife, ex-factory worker    
Mrs. Park Korea  1980 F  housewife, ex-factory worker      
Mrs. Sung Korea  1979 F  housewife  
Mrs. Joo Korea  1978 F housewife  
Mrs. Chun Korea  1979 F kindergarten caregiver, ex-nurse aid 
Mrs. Hwang Korea  1976 F  housewife, ex-factory worker    
Mrs. Sim Korea  1977 F housewife, ex-factory worker    
Ms. Yang Korea  1979  F housewife, sister-in-law of immigrant  
So-Young Korea  1974 F spouse of marriage immigrant 
Mrs. Sun Korea  1932 F mother in law of marriage immigrant 
Mrs. An Korea  1939 F mother in law of marriage immigrant   
Hye   Korea  1982 F spouse of marriage immigrant 
Mrs. Moon Korea  1940 F mother in law of marriage immigrant   
 
 
 < Officers, settlement center staff members, NGOs workers>   
 
Chan    Korean   M Earthians’ Station    
Gilsoo  Korean  M Koryoin Night School   
Meehee          Korean  F         Social enterprise - World Mom Ansan  
Jaehee  Korean  M Ansan Foreign Workers’ Center 
Heejin   Korean  F Ansan Foreign Residents’ Center    
Officer Kim Korean  F Ansan Police Station, W district branch 
Ryu    Korean  M Kimpo city Foreign Residents’ Center   





















: Interview guide  
 
Semi-structured interview script for immigrants (foreign wives and husbands)  
 
Topic of workplace 
 
Experience of migration 
1. What did you know about Korea before you came? 
How did you know about Korea? 
What was your impression of Korea? 
What did you expect your life in Korea to be like? 
 
2. Can you tell me a little bit about living in Korea in general? What are the difficult things 
about living in Korea? What are the positive things to living in Korea? 
 
3. Can you tell me a little bit about your life before you came to Korea? 
Where did you live?  
What did you do?  
What are the main reasons you decided to come to Korea? 
 
4.  Can you tell me a little bit about how you came to Korea? 
When did you get married? When did you come to Korea? How did you meet your 
husband or wife? 
 
Experience working with Koreans and other ethnic group members 
5. Can you tell me a little bit about how you started working for this company? 
When did you start to work for this company? 
Your job position is (       ), can you tell me a little bit about what your task is? 
  
6. What is the race/ethnicity of your friends in the factory? Who do you get along with best?  
 
7. Can you tell me a little bit about your experience of working with Koreans in this 
company? 
What are the good things about working with Koreans? Could you give an example? 
What are the challenges for you working with them? Could you give me an example? 
  
8. What are some of the differences between the Korean workers and the non-Korean 
workers in this company?  
A) What are the differences between Korean workers and non-Korean workers?  What 
are the main reasons you think that? Could you give me an example? 
B) You said that there is no difference between Korean workers and non-Korean workers, 




9. How would you describe employee relations between workers in this company? 
Between Korean workers? 
Between Korean workers and foreign workers in general? 
Between non-Korean workers? 
 
10. If you have any experiences working with Koreans in a previous company(ies), could you 
tell me a bit about that? 
A) What company did you work for? How was your experience working with Koreans? 
What were the good memories of working with them? What were the challenges (or 
bad memories) of working with them? What are the reasons for why you feel like 
that? 
B) Were there any other non-Koreans in that company? What were their nationalities? 
How was your experience with them? Was there any moment you felt that they were 
different (the same as you)? Can you give me an example?  
 
11. What are your dreams/goals about your near future?  
 
Questions on race 
12. In your opinion, how many different races are in Korea today including foreign races? 
Could you identify them? 
 
13. You said that there are (          ) races in Korea. What do you think about each race?  
How do they differ? 
What has been your experience with them? 
How would you feel if your son or daughter (sister or brother) got married to a person 
from the races you mentioned? (e.g., White, Black, Asian, “tongnama” etc.) 
  
14. Have you ever heard of the term “tongnama” or “tongnama” people? If so, what do you 
think about this term? 
Who belongs to “tongnama”?  
How are they different? 
Do you feel that you are “tongnama”? Do you have identified yourself this way? Why or 
why not? 
 
15. What images come to your mind when you hear the term “tongnama”? 
What was your experience with them? 
 
16. How do you define race? (What is race, in your opinion? What do you think of this based 
on? eg., appearance, culture, ancestry, gene, skin color, place where you were born?) 
Is (e.g: Filipino, Vietnamese etc) a race? 
Is Asian a race? 
Is “tongnama” a race? 
 





18. In your opinion, who should be eligible to get Korean citizenship? (English teachers, 
international students, foreign migrant workers, and foreign spouses) 
Could you tell me the reason? 
 
Topic of family 
19. Could you tell me a little about your family in Korea?  
 How many family members live together? Who are they? (e.g: wife, husband, brother-in- 
law, sister-in-law, mother-in-law, children etc.) What do they do?  
 
20. Can you tell me a little bit about living with Koreans as your family members? What are the 
positive things about living with Koreans? What are the difficult things about living with Kor
eans? (eg., what do you do with or for their family members? Do you cook all the meals for t
heir in-laws? Are you expected to serve them?) 
  
21. What experiences have made you feel different from your Korean family members? 
 Can you give me an example? What happened? 
 What are the main reasons you think that?  
 
22. Do you have any experiences of feeling that you were treated badly or unfairly by your 
Korean family members such as your spouse, parents-in-law, brother or sister-in-laws? 
  How do you think they view [whatever the respondent’s group is]? Do you think they have 
mostly positive attitudes toward them or mostly negative attitudes? Can you give me an 
example of when you felt this? How does this make you feel? 
 
23. Do you have any experiences of feeling like you were treated badly or unfairly by other 
Korean neighbors? 
 How do you think they view [whatever the respondent’s group is]? Do you think they have 
mostly positive attitudes toward them or mostly negative attitudes? Can you give me an 
example of when you felt this? How does this make you feel? 
 
24. If you have Korean citizenship or permanent residency, do you feel like you are Korean? If 
so, could you tell me the reasons? If not, could you tell me the reasons? 
 
25. If you have a child (or children), do you think that your child is Korean? Or do they share the 
same ethnic identity as you? Could you tell me the reasons? 
 
26. In the last national assembly election, Jasmin Lee, an immigrant from the Philippines was 
elected to the National Assembly for the first time in Korean history. What do you think 
about this? What does it mean to you? Can we say that this demonstrates acceptance of 
immigrants (foreign wives and foreign husbands) as members of Korean society?  
 




Semi-structured interview script for family: Korean spouse 
 
Part 1: Questions about family life 
 
1. Could you tell me a little about your family?  
 How many family members do you live together with? Who are they? (e.g:  wife, husband, 
brothers and sisters, brothers and sisters in law, parents, children etc) What do they do?  
 
2. What did you know about (country’s name of wife or husband) before you met your wife or 
husband?  
 What was your impression of this country? 
 How did you know about this country? Through what? 
 What did you expect of your life after marriage? 
 
3. Can you tell me a little bit about how you met your wife or husband? 
 When did you meet your spouse? Where did you meet? How was your experience from the 
first meeting to marriage? When did you get married? Were there any difficulties? 
(Difficulties of getting permission from parents and relatives, money etc) 
 
4. Can you tell a little about what your main concerns were, if any, when you decided to get m
arried to your wife or husband?  
 
5. Can you tell me a little bit about living with a foreign wife (or husband)? What are the good 
things about living with a foreign wife (or husband)? What are the difficult things to living 
with a foreign wife (or husband)? 
  
6. Do you have any experiences of feeling that your wife (or husband) is different from your 
Korean family members? 
 Can you give me an example? What happened? 
 What are the main reasons for thinking this?  
 
7. Do you have any experiences of feeling that your wife or husband gets treated a bit 
differently from other Korean family members such as your parents, brothers and sisters? 
How do you think they view [whatever the respondent’s group is]? Do you think they have 
mostly positive attitudes toward them or mostly negative attitudes? Can you give me an 
example of when you felt this? How does this make you feel? 
 
8. Do you have any experiences of feeling that your wife or husband is treated badly or unfairly 
against by Korean neighbors? (including experiences in shops, stores and community centers 
etc) How do you think they view [whatever the respondent’s group is]? Do you think they 
have mostly positive attitudes toward them or mostly negative attitudes? Can you give me an 




9. If your wife or husband has Korean citizenship or permanent residency, do you feel that she 
(or he) is Korean? If so, could you tell me the reasons? If not, could you tell me the reasons? 
 
10. If you have a child (or children), do you think that your child is Korean? Or do they share 
the same ethnic identity of your wife or husband? Could you tell me the reasons? 
 
11. Can you speak your spouse’s native language? How often do you use that language at 
home? What is your motivation to learning that language? If not, can you tell me the reason 
why you don’t learn that language? Do you have a plan to teach your spouse’s language to 
your children? If so, the reasons? If not, the reasons? 
 
12. Can you tell me a little about the social activities you do with your wife or husband? (eg. 
visiting relatives, dinner with neighbors, gathering with other couples, going out with other 
Korean friends, going out for drinks with Korean co-workers etc.) What occasions do you 
attend with your wife or husband How does your husband/wife fit in on these occasions? 
Have there been any difficulties? What occasions do you attend without your wife or 
husband? Could you give me an example? What are the reasons?  
 
13. Can you tell me a little bit about the good memories of living with your spouse? 
 
14. What are your plans or hopes about your near future?  
 
 
Part 2: Questions on race 
 
15. In your opinion, how many different races are in Korea today including foreign races? 
 Could you identify them? 
 
16. You said that there are (          ) races in Korea. What do you think about each race?  
How do they differ? 
What has been your experience with them? 
How would you feel if your son or daughter (sister or brother) got married to a person 
from the races you mentioned? (e.g., White, Black, Asian, “tongnama” etc.) 
 
17. Nowadays some people use the term “tongnama”. Have you heard of this term before? If so 
what was the situation? What do you think about this term? Have you ever heard 
‘tongnama’ from your family members or relatives to refer to your wife or husband? If so, 
can you tell me about the situation? 
 
18. Who belongs to “tongnama”? How do they differ? Does your wife (or husband) belong to 
“tongnama”? 
 
19. What images come to your mind when you hear the term “tongnama”? 
 What was your experience with them?  




20. In your opinion, what makes a Korean Korean? What are the differences between Koreans 
and the groups that you mentioned previously? 
 Are foreign wives Korean? Could you tell me the reason? 
 Are foreign husbands Korean? Could you tell me the reason? 
 Are the children from a Korean husband and a foreign wife Korean? Could you tell me the 
reason? 
 Are the children from a Korean wife and foreign husband Korean? Could you tell me the 
reason? 
21. How do you define race? (What is race, in your opinion? What do you think of this based on? 
(eg., appearance, culture, ancestry, gene, skin color, place where you were born?)  
 Is (e.g: Filipino, Vietnamese etc) a race? 
 Is Asian a race? 
 Is “tongnama” a race? 
 
21. “Do you agree with the statement ‘There are biological races in the species homo sapiens’?” 
22. In your opinion, who should be eligible to get Korean citizenship? (English teachers, 
international students, foreign migrant workers, and foreign spouses) Could you tell me the 
reason? 
 
23. In the last national assembly election, Jasmin Lee, an immigrant from the Philippines was 
elected to the National Assembly for the first time in Korean history. What do you think 
about this? What does it mean to you? Can we say that this demonstrates acceptance of 




Semi-structured interview script for family: Korean family members of immigrants (in-
laws and relatives) 
 
Part 1: Questions on family life 
 
1. Could you tell me a little about yourself?  
 
2. What did you know about (country’s name of wife or husband) before you met (OOO)? 
What was your impression of this country? 
How did you know about this country? Through what? 
 
3. Can you tell me a little about what your main thoughts were when you heard about this ma
rriage? Could you give me an example? Why did you think that?  
 
4. What concerns, if any, do you still have about this marriage? Or about (OOO)? What are t
he main reasons?  
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What concerns did you have before that you don’t have any more about (OOO)? What ar
e the main reasons? 
 
5. Do you have any experiences of feeling like OOO is different from other Korean family 
members and relatives? Can you give me an example? What happened? 
What are the main reasons you think that?  
 
6. If  OOOO  has Korean citizenship or permanent residency, do you feel that she (or he) is 
Korean? If so, could you tell me the reasons? If not, could you tell me the reasons? 
 
 
Part 2: Questions on race 
 
7. In your opinion, how many different races are in Korea today including foreign races? 
Could you identify them? 
 
8. You said that there are (          ) races in Korea. What do you think about each race?  
How do they differ? 
Do you have any chance to see them? (talk or work with them?) 
What was your experience with them? 
How would you feel if your son or daughter (sister or brother) got married to a person 
from the races you mentioned? (e.g., White, Black, Asian, “tongnama” etc) 
 
9. Nowadays some people use the term “tongnama”. Who belongs to “tongnama”? How do 
they differ? Do you consider OOO to be tongnama?  
 
10. What images come to your mind when you hear the term “tongnama”? 
What was your experience with them?  
 
11. In your opinion, what makes a Korean Korean? What are the differences between Koreans 
and the groups that you mentioned previously? 
Are foreign wives Korean? Why or why not? 
Are foreign husbands Korean? Why or why not? 
Are the children from a Korean husband and a foreign wife Korean? Could you tell me 
the reason? 
Are the children between a Korean wife and foreign husband Korean? Could you tell me 
the reason? 
 
12. How do you define race? (What is race, in your opinion? What do you think of this based 
on? (eg., appearance, culture, ancestry, gene, skin color, place where you were born?)  
  Is (e.g: Filipino, Vietnamese etc) a race? 
  Is Asian a race? 




13. “Do you agree with the statement ‘There are biological races in the species homo 
sapiens’?” 
 
14. There are many foreigners in Korea nowadays, such as English teachers, international 
students, foreign migrant workers, and foreign spouses. In your opinion, who should be 
eligible to get Korean citizenship? Could you tell me the reason? 
 
15. In the last national assembly election, Jasmin Lee, an immigrant from the Philippines was 
elected to the National Assembly for the first time in Korean history. What do you think 
about this? 
 
Semi-structured interview script for workplace: Foreign migrant workers 
 
Part 1: Experience working with Koreans and other migrants 
 
1. What did you know about Korea before you came? 
How did you learn these things about Korea? 
What was your impression of Korea? 
What did you expect your life in Korea to be like? 
 
2. Can you tell me a little bit about how you started working for this company? 
When did you start to work for this company? 
Can you tell me a little bit about what your task is? 
 
3. What is the race/ethnicity of your friends in the factory? Who do you get along with best?  
  
4. Can you tell me a little bit about your experience of working with Koreans in this 
company? 
What are the good things about working with Koreans? Could you give an example? 
What are the challenges for you working with them? Could you give me an example? 
 
5. What are some of the differences between the Korean workers and the non-Korean 
workers in this company?  
A) What are the differences between them?  What are the main reasons you think  that? 
Could you give me an example? 
B) You said that there is no difference between them, what are the main reasons you 
think that? Could you give me an example? 
6. How would you describe employee relations between workers in this company? 
Between Korean workers? 
Between Korean workers and foreign workers in general? 




7. If you have any experiences working with Koreans in a previous company(ies), could you 
tell me a bit about that? 
C) What company did you work for? How was your experience working with Koreans? 
What were the good memories of working with them? What were the challenges (or 
bad memories) of working with them? What are the reasons for why you feel like 
that? 
D) Were there any other non-Koreans in that company? What were their nationalities? 
How was your experience with them? Was there any moment you felt that they were 
different (the same as you)? Can you give me an example?  
 
8. Can you tell me a little bit about living in Korea in general? What are the difficult things 
about living in Korea? What are the positive things? 
 
9. What are your dreams/goals for your near future?  
 
Part 2: Questions on race 
 
10. In your opinion, how many different races are there in Korea today including foreign 
races? 
Could you identify them? 
 
11. You said that there are (          ) races in Korea. What do you think about each race?  
How do they differ? 
What has been your experience with them? 
How would you feel if your son or daughter (sister or brother) got married to a person 
from the races you mentioned? (e.g., White, Black, Asian, tongnama etc) 
  
12. Have you ever heard of the term “tongnama” or “tongnama” people? If so, what do you 
think about this term? 
Who belongs to “tongnama”? 
How are they different? 
Do you feel that you are “tongnama”? Do you have identified yourself this way? Why or 
why not? 
 
13. What images come to your mind when you hear the term “tongnama”? 
What was your experience with them? 
 
14. How do you define race? (What is race, in your opinion? What do you think of this based 
on? eg., appearance, culture, ancestry, gene, skin color, place where you were born?) 
Is (e.g: Filipino, Vietnamese etc) a race? 
Is Asian a race? 




15. Do you agree with the statement ‘There are biological races in the species homo 
sapiens’? 
 
16. In your opinion, who should be eligible to get Korean citizenship? (English teachers, 
international students, foreign migrant workers, and foreign spouses) 
Could you tell me the reason? 
 
 
Semi-structured interview script for workplace:  Korean co-workers 
 
Part 1: Experience working with immigrants and foreign migrant workers 
 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about how you start work for this company? 
When did you start to work for this company? 
Your job position is (             ), can you tell me little bit about what your tasks are? 
  
2. Can you tell me a little bit about your experience of working with immigrants and foreign 
migrant workers in this company? 
What are the good things about working with them? Could you give an example? 
What are the challenges of working with them? Could you give me an example? 
 
3. Could you tell me if there are any moments when you feel that they are different from 
working with Koreans in this company? Could you give me an example? 
In your opinion, what are the main reasons for these differences? 
 
4. How would you describe employee relations between workers in this company? 
Between Korean workers? 
Between Korean workers and foreign workers (immigrants and foreign migrant workers) 
in general? 
Between different ethnic groups within immigrant and foreign migrant workers? 
 
5. Based on your experience, are there differences between people of different nationalities 
in the company when you work with them? or is there no difference between them? 
Prove:  
A) What are the differences between different nationalities?  What are the main reasons 
for this? Could you give me an example? 
B) You said that there is no difference between different nationalities, what are the main 
reasons for why you say this? Could you give me an example? 
 
6. If you have any experiences working with foreigners in previous company(ies), could you 
tell me a bit about that? 
What company did you work? What kinds of foreigners did you work with (immigrants, 
foreign migrant workers, or undocumented workers)? What were their nationalities? How 
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was your experience with them? Was there any moment you felt that they were different 
(the same as Korean)? Can you give me an example?  
 
Part 2: Questions on race 
 
7. In your opinion, how many different races are in Korea today including foreign races? 
Could you identify them? 
 
8. You said that there are (          ) races in Korea. What do you think about each race?  
How do they differ? 
Do you have any chance to see them? (talk or work with them?) 
What has been your experience with them? 
How would you feel if your son or daughter (sister or brother) got married to a person 
from the races you mentioned? (e.g., White, Black, Asian, ‘tongnama’ etc.) 
  
9. Have you ever heard of the term “tongnama” or “tongnama” people? If so, what do you 
think about this term? 
Who belongs to “tongnama”?  
How are they different? 
 
10. What images come to your mind when you hear the term “tongnama”? 
What was your experience with them? 
How would you feel if your son or daughter (sister or brother) got married to one of 
them? 
 
11. In your opinion, what makes a Korean Korean? What are the differences between 
Koreans and the groups that you mentioned previously? 
Do you consider foreign wives Korean? Could you tell me the reason? 
Do you consider foreign husbands Korean? Could you tell me the reason? 
Do you consider the children from a Korean husband and a foreign wife Korean? Could 
you tell me the reason? 
Do you consider the children from a Korean wife and foreign husband Korean? Could 
you tell me the reason? 
 
12. How do you define race? (What is race, in your opinion? What do you think of this based 
on? eg., appearance, culture, ancestry, gene, skin color, place where you were born?) 
Is (e.g: Filipino, Vietnamese etc) a race? 
Is Asian a race? 
Is “tongnama” a race? 
 





14. There are many foreigners in Korea nowadays, such as English teachers, international 
students, foreign migrant workers, and foreign spouses. If you can select people from 
these groups as Korean citizens, which groups do you want to give Korean citizenship?   
 Could you tell me the reason? 
 
15. In the last national assembly election, Jasmin Lee, an immigrant from the Philippines was 
elected to the National Assembly for the first time in Korean history. What do you think 
about this? What does it mean to you? Can we say that this demonstrates acceptance of 
immigrants (foreign wives and foreign husbands) as members of Korean society?  
 
